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INTRODUCTION 
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One of the main concerns of pregnant women is the wellbeing of the foetus. 
Until relatively recently pregnancies took their natural course. Women could do 
little or nothing to assure a health child beyond a healthy lifestyle and diet. 
Reassurance about the health of the foetus or confrontation with a disabled 
child came only with birth. Scientific and technological developments in the 
area of prenatal testing have open up new novel opportunities for choice and 
control in human reproduction. Nowadays women have the possibility to obtain 
potentially significant information about the health status of their foetus during 
pregnancy and to choice in some extent the desirable characteristic of their 
offspring.1 
Prenatal testing includes both diagnostic and risk assessment procedures. 
The diagnostic tests provide certainty about whether or not the foetus has a 
disability. Current available diagnostic tests are chorionic villus sampling (CVS) 
and amniocentesis (AMN). CVS is performed between the 10th and 14th week of 
gestation through either transcervical or transabdominal removal of a sample of 
the placental tissue (chorionic villi). AMN is usually performed in the second 
trimester of pregnancy (between 15th and 18th week of gestation) through a 
transabdominal aspiration of a small amount of amniotic fluid. Because of the 
invasive character of AMN and CVS, they are associated with a risk of 
miscarriage of 0,3 % -0,8.2 Other risks of these tests include bacterial infection 
and foetal injury.2"5 Hence, it is customary to reserve the invasive diagnostic 
procedures for pregnancies deemed to be a high risk for certain foetal genetic 
conditions. These risks include being of advanced maternal age (from 36 years 
and more), having had a previous child with a congenital anomaly and having a 
family history of congenital defects5 
Conventionally, the assessment of the risk of the foetus being affected by a 
certain disease or condition is determined through prenatal screening. During 
the period in which this study was carried out, the most commonly used 
prenatal screening tests included the Nuchal Translucency Measurement (NTM) 
and the Maternal Serum screening test (alpha-foetoprotein, human chorionic 
gonadotropin, and unconjugated estriol; MST). These screening tests provide 
information about the risk of the foetus having Down syndrome and other 
trisomies.3"1'1 NTM is performed in the first trimester of pregnancy (at 10th and 
14th week of gestation). It involves the determination of gestational age and 
measurement of the thickness of the nuchal translucency zone. The deviation of 
the nuchal transluceny from what is normal at the gestational age together with 
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the woman's age-related risk produces an individualised risk estimation of the 
foetus having Down's syndrome. The sensitivity of the NTM is about 70 to 75 % 
with a specificity of 95%. 3 '7 ·1 1 -1 3 MST is a blood test that is performed in the 
second trimester of pregnancy between the 6th and 18th week of gestation.10,11 
An unusual high level of these three serum markers in the mother's bloodstream 
combined with the maternal age and the woman's age-related risk indicates the 
individualised risk of having a foetus with Down syndrome or neural tube 
defects. The sensitivity of MST is about 60 to 70% with a specificity of 95%. 
6,7,9,14 
An advantage of prenatal screening is that it does not involve any physical 
risks for the mother or the unborn child. A "normal" result from prenatal 
screening means that fewer women undergo further invasive testing reducing 
the number of miscarriages caused by invasive diagnostic.3 
Concerns in relation to prenatal screening involve the difficulty to interpret 
the odds of the screening tests. The possibility of false positives and negatives 
makes the assessment of the screening results more difficult.15,16 Since 
screening only estimates a woman's risks for having an affected pregnancy, 
further diagnostic is needed to confirm the presence or absence of the screened 
condition. Once a woman has this information she must decide whether she 
wants to take the risks of invasive diagnostic and what is the right option 
according to her moral beliefs and values in case of a confirmed disability. The 
point should also be made that many of these decisions are bound by time 
constraints.17 
These facts have led disability group advocates and liberal feminists to claim 
that prenatal screening is actually not providing women greater autonomy in 
their reproductive decision making/'18,19 but rather is placing pressure on 
women to assure the birth of a healthy child.20 23 
Prenatal screening in the Netherlands 
While prenatal screening for Down syndrome and neural tube defects became 
accepted as part of standard prenatal care in most western countries a decade 
ago12,24, health policy in the Netherlands has been reluctant to make screening 
available to all pregnant women. At the time the data for this study were 
collected (2002-2004), prenatal screening (NTM and MST) was not offered as 
part of prenatal care. The Population Screening Act (Gezondheidsraad: 
Commissie WBO, 1996) was enforced to protect people from screening for 
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serious conditions for which no cure or prevention exists. As termination of 
pregnancy is not regarded as neither treatment nor prevention population based 
prenatal screening by risk assessment tests was not allowed by law. 
Consequently, a specific license for prenatal screening was required. Only 
women with a higher risk for having a child with a congenital anomaly were 
offered invasive diagnostic tests. Women under the age of 36 or without specific 
risks could have a screening test if they asked for it and if they paid for the test 
themselves.25"28 
This approach in which pregnant women outside the risk groups could have a 
test only at their own initiative presented two mayor disadvantages: 1) the age 
limit for the provision of prenatal screening deprived young women from 
knowledge that would help them to make better informed decisions regarding 
invasive diagnostic and 2) it could lead to inequality between those women who 
are well-informed and often better educated and those women who are not 
well-informed.27,28 
From January 2007 onward, however, the policy has changed. Nowadays 
Dutch caregivers are legally obliged to inform each pregnant woman, regardless 
of her age, about the options for prenatal screening. Women who express 
interest in prenatal screening should be provided with both verbal and written 
further information about methods for foetal screening and diagnostic with the 
emphasis on voluntary participation. Women in the risk group may directly 
choose for CVS or AMN. Women under the 36 year and with not known risks are 
only eligible for risk assessment tests. Cost of these test are still reimbursed 
only for women in the risks groups. The costs of diagnostic tests are reimbursed 
for women younger than 36 of the screening result indicates an increased risk.29 
The decision of the Dutch parliament of expanding information about 
prenatal screening to young women has been debated for over two decades.25 
27,3o,3i
 C r u c j a l t 0 t h i s debate were the ethical, social and cultural aspects 
associated with an unsolicited test offer. 
While prenatal screening is commonly presented as offering new 
reproductive choices for women (and their partners)17,32"35, one of the main 
concerns of the Dutch parliament regarding the introduction of nationwide 
prenatal screening program was the negative impact that an unsolicited test 
offer could have on women's reproductive autonomy and ethical decision 
making. Despite the fast technological development of means for detecting 
affected foetuses, the possibilities for antenatally curing congenital diseases of 
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foetuses are still very limited. The only options which are generally available to 
a woman following detection of an affected foetus are either termination of 
pregnancy or preparing for the birth of a disabled child.36,37 Consequently, an 
active offer of prenatal screening might force women to make value-laden 
decisions about the life of the foetus, bringing them into complex ethical 
dilemmas.2023 
Contributing to the discussion about the coercive character of the choice 
was the idea that incorporation of screening into routine prenatal care leads to 
médicalisation of pregnancy transforming it from a normal and joyful period to 
a risk-dominated and technology guided event.38 This is a development that is 
contrary to the traditional support given in the Netherlands to a 'natural 
approach' to pregnancy and delivery.39,40 
Autonomy of the choice 
At the basis of the debate about the desirability of expanding prenatal 
screening to all pregnant women is the assumption that women have an 
indisputable right to autonomous reproductive choices. Two different views 
about the effect of an active offer of prenatal screening on the women's 
reproductive autonomy and ethical decision making can be distinguished. 
Defenders of a standard offer of prenatal screening are of the opinion that 
more knowledge about the health of the foetus gives pregnant women the 
opportunity to enhance their reproductive autonomy.32 This assumption is based 
on the rule that for rational individuals more choices are always preferred to 
less choices or no choices at all. According to this line of thinking, women 
should be informed of all the tests available in order to enable them to make 
informed, objective decisions about their need for prenatal testing.12,4147 
Depriving women of the possibility of performing prenatal screening, would thus 
restrict their autonomy by impending their access to the detection of serious 
malformations and therefore to abortion and other options.48 
For their part, opponents of the standard offer of screening to all pregnant 
women claim that an unsolicited offer does not provide women with greater 
autonomy but rather restricts their scope for deciding themselves whether they 
want to know all possible deficiencies in their child. Women to whom screening 
is offered cannot avoid making a decision about whether or not to use to test. 
25,27
 The obligatory character of the choice, might place pressure on women to 
make use of the available means to ensure the birth of a healthy child 4 1 ·4 4"4 8 
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forcing them to make decisions that meet society's norms and values.4'20'4960 
Therefore, they argue that autonomy would be respected only when women ask 
for screening themselves. Only in this case, the request would reflect their 
personal values without pressures due to the expectations of family, 
practitioners, friends and society at large.61 
New choices and new dilemmas 
One of the arguments of the Dutch Government against a nationwide prenatal 
screening programme was that an unsolicited test offer might bring women into 
a moral dilemma when considering having the test performed or not. This 
dilemma was sketched as follows: since there is no therapy available for most of 
the screened disabilities, women receiving abnormal results are forced to make 
a choice between two equally binding and mutually exclusive ethical principles, 
namely the moral duties of "respecting the life of the unborn" and "avoidance 
of suffering". These two principles support two incompatible options: 1) 
bringing the pregnancy to term, implying direct responsibility for the suffering 
of a disabled child; or 2) opting for abortion and therefore violating the right to 
life of the foetus.25"27,29 The impossibility to foresee either the degree of 
suffering or the consequences of a disability makes it more difficult to 
determine what is the right choice from a moral perspective. 
Added responsibility 
Debates about the women's right to make their own reproductive decisions 
highlight the double-edged nature of this desire for reproductive autonomy.62,63 
More knowledge entails more choices: a choice whether or not to take the test 
and subsequently a choice on whether or not to abort a disabled child. Whereas 
in earlier times the birth of a disabled child was just bad luck, the development 
of prenatal screening has turned disability into something that could have been 
prevented making parents morally responsible for the burdens of a disability on 
the child itself, their family and society at large.1,64 
While the prevention of disabled children do not form the main objective of 
prenatal screening, the decision of the Dutch parliament to offer information 
about the test to all pregnant women makes the prevention of children with the 
screened disabilities the express responsibility of individual pregnant women. 
According to Tijmstra, women would become more and more dependent on 
medical technology and related expertise, feeling more and more weighed 
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down with the responsibility for the full term of the pregnancy and the 
outcome.38 
Need for empirical moral evidence 
The growing consensus is that women will only benefit from the test offer when 
they are able to make an autonomous decision in accordance to their ethical 
values and beliefs.33,34 However, little attention has been paid to the impact of 
women's ethical beliefs on decision making. Most of the studies on women's 
motives for accepting or declining prenatal screening tests, principally focus on 
the psychological and emotional aspects of decision making.17,65 75 Other studies 
focus on the influence of culture and religion. These studies are limited to 
groups with strong religious convictions.7679 Consequently, although it is 
assumed that the ethical values of parents also play an important role in 
decision making,51,80,81 their precise significance is not sufficiently clear. The 
concrete impact of women's ethical beliefs in decisions regarding prenatal 
testing needs to be addressed in order to determine under which conditions the 
offer of prenatal screening can be justified from an ethical viewpoint. 
Objective of this thesis 
The aim of the study presented in this thesis is twofold. First it aims to highlight 
the impact of a test offer on the women's reproductive autonomy. In 
accordance with the ethical principle of autonomy, decisions regarding 
screening should be guided by the woman's own ethical beliefs and values 
without any external influence coming from the views and interests of other 
persons. Therefore, it is important to determine the ethical considerations 
behind decisions regarding the use of prenatal screening and whether women to 
whom prenatal screening has been offered decide according to their own 
ethical values and beliefs. 
A second aim of this study is to assess the effect of an unsolicited test offer 
on the women's views on their moral duties toward their offspring. 
In order to explore the conceptual framework of this thesis we addressed 
four central research questions that come to the fore in the Dutch debate: 
1. What are the women's ethical views regarding prenatal testing and control 
of the offspring characteristics? What is the concrete impact of these ethical 
beliefs on decision making regarding participation in prenatal screening? 
(chapter 2 and 3) 
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2. Does an unsolicited offer of a prenatal screening test impede women to 
decide according to their ethical beliefs and preferences? Can we say that 
the test offer is a threat for the autonomy of the woman? (chapter 4) 
3. Does the test offer compel women to choose between two or more equally 
demanded (ethical) norms and values that require different and exclusive 
choices, bringing them into an ethical dilemma? (chapter 5) 
4. Which is the impact of the availability of prenatal screening on the woman's 
views regarding their moral duties towards their offspring? (chapter 6). 
Answer to these questions will provide an original contribution to existing 
studies on women's reasons and motivations for using prenatal screening and to 
existing debates about the desirability of expanding an active test offer to all 
pregnant women. 
Methods 
The study presented in this thesis is a qualitative study that forms part of a 
larger research project, which was a randomized controlled trial (RCT) carried 
out at the VU Medical Centre between May 2001 and April 2004. The RCT aimed 
to investigate risk perception, decision making and the psychological wellbeing 
of pregnant women who are offered prenatal screening.66'82"β4 
Participants were enrolled from 44 midwifery and gynaecology practices all 
over the Netherlands, between May 2001 and April 2004. Exclusion criteria of 
the RCT were: a gestational age of more than 16 weeks and command of the 
Dutch language. Women who gave informed consent were randomized into two 
intervention groups and a control group. Women in the first intervention group 
were offered a defects a NTM for Down syndrome; women in the second 
intervention group were offered a MST for Down syndrome and neural tube 
defects; women in the control group received normal care at that moment in 
the Netherlands (no offer). The test offer consisted of an information booklet 
sent to the participants at home and an oral explanation by the midwife or 
gynaecologist. The booklet contained information about the particular screening 
test, the disorder(s) screened for, the possible test outcomes and the options 
available in case of an increased risk. 
Data collection took place through postal questionnaires at different points 
in time during and after pregnancy: before any information about screening was 
given (T1); after a prenatal screening test was offered but before it was 
performed (T2); after the test result was know or at a comparable time for 
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women in the intervention group who declined the screening test and for those 
in the control group (T3); at the last trimester of pregnancy (28th week) (T4); 
and within two months after delivery (T5). During the inclusion period, 4077 
pregnant women were asked to participate in the study. A total of 2986 women 
(73%) gave informed consent. To protect anonymity, each woman was allocated 
a numerical code. 
A subgroup of participants of the RCT was randomly selected for 
participating in the qualitative study (n=140). These women received an extra 
questionnaire with open ended questions at T I , T4 and T5. The questionnaires 
included questions about the women's ethical views regarding the selection of 
the offspring's characteristics and abortion. In questionnaire T4 we included 
additional questions about their feelings regarding the test offer and the 
decision they made. An additional question concerning their view about the 
right decision in case of a foetus with Down syndrome was included. In 
questionnaire T5 we asked participants whether they would make the same 
decision in a next pregnancy and the reasons for their decision. This 
questionnaire was directed to assess whether the availability of prenatal 
screening leads women to believe that they have a moral duty to accept testing 
A total of 130 women returned questionnaire T1 (63 from the MST group and 67 
from the NTM group). A total of 117 women returned questionnaire T4 (60 from 
the MST group and 57 from the NTM group). A total of 111 women (44 from the 
MST-group and 67 from the NTM-group) returned the T5 questionnaire. 
Some participants who were in the process of deciding about testing (T2) 
were also randomly approached for participating in a face to face semi-
structured interview (n=81). The aim of the interview was to obtain deeper 
insight into the consideration that women make when deciding about the 
acceptance of a prenatal screening. Participants were asked by phone to make 
an appointment within a week after the test offer was received and before the 
test would eventually be performed. In total 59 women (26 from the MST group 
and 33 from the NTM group) agreed to be interviewed. 
As this thesis was aimed at exploring the ethical aspects of decision making 
of women to whom a prenatal screening test was offered, and the participants 
in the control group were not offered prenatal screening, only data of pregnant 
women in the intervention group were used. 
An overview of the different times of data collection and number of 
participants in is given in table 1. 
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Outline of this thesis 
Chapter 2 explores the role of the women's individual ethical beliefs and moral 
norms in decision making regarding the use of prenatal screening and their 
impact on the final decision. Under the notion of ethical beliefs we understand 
personal values, moral standards, intuitions, sentiments and views about what 
is right and wrong in topics related to reproductive issues. Our leading question 
was: "which, if any, is the impact of the women's personal ethical beliefs and 
moral norms in decision making?" For this analysis we used data from the semi-
structured interviews performed with participants who were in the process of 
deciding about the acceptance of screening (T2). 
The analysis of the semi structured interviews showed that considerations 
about the legitimacy of intervening in the course of nature were taken into 
consideration when deciding about the acceptance of the test offer. In chapter 
3 we analyses what women exactly mean when they appeal to nature and the 
impact of those meanings on decision making. Data for this analyse were 
collected from the semi-structured interviews performed at T2. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of an active offer of prenatal screening on 
women's autonomy. The question we aimed to analyse in this chapter was: does 
the offer of prenatal screening impede women in making autonomous choices? 
To answer this question we explored whether women to whom a test was 
offered, decided freely according to their personal values and beliefs or were 
on the contrary compelled to make a certain kind of choice by both external -
i.e. the opinion of important ones, social or cultural expectations- and internal 
pressures- i.e. emotions, doubts and wishes - raised by the test offer. Data for 
this chapter were collected from the above mentioned semi-structured 
interviews. (T2) 
Chapter 5 explores the possible conflicting aspects in the choice regarding 
the acceptance of prenatal screening. The main aim of this chapter was to 
analyse whether women confronted with a test offer face a (genuine) moral 
dilemma. Like the previous chapters semi-structured interviews provided the 
data for this chapter. In order to detect possible (moral) conflict we analysed 
the interviews for expressions of doubt and worry, conflicting duties, needs and 
wishes. 
Chapter 6 looks at the impact of an unsolicited prenatal screening test on 
women's believes about their parental duties. The central question in this 
chapter was whether the availability of prenatal screening leads women to 
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believe that they have a moral duty to test. Data for this chapter were 
collected from the open ended questionnaire sent at T5. 
Chapter 7 includes a case study that show a change in ethical views and 
attitude to prenatal screening by a woman who declined the offer of the 
screening test during our study and delivered a child with Down syndrome. 
In Chapter 8 the implication of the findings of this study for ethical theory and 
clinical practice are discussed. 
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Table 1 : Schema of data collection. 
Data 
collection 
TI 
T2 
T4 
T5 
Time 
Before prenatal 
screening has been 
offered 
During decision making 
about the acceptance 
of the screening offer 
In the last trimester of 
pregnancy 
Within two months 
after delivery 
Approach 
Open ended questionnaire 
with items about 
participants' ethical views 
regarding the selection of 
the offspring's 
characteristics and abortion. 
Semi-structured interview 
with items about: 
- Participants' reasons for 
their decision. 
-Participants' ethical views 
regarding the selection of 
the characteristics of the 
offspring and abortion. 
Open ended questionnaire 
with questions about: 
-Participants' ethical views 
regarding the selection of 
the offspring's 
characteristics and abortion 
in case of a foetus with 
Down syndrome. 
- Participants' ethical views 
regarding the offer of 
prenatal screening and 
regarding the decision they 
made. 
Open ended questionnaire 
about: 
-Participants' opinion on the 
test offer 
-Participants' decision in a 
next pregnancy 
- Participants' ethical views 
on the significance of 
testing within their parental 
duties and rights 
Participants 
N= 130 (63 from 
the MST group 
and 67 from the 
NTM group) 
N= 59 (26 from 
the MST group 
and 33 from the 
NTM group) 
N=117(60from 
the MST group 
and 57 from the 
NTM group) 
N= 111 (44 from 
the MST-group 
and 67 from the 
NTM-group) 
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Abstract 
Prenatal screening for Down syndrome and other chromosomal anomalies has 
become common obstetrical practice. The purpose of this intervention is to 
provide women with the information needed to make informed reproductive 
choices. It is assumed that the ethical beliefs of the women play an important 
role in decision making about whether to undergo testing or not, but little is 
known about their precise significance. More insight into how women 
conceptualise their choice of using prenatal screening tests may clarify the 
impact of personal ethical beliefs. With this aim, we conducted qualitative 
research consisting of semi-structured interviews with 59 women in the 
Netherlands who were offered a prenatal screening test. 
Analysis of the interviews revealed that the ethical views between acceptors 
and decliners showed similar diversity. In contrast with the currently accepted 
view, we conclude that ethical beliefs are one of the factors implicated in the 
decision. Women decide about prenatal screening by balancing the information 
provided by the test against the risks of further investigation, the emotional 
burden of a disabled child on their wellbeing and life perspective, as well as on 
those of family members. Normative moral principles are introduced once the 
choice is made, namely as factors in justifying and supporting the decision. 
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Introduction 
Prenatal screening for Down syndrome and neural tube defects has become 
common obstetrical practice in many countries.1,2 The purpose of this 
intervention is to provide women with information in order to enhance their 
reproductive choice.3 An important ethical condition for the introduction of 
prenatal screening is that women decide according to their own values and are 
able to come to terms with their decision.4 
Since no treatment is available for the defects detected by the test, women 
receiving a prenatal screening offer are thought to be confronted with ethical 
questions about the value of a disabled life and their parental responsibilities 
regarding an affected foetus. Therefore, the women's ethical beliefs assumingly 
play a leading role in the decision on prenatal testing.5"7 The aim of the present 
study is to explore the impact of the woman's personal ethical beliefs on 
decision making regarding prenatal testing. Under the notion of ethical beliefs, 
we understand the total set of personal values, moral standards, intuitions, 
sentiments and views about what is right and wrong. 
Many studies have been performed on women's motives for accepting or 
declining prenatal screening tests. Some of these studies principally focus on 
the social, psychological and emotional aspects of decision making.816 Other 
studies focus on the influence of culture and religion. These studies are limited 
to groups with strong religious convictions.17"20 Little attention has been paid to 
the impact of ethical beliefs on decision making in Western secular societies. In 
many countries prenatal screening has become normal antenatal care. This may 
impede women to contemplate the ethical norms related to reproduction and to 
decide in consequence. Consequently, the concrete role of women's ethical 
beliefs in decisions regarding prenatal testing is not sufficiently clear. 
In contrast to other countries, prenatal testing was still not part of normal 
antenatal care in the Netherlands at the time our study was performed. 
According to the Population Screening Act (PSA; 1996), the Dutch population 
needs to be protected against screening programs that could be a threat to 
psychological or physical health. Prenatal screening for serious and untreatable 
disorders was supposed to be such a threat and is therefore not allowed by law. 
Only women with an increased risk of giving birth to a disabled child due to 
advanced maternal age or a medical indication were allowed to be offered 
prenatal testing. Although it was forbidden to offer testing to women without 
an increased risk, tests were allowed if women requested the test themselves. 
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Since January 2007, this policy has changed in so far that women with normal 
risks can be informed about available tests, but the tests are not reimbursed. 
The prohibition on the explicit offering of prenatal tests made it possible to 
study the effects of such offering in a randomised controlled trial. The RCT 
enrolled 1968 pregnant women from 44 midwifery and gynaecology practices all 
over the Netherlands. The study was carried out at the EMGO Institute of the VU 
University Medical Centre (VUMC). Exclusion criteria were: a gestational age of 
more than 16 weeks, and no command of the Dutch language. Participants were 
randomised in two intervention groups and one control group. One intervention 
group was offered a Nuchal Translucency Measurement (NTM) for Down 
syndrome (n=729). The other intervention group received a Maternal Serum 
screening Test (MST) for Down syndrome and NTD (n=670). The control group 
(n=569) received normal antenatal care without any test offer. The purpose of 
the RCT was to assess the decision making of women when confronted with a 
prenatal test offer, the psychological effects of the decision and its 
consequences. Data collection took place through questionnaires about the 
personal reasons for accepting or declining the test.21,22 A special permit for 
explicitly offering of prenatal screening was granted by the Minister of Health, 
under the PSA. The study was also approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of 
the VUMC. 
A qualitative study was developed in conjunction with the RCT in order to 
get more insight into the impact of ethical beliefs on decision making. 
Methods 
In the qualitative study, we focused on the ethical topics that women take into 
consideration when deciding about prenatal screening. 
Participants of the RCT, who were in the process of deciding whether to 
accept the offer, were asked by phone to participate in an interview. 
Participants were randomly selected and asked to make an appointment within 
a week after the test offer was received and before the test would eventually 
be performed. We approached 81 women from the intervention groups. Since 
our purpose was to study the impact of ethical beliefs on decision making after 
being confronted with a test offer, we did not include participants of the 
control group because a test was not offered to its members. 
In total 59 (of 81) women (26 from the MST group and 33 from the NTM 
group) agreed to be interviewed. The reasons for declining the interview were 
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lack of t ime (n=16) and the impossibility of making an appointment before 
performing the test (n=4). Two women (n=2) refused because of the nature of 
the subject. 
The demographic characteristics of the interviewees, compared to the group 
of participants in the RCT, are summarised in Table 1. The interviewed group 
resembles a representative sample of all the women participating in the 
quantitative research project, when compared to social status, level of 
education, age and religious conviction. 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of women participating in the present 
study and of the total participants' group. 
Interview sample Total participants 
(n=59) (n=1399) 
NTM=33 MST=26 NTM=729 MST=670 
Age 
<35 
>35 
Educational level 
High 
Middle 
Low 
Marital status 
Married 
Cohabitating 
Single 
Number of children 
0 
1 
2 
>3 
Religion 
45 
14 
25 
23 
9 
39 
19 
2 
29 
20 
7 
3 
Active 1 
Somewhat .,_ 
active 
Inactive 18 
Without religion 29 
NTM: Nuchal Translucency Measurement; MST: Maternal Serum screening test. For the 
interview sample, the totals of degree of religiosity and educational level do not add up 
to 59 because of missing values on these questions. For the total sample, the totals of 
age, marital status, degree of religiosity, and educational level do not add up to 1399 
because of missing values on these questions. 
1.227 
123 
579 
616 
165 
925 
448 
24 
602 
574 
163 
60 
58 
255 
412 
668 
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Interviews 
Interviews were carried out at the participant's home. We decided to interview 
only women because we assumed that this might facilitate a more open 
discussion. Furthermore, some of the women included in the study were single. 
We included a question in the interview regarding the opinion of the partner 
and its effect on the woman's final decision. The interviews were conducted by 
E. Garcia and two professional interviewers ascribed to the VUMC. Interviews 
were recorded and transcribed with permission. To protect anonymity, each 
woman was allocated a numerical code. 
All interviews followed the same semi-structured plan, with two 
distinguished parts. Firstly, we started with open-ended questions about the 
women's reasons to accept or decline the screening test. Special attention was 
paid to other topics emerging in responses and identified as important by the 
participants. We studied the contribution of others on the decision making, by 
explicitly asking the women which persons they had approached and the 
influence of their opinion upon their final decision. Secondly, we extended the 
dialogue to ethical topics considered to be of importance in making a choice 
about prenatal testing in general (not only on prenatal screening) such as, 
"worth of a life with a disability", "parental rights and responsibilities", "moral 
status of the foetus" and "abortion".23'24 
The interview questions were assessed for their intelligibility after 
performing the five first interviews. No adaptation was needed. 
Data analyses 
Interviews were qualitatively analysed using a two-steps inductive approach. In 
a first analysis, we looked for the reasons women reported for accepting or 
declining the test offer. The second part of the interview was coded according 
to the themes discussed. The themes were then sorted into sub themes 
according to the different views that emerged from the responses, using the 
assistance of computer software N-Vivo (Nudist-Vivo, 2.0, Q.SR software, 
Durham, UK). 
After some adaptations, the different ethical items were finally organised 
into nine main categories. The resulting categories were then discussed by 
other researchers participating in the RCT-study. To test the reliability, the first 
three interviews were analysed by other researchers. Differences were found in 
fragments admitting a double coding among "being against abortion", "parental 
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responsibility to respect the life of the unborn", "accepting the child 
unconditionally" and "accepting their own destiny". 
After some discussion, these differences in interpretation were resolved. 
Results 
Before we present the ethical reasons that are involved in the decision making 
process, we give a summary of the test uptake and the reasons given for 
accepting and declining the test offer based on the RCT study. Then we will 
proceed with the results of the qualitative study. 
Test uptake among participants 
Table 2 gives the distribution of acceptors and decliners. The overall 
acceptance was 46% among the RCT participants and 35% among the 
participants of the qualitative study. No reason was found for this difference 
and it may be attributed to coincidence. The NTM test acceptance (36%) among 
interviewers was significantly lower than in the RCT (53%). More concordance 
was found in the MST update with 34% of the women interviewed accepting the 
test offer, comparing with 38% test uptake of the total participants. 
From the RCT study it becomes clear that no differences were found 
between the two intervention groups with respect to the diversity of reasons in 
the acceptance or denial of the test offer.21'22 
Table 2. Test uptake of the interview sample in comparison with the total 
participants group. 
Prenatal test 
offer 
NTMa 
MSTb 
Accepting screening 
Total 
participants 
387 (53%) 
254 (38%) 
Interview 
sample 
12 (36%)c 
9(34%) 
Declining screening 
Total 
participants 
342 (47%) 
416 (62%) 
Interview 
sample 
21 (63%)d 
17 (65%)e 
a
 Nuchal Translucency Measurement. 
b
 Maternal Serum screening test. 
c
 One of the participants has not performed the test because there was no place in the 
hospital. 
Two participants declined the screening test because they wanted to perform 
amniocentesis. 
e
 One participant preferred to perform an NTM offered by the gynaecologist 
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Reasons for declinin$ 
The reasons for declining the screening offer are given in Table 3. These reasons 
coincided with those given by the interviewees who declined the offer. 
There was one difference between the data from the RCT and the 
qualitative data. Opposing abortion was a reason against screening for only 15% 
of the participants of the RCT. Nevertheless, analysis of the qualitative data 
showed that all interviewees (100%) mentioned unwillingness to decide about 
termination of pregnancy in the case of Down syndrome as an important factor. 
Down syndrome was described as being not serious enough for justifying 
termination. The impossibility of controlling everything and concerns about the 
acceptability of intervening in the natural outcome of pregnancy were 
mentioned in the interviews as additional reasons for declining. 
Practical reasons, such as the difficulty in making an appointment at the 
hospital and the lack of time, were also reported as extra reasons by a minority 
of the decliners (2/39). Two participants declined the screening test because 
they opted for amniocentesis. 
Table 3. Overview of the reasons for declining screening. 
Reasons for declining screening One of the reasons Decisive reason 
(n=758) (n=500) 
Inaccuracy of the test 42 22 
Anxiety 36 13 
Adverse characteristics of diagnostic ,_ .. 
test 
No wanting to perform abortion 15 13 
Acceptance destiny 16 10 
Non necessary 35 12 
Practical reasons 7 6 
Reasons for acceptance 
Reasons for accepting the test offer are given in Table 4. In the qualitative 
study, acceptors gave fewer reasons to accept the test compared to the 
decliners. This finding was not confirmed by the RCT analysis. 
None of the acceptors mentioned the finding of Down syndrome or abnormal 
conditions as reason for using the screening. The qualitative study showed that 
desiring more knowledge about the health of the foetus is related to the desire 
to obtain reassurance and to exclude worries during pregnancy. This differs 
The impact of ethical beliefs on decisions about prenatal screening tests 33 
from the quantitative results where the desire to obtain reassurance was 
reported only by 8% of the women as a reason for testing. 
Table 4. Overview of the reasons for accepting screening. 
Reasons for accepting screening One of the reasons Decisive reason 
(n=641) (n=353) 
Favourable characteristics of the 
Screeningtest 18 15 
Gaining knowledge 50 29 
Basis for deciding about diagnostic test 36 21 
Personal risks 15 12 
Wanting a healthy child 5 5 
Reassurance 8 4 
Results from the qualitative study 
The ethical beliefs were divided into nine categories on the basis of the topics 
discussed in the second part of the interviews. The results are given by referring 
to acceptors and decliners and to all participants where the whole study group 
is meant. As a key to the presentation of interview data in the following 
sections, Κ indicates a participant recruited from private midwife practice and 
Ο indicates a participant recruited from a hospital-based midwife practice; 
these letters are followed by the number assigned to the practice, then the 
number assigned to the interviewee and finally information on whether the 
interviewee had accepted or declined the MST or NTM. 
Parental responsibilities 
All participants described their parental responsibilities in terms of protection, 
care and guaranteeing their children and themselves an adequate quality of 
life. Prenatal screening was described as a free personal option. Women felt 
compelled to avoid situations and habits during pregnancy that might endanger 
the health of their offspring, such as smoking and drinking. The main reason for 
not considering screening as a parental obligation was that the test does not 
give sufficient information for further decisions. 
"It seems to me to be far too complicated to make a choice or take 
a decision. Suppose they say it is not good. Well, to what degree 
then? And it seems to me to be far too difficult to say I will not do 
it, or I am going to have it tested, or I will have taken it away. I 
don't know." (K194-150; NTM-acceptor) 
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Both women accepting and declining the test described their parental 
responsibilities as being context dependent. All of them admitted that their 
choice could be different in different circumstances. 
Control of offspring's qualities 
A perfect child was described as an unachievable ideal. Still, participants were 
of the opinion that parents have a right to decide whether the child's 
characteristics fit their life, according to their personal situation and based 
upon what they consider good. This includes selection of those children they 
think they are able to care for. 
"In principle I agree that parents have the right to make that 
choice, because while the government might indicate that you 
cannot have an abortion in case of a child with Down syndrome and 
in fact, the parents are convinced that they cannot deal with 
having a child with Down syndrome, what kind of a life would such 
a child have? No life either, even if it has but a small disability. So 
I do think that in principle it is something for the parents to 
decide." (K037-101; MST-decliner) 
All participants agreed that unconditional acceptance of children is the most 
praiseworthy approach. 
"/ admire that. I have incidentally read about two women, one was 
about thirty-eight or something and the other was forty-two and 
both were having a baby without considering taking a test. And I 
do think that is admirable. I am not sure what I would do myself. 
It is really difficult to say. But indeed, I admire them for taking 
things the way they are. " (0609-079; NTM-decliner) 
All participants worried about the obsession with physical perfection in society. 
They feared that prenatal testing would be used as a eugenic means, leading to 
the commodification of children. 
"/ think that these things are part of life, so I would dislike it if 
people were to say on a given moment that if the child has a risk 
of being deaf, we do not want him anymore, or if the child has 
freckles I do not want him. " (K188-189; MSTM-acceptor) 
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There was one difference between acceptors and decliners. It had to do with 
the significance attached to the avoidance of Down syndrome, while knowing 
that other anomalies can also be present. 
Interest of the child 
The interest of the child was formulated in terms of happiness, quality of life 
and being loved. All participants connected the child's happiness with the 
possibility of developing a satisfactory and autonomous life, according to 
accepted social standards. 
"The most important thins for me> thinkins about my child, is that 
he can be independent and make his own choices and that he can 
be happy in life, and I find that very difficult in the case of a child 
with Down syndrome." (K034-074; NTM-acceptor) 
Closely related with this view, participants also agreed that not-to-be born 
could be the most acceptable option; when a reasonable normal life cannot be 
reached because of the seventy of the disability. In case of less severe 
disabilities, the future happiness of the child was described as depending on the 
degree of acceptance by the parents and of their capacity to love such a child. 
"Yes, it is only fair to such a child, because if the parents really 
are convinced that they cannot raise such a child yet they would 
have it, then a child like that can never be happy. Nor the parents, 
in fact. But the child would not. Then I am afraid such a child will 
end up beins the victim of the situation within the family, or very 
soon outside the family. So then I think that the child itself is not 
better off to be born with parents who do not want him. " (K037-
101; MST-decliner) 
The difference between acceptors and decliners had to do with their 
assessment of the information provided by the test, in relation to the best 
interest of the child. Acceptors considered it as a means to ensure a good life 
for their child. Decliners considered avoiding unnecessary risks for the foetus as 
the most rational action in the best interest of the child. 
Status and foetus' right to life 
All participants defended the right to life of all foetuses, even those who did 
not consider the foetus as a real child. However, the right to life of the foetus 
was not reported as absolute and to be protected in all cases. Participants 
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supported the right to life of the unborn child as being subordinated to the 
quality of life of the child itself and to the wellbeing of their family members. 
"In principle I think that they have the right to exist, but / do 
think that as a parent you should have the choice to decide 
yourself what you want and in how far you want to go. " (K372-051; 
MST-acceptor) 
Participants differed in their opinions about when the foetus has to be 
considered a human being. The opinions fluctuated between the moment of 
conception and the moment on which they could feel the foetus. Paradoxically, 
all participants defined abortion or miscarriage in the first months of pregnancy 
as the loss of a real child. 
The value of a life with disability 
During the conversation about screening tests, none of the participants 
mentioned experience with neural tube defects. Discussion about the 
disabilities detected by prenatal screening was limited to a possible child with 
Down syndrome. 
Children with Down syndrome were described as mostly happy and with a 
reasonable quality of life, even if they might suffer from other physical 
disabilities, such as heart and breathing problems. 
"Children with Down syndrome always smile and are cheerful. Of 
course, they are moody now and again but then again So I am. But 
in general they are very happy people. " (K303-119; MST-acceptor) 
All participants agreed that a disabled child might help family members to cope 
with adversity and to appreciate the worth of little and irrelevant things. 
"But even then, I think, you can learn a great deal from these 
situations. That in life sometimes things happen through which you 
become more aware that little things mean a lot. And I find that 
very essential." (K188-189; MST-acceptor) 
In spite of this opinion, participants shared a concern about the burdens that 
they and other family members could face when a disabled child is born, due to 
the special attention the child requires, such as more worries, lack of attention 
for other children, more financial costs and loss of time for other activities. 
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"But suppose it is severely disabled or multiple disabled. Firstly 
you cannot do that to your other children, because all the 
attention will go to this child and you will hardly be able to handle 
this child yourself. Meanwhile, what is the quality of life of such a 
baby? It is undoubtedly very important, to what extent they are 
able to say somethins regarding thai for themselves." (K194-144; 
NTM-acceptor) 
A negative factor has to do with the social discrimination they might face. 
Women complained about the fact that everybody would look at them, even 
when they expected they could cope with the emotional and physical burdens 
of a child with Down syndrome. 
"Yeah, I think so and this is not so much determined by yourself, 
but mostly by your environment. Your child is not normal, but it is 
still your child. And you may be happy with it, but everybody says 
oh god, / am so sorry for you, whereas you may be perfectly happy 
with it. And even when it grows up, it will still remain that siri or 
boy with Down syndrome, instead of the child next door. " (KISS-
US; MST-decliner) 
An important difference between acceptors and decliners was the emotional 
impact they expected from a disabled child. Women who accepted the test 
considered the care for a disabled child as an unbearable emotional and 
physical burden to them and their family. Women declining the test trusted that 
they could emotionally cope with an affected child and take care of it. 
Views on abortion 
All participants shared similar ideas about the ethical acceptability of abortion. 
Nobody evaluated it as something absolutely wrong. All of them considered that 
it might be ethically justified in extreme cases. For instance, in case of a 
severely disabled with a short life expectancy. 
"Well, you should not cross a certain line. There ought not to be a 
choice between havins a boy or a siri. I think that is just not 
acceptable. But in case of somethins Me, let's say, very severe 
diseases, or so, then I think it is just r/g/it that abortion is 
possible." (K236-147; NTM-decliner) 
Termination in the case of Down syndrome was reported to be a little egoistic. 
Nevertheless, participants reported it as ethically permissible when parents 
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cannot take care of a disabled child, or when they cannot cope with the 
burdens that such a child can have on their personal and family life. 
"Well, I would personally consider myself egot/st/c. And why? Yes, 
the child itself has no say in anything. You have not even seen it, 
you do not know anythins yet and still you would terminate the 
pregnancy. Well, you choose for yourself and not for the child, at 
that time. The child may have a nice fine life, but I do think that 
it would be a bis burden. But you can have the same with other 
children. A child does not necessarily have to have Down 
syndrome, for that matter. So I do consider it somewhat 
egot/st/c." (K236-167; MST-acceptor) 
The difference between acceptors and decliners had to do with their perception 
of the relation between abortion and prenatal screening. For decliners, prenatal 
screening goes hand in hand with abortion. Therefore, women who showed 
reluctance to consider termination, did not consider prenatal screening as an 
acceptable option for themselves. According to their opinion, testing is only 
useful for women who plan to terminate pregnancy. 
"If you take a test you make beforehand the decision to terminate 
pregnancy if you hear that you'll get a child with Down syndrome. 
I think that you take a test with the purpose to terminate your 
pregnancy. And for me it doesn't matter if it is a Down syndrome 
child. " (K037-079; NTM-decliner) 
Although acceptors did not exclude termination of their pregnancy in the case 
of a confirmed diagnosis, they did not directly associate testing with the 
possibility of abortion. Most of them opted for waiting for further diagnostic 
tests before making a decision. Acceptors who reported that they did not want 
to terminate pregnancy, described the test as useful information for making a 
better choice concerning invasive diagnostics and for preparing themselves for 
the birth of a child with Down syndrome. Those acceptors who indicated they 
would opt for termination gave as reason their commitments to other children 
and their own life perspective. Still, they reported abortion as an experience 
they personally preferred to avoid. 
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"/ trust that ;'t is normal, I mean that my chance is normal for my 
age. If the screening results $ive a higher risk, well I'll think what 
to do at that moment. I do not really know. I don't think I'll say I 
do not want the child anymore. But, I don't know. I'll decide at 
that moment." (K383-176; NTM-acceptor) 
Moral authority of nature 
All participants shared as a common belief the conviction that everything that 
happens has a meaning and that we cannot always overcome destiny. 
Furthermore, participants believed that "defective" foetuses would be 
eliminated through spontaneous abortion by natural selection. 
"You should sometimes accept that certain things are meant to be, 
and which you should deal with, perhaps. It sounds quite 
philosophical, but I think you just cannot avoid all difficulties. 
That it will backfire at you somehow. I strongly believe that you 
have a certain fate and certain things happen because of that and 
you should learn from them. " (K037-095; NTM-acceptor) 
The difference found between acceptors and decliners has to do with their 
willingness to interfere in the course of pregnancy. Women declining are of the 
opinion that nature has to take its course and described the healthy status of 
the foetus as destiny. 
"I am convinced that nature has to take its course. You should not 
mess with faith by performing so many tests beforehand, when 
there is no reason to do so." (K236-142; NTM-decliner) 
For their part, acceptors defined the test offer as a possibility to control nature 
and to interfere in the outcomes of pregnancy in order to guarantee a good life 
for themselves and their children. 
"/ think that when you talk about these cases, of having no life 
expectancy, for example, then I think that if nature does not do 
its job, you should decide for yourself. " (K037-096; NTM-acceptor) 
Parenthood and the meaning of children in their life 
Having children is described as a personal project that must fit with one's 
personal life's project. 
Participants described having children in terms of enrichment. They 
considered children as a projection of the parents themselves and a source of 
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joy in spite of the expected difficulties and responsibilities in parenthood. Even 
though children were reported as important, participants added that they were 
not absolutely necessary for their own happiness. 
"I have a partner, but one remains an individual. I know a lot of 
people think I should stop exoggeroi/ng, bui / believe that the 
moment you have a baby, you have duplicated yourself, more or 
less. You produce a little human being. I think that is just so 
beautiful, so exceptional even. For no one else could have made 
my daughter, or my son. I am the only one, together with him. " 
(K372-061; NTM-decliner) 
Having healthy children who can enjoy a happy and good life was reported as 
the underlying aim of reproduction. Both acceptors and decliners agreed that an 
affected child would be an impediment for completely realising the values of 
parenthood. 
Participants claimed the personal right to have children even by recurring to 
technological methods when reproduction is not possible in the normal way. 
This right was considered to disappear when parents are not able to care for 
and raise the child. 
The difference between acceptors and decliners had to do with their perception 
of the personal recourse to technological control to fulfil their reproductive 
desires. Women who considered children as gifts from God or nature were more 
reluctant to make use of prenatal testing. Participants who saw children as a 
personal right, considered the use of technical methods for control of the 
characteristics of their offspring as ethically acceptable. 
Standard access to prenatal testing 
Participants showed positive attitudes towards the offer of prenatal screening, 
independently of whether they wanted to make use of it or not. Testing was 
considered as ethically acceptable as long as it does not introduce health risks 
for the foetus and the mother. 
Although most participants were in favour of the offer of screening, they did 
not consider standard testing as self-evident. They defended the right of the 
parents to take their own private decisions about the use of new technological 
methods, according to their preferences and beliefs. Furthermore, they 
expressed their worry that testing becomes a commonplace when offered in a 
standard manner to all pregnant women. 
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"/ do not think it is obvious. I believe you should only test on 
indication. Every test has its downside. Tests that make you 
unnecessarily afraid, like the risk of a premature birth and so on. I 
do not think one should w/7/ing/y and knowinsly take these risks 
upon oneself. " (K236-136; MST-decliner) 
Participants tended to limit the test offer to groups at risk. Their reasons were 
the possible increment of spontaneous abortions caused by invasive diagnostic 
procedures and the uncertainty and additional stress that testing can introduce 
in pregnancy. 
Participants also expressed their concern that parents would have a test 
without making a carefully well-considered decision about the consequences. 
Even though women felt free to undergo screening, they worried that it might 
become more and more difficult to opt for a pregnancy without testing. 
"I think you have to consider what you want to know and what do 
the test results mean. You can know whether it has Down 
syndrome, but what is the extra worth of this information? And I 
think that few people consider all these things. People test 
without thinking oòout the consequences of the test. " (K038-095; 
NTM-acceptor) 
No differences between acceptors and decliners were found regarding their 
views about standard access to prenatal screening. 
Discussion 
Given the Dutch policy up to 2007 regarding the offer of prenatal tests, we had 
a unique opportunity to gain insight into the impact of ethical views on the 
decision making process regarding prenatal screening. A strength of this study is 
the use of qualitative data to clarify the results from a concomitant RCT. 
According to other studies17,23 none of the acceptors mentioned the finding 
of Down syndrome or abnormal conditions as reason for using the screening. 
Most of the women who opted for prenatal screening aimed to know whether 
the foetus was healthy. From our qualitative analyses it became clear that such 
knowledge is associated with the desire to eliminate uncertainty about the 
health status of the foetus. Acceptors did not consider abortion as the most 
obvious follow-up in case of a confirmed disability. Women who opt for testing 
without the intention of terminating pregnancy consider the screening as a way 
to prepare themselves for the birth of an affected child. Acceptors who would 
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opt for abortion defined the test as a means for controlling the outcomes of 
pregnancy in order to guarantee a good life for themselves and their family. 
For their part, decliners reported as their main reason for not using the test 
the uncertainty and stress that testing might cause them. Results from the 
interviews showed that this uncertainty was related to their unwillingness to 
consider abortion in the case of Down syndrome and to interfere in the natural 
course of pregnancy. For decliners testing was closely linked to the decision of 
aborting an affected foetus. Therefore, they did not view the test as a personal 
option. 
In spite of their different personal attitudes towards testing and termination 
of pregnancy in the case of Down syndrome, acceptors and decliners appear to 
be more alike than different in their ethical views. All participants were quite 
open to technical control of pregnancy outcomes. They also agreed in 
considering termination of pregnancy as ethically acceptable when it is 
performed in the best interest of the child. At the same time they manifested 
their concern about the acceptability of intervening in the natural outcome of 
pregnancy and feared that testing would become a routine procedure aimed to 
select healthy children. 
These findings show that ethical views about testing are not directly related 
to personal decision-making regarding the acceptance of prenatal screening. 
Diversity of views was a characteristic of both acceptors and decliners. All 
participants reported that their choice was context related and that they would 
decide another way in different circumstances. This result is contrary to studies 
supporting the view that different ethical views and religious beliefs would lead 
to different choices regarding prenatal testing.5'17'19'23 An explanation for this 
diversity of views between acceptors and decliners might be due to the low 
proportion (ca. 23%)of active religious women in the qualitative study (11/47) 
and in the quantitative study (313/1399). The agreement on the acceptability of 
abortion might be due to the fact that abortion is legally permitted in the 
Netherlands. 
In order to understand the impact of personal ethical views on the decision 
making process, we made a distinction between "personal ethical 
considerations" and "universal moral principles". We interpreted as personal 
ethical considerations expressions in terms of desires or wishes such as "I don't 
want to abort a pregnancy" or "I worry that testing becomes a means of 
selecting perfect children", and universal moral principles were interpreted in 
The impact of ethical beliefs on decisions about prenatal screening tests 43 
normative expressions such as "abortion is morally good when performed in the 
interest of the child", or "parents have the right of access to prenatal testing 
for selecting their children". According to this interpretation, the ethical 
reasons given by our participants for accepting or declining prenatal screening 
could be characterised as personal ethical considerations, since women referred 
to their personal feelings as the explanation of their choice. They also admitted 
that the opposite choice would be ethically justified in different circumstances. 
These feelings would reflect the participant's views about the value of a 
disabled child according to their capacity to take care of it and to provide it 
with a reasonable level of wellbeing. 
When discussing the ethical acceptability of prenatal testing and abortion, 
participants referred to universal moral principles to support their decision 
regarding the test. This fact may indicate that concordance with a moral norm 
is an important factor for women in order to justify their choice. Decliners 
mentioned "the unacceptability of interfering in the course of nature and in 
their own destiny", as well as "the wrongness of taking unnecessary risks for the 
child" as arguments against prenatal screening. Acceptors reported "the 
parental duty of protecting the child from extreme suffering" and "the right of 
everyone to have a good and happy life" as justification for their decision to 
test the foetus. Both acceptors and decliners appealed to "the duty of the 
parents to decide in the best interests of the child" and "the right of the 
parents to decide according to their personal circumstances". 
Based on these findings, we distinguish two levels in the decisional process 
regarding the decision about prenatal screening: on the first level, women 
decide what they want to do by looking at their existing personal and familiar 
circumstances. Women make a decision mainly by balancing the psychological 
and emotional effects of the test's information against the emotional and other 
burdens they expect a disabled child would have on their commitments to other 
children and themselves. In fact, all participants considered further testing as a 
logical step after a positive screening result. Therefore, the emotional risk 
associated with invasive diagnostic procedures would be a central factor in 
decision making. Societal expectations might have more impact on the 
emotional attitude towards a disabled child than the financial and physical 
burdens that such a child entails. The service provision for disabled people is 
relatively well organised in the Netherlands, where many organisations promote 
the participation and integration in society of individuals with a disability. 
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On a second level, normative moral principles are introduced as additional 
arguments, backing and supporting the decision made on the first level. On this 
level, ethical norms appear to perform an instrumental role as normative 
reasons, being brought into play in order to give a moral justification to the 
reproductive preferences of the women regarding the place of a disabled child 
in their lives. We conclude this from the fact that although participants 
reported mainly emotional or psychological arguments as the most decisive 
reason for their decision, they appealed to universal moral principles to explain 
their decision in the course of the interview. 
The right of parents to select the children they think they can care for and 
those with the highest chance of having a good life, was quoted as essential in 
justifying their choice, both by women declining and accepting the screening 
test. Participants claimed the right of the parents to make their own decision 
about the use of prenatal testing and to determine which child fits their lives. It 
should be noted that this right can be only effective when the technical means 
are available that allow parents to know the characteristics of their offspring 
early enough. 
The finding that both women accepting and declining refer to the same 
moral principles in order to support their choice, might be an indication that 
decisions regarding prenatal testing have not yet been integrated into the 
ethical beliefs of the parents. This can be due to the difficulty of identifying 
the limits between what can be considered acceptable parental interests and 
what kinds of suffering and burdens are sufficient enough to justify termination. 
An additional interpretation of these findings would be that women are 
reluctant to consider the moral implications and the added responsibilities 
raised by the increase in available information about the health status of the 
foetus, as Gregg and Lippman suggest.25,26 
In view of these considerations, we argue for the existence of a tension 
between the moral theories that suggest that decisions about prenatal testing 
are mainly guided by women's moral beliefs and the way in which women 
decide in practice. The moral theories are founded on a deontological view 
based on a link between the concepts of right action, moral rule and 
rationality. Contrary to the assertion of these theories, our analysis shows that 
the choices about prenatal testing are not primarily driven by the ethical 
convictions of women, even though these are considered when making the 
decision. The decision appears to derive less from the moral duty to protect the 
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child against the consequences of a disability, than from the burden that they 
expect a disabled child would have on their lifestyle and that of those close to 
them. Personal beliefs about testing, abortion and the value of a disabled life 
are brought in among other personal and practical reasons with regard to their 
wellbeing and life perspective, as well as those of family members. Together 
they shape the final decision. Reproductive decisions about prenatal testing 
appear to get their moral significance within a system of cultural and social 
ideals, in which individuals claim the right to determine what they consider 
good or bad, according to their individual view of a worthy life and based upon 
what they judge good for them in accordance with the actual context of their 
lives. Based on these considerations, we presume that decisions regarding 
prenatal testing take place according to a pragmatic ethics, in which each 
decision is ethically valuated according to individual circumstances by weighing 
up the consequences of one's action for oneself and others. 
Given the impact of the expected burdens of a child with Down syndrome on 
women's family and personal lives, we suggest that health professionals must 
provide clear information about the disabilities for which prenatal testing is 
offered to help couples to make informed reproductive choices. This 
information should include the clarification that testing is not directly related 
to abortion, as Ahmed argues.17,23 In addition, parents must be allowed to make 
their decision about what to do with the test results. The need of balanced 
information is more urgent in countries where prenatal testing is routinely 
offered. It remains important to examine the implications that a broad offer of 
prenatal screening and the pressure of dominant opinions in society regarding 
disability might have on women's views about their parental responsibilities. 
46 Chapter 2 
References 
1. Leporrier N, Herrou M, Morello R, Leymarie P. Fetuses with Down's 
Syndrome detected by prenatal screening are more likely to abort 
spontaneously than fetuses with Down's syndrome not detected by prenatal 
screening. BJOG-Int J Obstet Gynaecol 2003; 110: 18-21. 
2. Nicolaides KH, Heath V, Cicero S. Increased fetal nuchal translucency 
measurement at 11-14 weeks. Prenat Diagn 2002;22: 308-15. 
3. Economides DL. Early pregnancy screening for fetal abnormalities. 
Ultrasound Obstet Gynecol 1999;13: 81-3. 
4. Willians C, Alderson P, Farsides B. Too many choices? Hospital and 
community staff reflect on the future of prenatal screening. Soc Sei Med 
2002;55: 743-53. 
5. Carroll JC, Brown JB, Reid AJ, Pugh P. Women's experience of maternal 
serum screening. Obstetrical and Gynecological Survey 2001;56(1): 17-18. 
6. Liamputtong P, Halliday JL, Warren, R, Watson LF, Bell RJ. Why do women 
decline prenatal screening and diagnosis? Australian women's perspective. 
Women Health 2003;37: 89-108. 
7. Rapp R. Refusing prenatal diagnosis: The meanings of bioscience in a 
multicultural world. Sci Technol Human Values 1998;23(1): 45-70. 
8. Bryant LD, Green JM, Hewison J. Attitudes towards prenatal diagnosis and 
termination in women who have a sibling with Down's syndrome. J Reprod 
Infant Psychol 2005;23(2): 179-196. 
9. Crang-Svalenius E, Dykes AK, Jorgensen C. Factors influencing informed 
choice of prenatal diagnosis: Women's feelings and attitudes. Fetal Diagn 
Ther1998;13: 53-61. 
10. Green JM, Statham H. Psychosocial aspects of prenatal screening and 
diagnosis. In: Marteu T, Richards M (eds.). The troubled helix: Social and 
psychological implications of the new human genetics. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996: 140-163. 
11. Green JM, Statham H, Snowdon C. Screening for fetal abnormalities: 
Attitudes and experiences. In: Chard T, Richards MPM (eds). Obstetrics in 
the 1990s: Current controversies. London: McKeith Press, 1992. 
12. Markens S, Browner CH, Press N. Because of the risks: How US pregnant 
women account for refusing prenatal screening. Soc Sei Med 1999;49: 359-
69. 
13. Marteu TM, Kidd J, Cook R, Michie S, Johnston M, Slack J, et al. Perceived 
risk not actual risk predicts uptake of amniocentesis. Brit J Obstet 
Gynaecol 1991 ;98: 282-6. 
14. Press N, Browner CH. Why women say yes to prenatal diagnosis. Soc Sci 
Med 1997;45: 979-89. 
15. Santhalahti P, Aro AR, Hemminki E, Helennius H, Ryynänen M. On what 
grounds do women participate in prenatal screening? Prenat Diagn 1998; 18: 
153-65. 
The impact of ethical beliefs on decisions about prenatal screening tests 47 
16. Spencer K. Uptake of prenatal screening for chromosomal anomalies: 
Impact of test results in a previous pregnancy. Prenat Diagn 2002;22(13): 
1229-32. 
17. Ahmed S, Atkin K, Hewison J, Green J. The influence of faith and religion 
and the role of religious and community leaders in prenatal decisions for 
sickle cell disorders and thalassaemia major. Prenat Diagn 2006;26(9): 801-
9. 
18. Alkuraya FS, Kilani RAA. Attitude of Saudi families affected with 
hemoglobinopathies towards prenatal screening and abortion and the 
influence of religion rulings (Fatwa). Prenat Diagn 2001 ;21 (6): 448-51. 
19. Sher C, Romano-Zelekha 0, Green MS, Shohat T. Factors affecting 
performance of prenatal genetic testing by Israeli Jewish women. Am J 
Med Genetics 2003; 120A: 418-22. 
20. Zahed L, Bou-Dames J. Acceptance of first-trimester prenatal diagnosis for 
the haemoglobinopathies in Lebanon. Prenat Diagn 1997; 17(5): 423-8. 
21. van den Berg M, Timmermans DRM, Kleinveld JH, Garcia E, van Vught JM, 
van der Wal G. Accepting or declining the offer of prenatal screening for 
congenital defects: Test uptake and women's reasons. Prenat Diagn 
2005;25(1): 84-90. 
22. van den Berg M, Timmermans DR, ten Kate LP, van Vugt JM, van der Wal G. 
Are pregnant women making informed choices about prenatal screening? 
Genet Med 2005;7: 332-8. 
23. Ahmed S, Green JM, Hewison J. Attitudes towards prenatal diagnosis and 
termination of pregnancy for thalassemia in pregnant Pakistani women in 
the North of England. Prenat Diagn 2006;26: 248-57. 
24. Watt H. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis: Choosing the "Good Enough" 
child. Health Care Anal 2004;12: 51-60. 
25. Gregg R. "Choice" as a double-edged sword: Information, quilt and mother 
blaming in a high-tech age. Women Health 1993;20(3): 53-73. 
26. Lippman A. The genetic construction of prenatal testing: Choice, consent, 
or conformity for women? In Rothenberg KH, Thompson EJ (Eds.). Women 
and prenatal testing: Facing the challenges of genetic technology. 
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1994. 

WOMEN'S VIEWS 
ON TI IE MORAL STATUS 
OF NATURE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF PRENATAL SCREENING DECISIONS. 
ELISA GARCiA / DANIELLE R.M. TIMMERMANS / EVERT VAN LEEUWEN 
JOURNAL 01- MEDICAI ETHICS 2011, 17-Ί61 465 
50 Chapter 3 
Abstract 
Appeals to the moral authority of nature play an important role in ethical 
discussions about the acceptability of prenatal testing. While opponents 
consider testing a dangerous violation of the moral inviolable course of nature, 
defenders see testing as a new step in improving dominion over nature. In this 
study we explored the meaning of appeals to nature among pregnant women to 
whom a prenatal screening test was offered and the impact of these appeals on 
their choices regarding the acceptance of screening. Contrary to theoretical 
debates we found that appeals to the moral authority of nature do not prevent 
women from welcoming the possibilities of controlling the outcomes of 
pregnancy, neither do they provide prima facie justification for (not) 
intervening in the natural course of events. Both acceptors and decliners 
believed in an inherent morality in nature that must be respected. They 
welcome the possibility of knowing more about the health of the foetus and to 
make their own reproductive decisions. Concerns for the quality of their child's 
life and for their capacity to assure a good life for their family and disabled 
child appear to play a central role in the decision regarding the use of 
screening. Appeals to nature can be interpreted as an attempt to justify beliefs 
regarding suffering that must be avoided and the impact that family interests 
may have on the decision. These findings have significant implications for 
ethical guidance in debates about the acceptability and boundaries of control of 
offspring characteristics by prenatal testing. 
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Introduction 
Most parents long for children that are healthy and will enjoy a good life. For 
many decades parental influence on their offspring began after birth. Before 
the introduction of prenatal testing there was no way for parents to prevent a 
congenital disability except by not having children. The genetic constitution 
and health status of the foetus were left to the regulation of nature, deity, 
destiny or blind chance. With the development of prenatal testing for 
congenital disorders this situation has profoundly changed. Parents can now get 
extra information about the health of the foetus on the basis of which they can 
make reproductive decisions regarding the birth of a disabled child that was 
previously left to the influence of nature.1"3 
While the expanded scope of parental choice is perceived by some as a 
positive effect of technological developments in reproductive medicine, not 
everyone welcomes prenatal testing.4 Debates on the acceptability of prenatal 
testing often include appeals to the moral legitimacy of human interference 
with the natural course of pregnancy. Contemporary thinking includes two main 
opposing and extreme viewpoints about the moral status of nature: 
The first view recognises an inherent morality in nature as the source of 
objective moral values that must be used as a reference point for normative 
restrictions regarding human interference. The underlying assumption in this 
view is that we are beholden to a morally inviolable natural order of things with 
a specific purpose for mankind that must always be respected. An important 
implication of this view is that humans should have no say in the outcome or 
make-up of a child. They must simply accept the 'gift' that is provided and make 
no attempt to change, direct, control, design or exclude it. This view condemns 
most attempts to control or select the characteristics of offspring because they 
would make children the products of choice, determined strictly according to 
our plans and serving only our desires. This control conflicts with the idea that 
children are unconditional gifts undermining the unconditional acceptance of 
children that is central to parenthood. In this view disability is not an 
impediment for a full human life.5'7 
The second view considers nature as simply a (biological) matter of neutral 
worth, which proceeds without purpose or any guidance in matters of good and 
bad. Defenders of this view ascribe nature only a relative value that is derived 
from its relationship to human functioning and flourishing. Furthermore, it is 
important to indicate that recognition of the features that are necessary for 
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human functioning and flourishing might be associated with particular views 
about human nature.8 Human beings are encouraged to dominate nature by 
striving to improve it. The only limits to human freedom in this respect are 
provided by human reason. Disability is portrayed as an undesirable condition 
where suffering and limited capacities override the possibility of developing a 
fully human existence. Prenatal testing is seen as a chance to exert rational 
control over the undesirable characteristics of human offspring and 
consequently it is seen as inherently beneficial and even necessary, while 
choosing to remain ignorant and to accept or allow disability would be morally 
9-13 
wrong. 
Quantitative and qualitative data produced in a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) designed to analyse the factors that play a role in choices regarding the 
use of prenatal screening have shown that considerations about the moral duty 
to follow nature appear to play a role in decision-making on the acceptance of 
a test offer.14,15 Those considerations were mentioned both by women who 
accepted screening and by those who declined it. In this paper, we aim to 
explore what participants meant when they appealed to nature and the impact 
of their considerations on decision-making. 
Methods 
This paper results from a qualitative sub study examining the impact of ethical 
beliefs on decisions regarding prenatal screening that was embedded in a RCT. 
The intervention group of the RCT was offered a Nuchal Translucency 
Measurement (NTM) or a Maternal Serum screening test (MST). The control 
group received no offer of a test.14,15 Participants in the RCT who were in the 
process of deciding whether to accept the offer were randomly selected and 
asked by phone to participate in an interview within a week after the test offer 
was received and before the test would eventually performed. In total 59 
women (26 from the MST group and 33 from the NTM group) agreed to be 
interviewed. With permission, all interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed. To protect anonymity, each woman was allocated a numerical 
code.14 
The demographic characteristics of the participants in this qualitative study 
were compared with the total of participants in the RCT. The subgroup 
resembles a representative sample of the RCT participants regarding social 
status, level of education, age and religious convictions. 
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Data analyses 
Qualitative analysis was performed through a two-step inductive approach using 
the assistance of computer software N-Vivo (Nudist-Vivo, 2.0;QSR software, 
Durham, UK). In a first analysis, we looked for the reasons women reported for 
their decision. In a second analysis reasons were divided into meaning units 
corresponding to the issues discussed in the interview. The meaning units were 
subsequently condensed and shortened into nine categories that corresponded 
with ethical considerations that emerged from the responses. One of the 
categories had to do with the moral status attributed to nature.14 Within this 
category new codes were made based on differences and similarities and sorted 
into six subcategories that correspond with two main underlying views regarding 
the relationship between nature and prenatal testing: 1) nature ought not to be 
changed nor totally controlled; and 2) helping nature to do its work well. 
Results 
The findings from the MST group and the NTM group are presented together, as 
previous studies showed no differences in ethical views between the two 
intervention groups.14,15 Differences between acceptors and decliners are 
identified when present. 
1. Nature ought not to be changed nor totally controlled 
1.1. Health status of the foetus as a matter of fate or destiny 
Participants reported the health status of the foetus as something that is 
determined beforehand by nature or God. They believed that the 
characteristics of their offspring are part of their own fate and that parents get 
the children they deserve. According to this view, both acceptors and decliners 
believed that respecting the natural course of pregnancy, without trying to 
control everything, was the most acceptable ethical option. 
"I know people who say that they do not want to test because they 
accept their child how it is. I really believe that is the best way to 
act. Nobody wants a disabled child. This is a fact. But what is 
tricky is that we all accused Hitler because he didn't want 
disabled people and we are doing the same with so many tests. 
Taking things the way they are is indeed the best option. " (K027-
134; MST-acceptor) 
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Nevertheless, they argued that parents are free to control and decide about the 
birth of a severely disabled child. 
"Some people think that they have to accept the child and to 
enjoy him because that is the goo/ of their life. I don't agree with 
this! I think that nature sometimes makes mistakes that even God 
should disapprove. Parents do not need to accept it." (K037-101·, 
MST-decliner) 
1.2. Nature knows better 
Participants opined that there is a meaning in everything that happens. Both 
acceptors and decliners reported that everyone ought to allot his own fate a 
place in his life and ought to learn from it. 
"You should sometimes accept that certain things are meant to be 
and you should deal with them. It sounds quite philosophical, but I 
think you just cannot avoid all difficulties. I strongly believe that 
you have a certain destiny and things happen with a purpose and 
you should learn from them. " (K037-095; NTM-acceptor) 
Participants reported that nature itself will determine which disabilities are 
compatible with a fair quality of life and which are not. They trusted that 
severely disabled foetuses would be eliminated by nature through spontaneous 
abortion. Nevertheless, participants believed that parents have the 
responsibility to decide what the best option is when a severe disabled foetus is 
not naturally eliminated. 
"I think that what nature finds wrong is wrong. If this child is not 
good, nature should eliminate him. But I think that in cases of no 
life expectancy if nature does not do its job, you should decide for 
yourself. " (K188-198; MST-acceptor) 
A difference found between acceptors and decliners signified to what extent 
they judged they may intervene in pregnancy. Acceptors welcomed the 
possibility of making their own decision that comes with testing. 
"I have always known that I would want to know whether there 
was something wrong with the child beforehand. Plainly because I 
don't like the idea of having a child that is severely disabled or 
has Down syndrome. If you cannot do anything it is all right. But if 
I there is a chance of making my own choice I want to do so." 
(K236-167·, MST-acceptor) 
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Decliners preferred to avoid difficult decisions about the desirable 
characteristics of their child. They feared that attempts to control everything 
might result in unforeseen consequences. 
"/ am convinced that nature has to take its course. You should not 
mess with faith by performing so many tests beforehand when 
there is no reason to do so. I want a perfect child. But some things 
happen irremediably and you cannot control them. You have to 
accept them as they come. " (K236-142; NTM-decliner) 
1.3. Disability belongs to life 
Participants saw disability as something that belongs to human life and is not 
always an impediment for a good life. A society with only perfect people was 
reported as something we must not strive for. Furthermore, participants 
believed that disability is not without value because it helps people to value the 
positive things of life. 
"There are so many reasons why children are not 100% healthy. 
That's part of life! Thank goodness! Imagine a world where 
everybody is perfect! I believe that some things go wrong so that 
we realise how happy we must be with things that go well. " (K188-
188; MST-acceptor) 
A difference between acceptors and decliners was found in their expectations 
about parenting a disabled child. Decliners trusted that they could care for 
child with Down syndrome, while acceptors considered the care for a disabled 
child as an unbearable burden. 
2. Helping nature to do its work well 
2.1. Improving health 
Participants believed that they have a duty to employ all available means to 
improve the health of the foetus and to avoid substances that can create 
substantial risks. Still, this improvement was reported to be limited by the 
congenital status of the foetus. 
"You can take folic acid before you get pregnant and avoid salt, 
alcohol, red meat and that kind of things but that's all you can do. 
You cannot change that the child has Down syndrome; it is 
determined by nature. " (K383-164; NTM-decliner) 
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Both acceptors and decliners reported that women have a duty to seek 
available prenatal care. They did not link this responsibility with the use 
of testing because it does not contribute to the health of the foetus. 
2.2. Testing the foetus 
All participants were aware that testing could not guarantee a completely 
healthy child. They also questioned the adequacy of the information given by 
prenatal screening. Therefore, screening was not considered necessary in 
pregnancy. 
Nevertheless, participants mentioned that testing becomes necessary when 
women have sufficient reason to fear severe disabilities of the child, for 
instance because of advanced age or because of medical reasons. 
"I think that you must look at the age of the women. It is less 
worthwhile to offer a test to a young woman. But it is normal that 
women older than 36 set a test because they have a higher risk of 
Setting a disabled child. If you have the feelins that there is 
something wrong with the baby you can always ask for a test. " 
(K027-133; MST-acceptor) 
A difference found between acceptors and decliners had to do with their 
assessment of the utility of screening for controlling the health of the foetus. 
Acceptors reported the test as an extra chance to exert some control and in 
case of a confirmed disability to make their own decision about the birth of the 
child. 
"/ wont to make use of every extra chance of knowing whether the 
child is healthy or not. A child with some disabilities would have a 
very big impact on our lives. I want to think very hard about 
whether I want to accept it. " (K380-192; NTM-acceptor) 
For their part, decliners did not believe that screening offers real control, since 
it only indicates the possibility that the foetus has a disability. They did not 
want to take the risks of an invasive diagnostic test. Therefore, they opted to 
wait until delivery. 
"The test does not give any assurance! It gives only a chance and 
the smallest chance is already a chance that there is something 
wrong. Actually you don't know anything. You can know it better 
after delivery." (K185-148; MST-decliner) 
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Whatever their decision, decliners reported that they would have a 
detailed ultrasound scan to determine the duration of pregnancy and to 
visualise their foetus. 
2.3. Decidin$ about the characteristics of the offspring 
Participants were concerned about the difficulty of determining the boundary 
between 'desirable' and 'undesirable' characteristics. The decision was 
reported to be even more difficult in case of Down syndrome because 
participants believed that this condition might be compatible with a good 
quality of life. 
"It is impossible to judge the quality of life of the child. A 
disabled child can have a good life. We find it burdened, but 
nobody knows whether the child is happy. Down syndrome has 
many gradations. This makes it more difficult to know what is 
acceptable and unacceptable." (K188-189; MST-acceptor) 
Participants did not see disability as something that must be avoided at all 
costs. Nevertheless, they reported abortion as morally acceptable in case of 
severe disabilities with a very low quality of life or when parents cannot provide 
the child the necessary care. In these cases, termination was described as doing 
something in the best interest of the child. 
In spite of this view, participants opting for testing mentioned that parents 
might actively help nature in interrupting pregnancy when foetuses with a 
severe disability are not naturally eliminated. 
"For me this is a very difficult issue. I've once been in an 
institution for disabled children. There were children who were 
lying down all the day; they couldn't walk or sit. They couldn't 
even talk. If you could know that beforehand! This is the point. 
Such a child has no life. I think you must make a choice thinking of 
the child. Well, it is not good if parents can choose between a boy 
and a girl. This would be not normal. But it is good that it is 
possible to find out about very severe disabilities in the best 
interests of the child". (K236-147; NTM-decliner) 
A difference between acceptors and decliners was found in their views on the 
acceptability of abortion in their own personal situation. Acceptors were open 
to possibility of abortion in case of Down syndrome. 
58 Chapter 3 
"If I get a high risk I will find out about what it implies to have 
such a child and about the burdens of caring for him. I think 
about how difficult it will be for me if I decide to terminate 
pregnancy. " (K185-150; NTM-acceptor) 
For decliners abortion was not acceptable in their individual circumstances 
because of their ability to care for a disabled child. 
"For me Down syndrome is not a reason for abortion. I find it 
hypocritical to do a test if you don't do anything with the result. 
If the child is disabled, it should be very sad, but that is how it 
is." {K236-171; NTM-decliner): 
Discussion 
Prenatal testing is offered as a tool to support parents to make conscious 
decisions about their offspring.14 In discussions about the admissibility of 
prenatal testing the ethical argument about the acceptability of intervening in 
nature is frequently brought up.16,17 For some, testing is a way of putting 
autonomy above nature by deciding on the desirable characteristics of the 
foetus.3 For others, the genetic constitution of our children is a matter of fate 
or God's will that is beyond our choice and control. Therefore, these people 
consider testing with the aim of selecting the traits of the offspring as 
necessarily in conflict with the idea of children as 'unconditional gift'. 
Moreover testing promotes the idea that children are a made or chosen 
'product'. 
Since Greek antiquity nature has been a source of arguments in ethics and 
(natural) law. Some ethical traditions consider nature as synonymous with good. 
Others reject nature as arbitrary and meaningless.18,19 Arguments derived from 
these basic valuations refer to nature as a secure guide or source of moral 
precepts or reject and distrust nature in favour of human endeavour. Those 
references need to be clarified in ethical debate and decision-making. 
Contrary to the arguments derived in the above sketched ethical traditions, 
we found that both acceptors and decliners believed in the existence of 
rationality and purpose in the natural course of events that must be respected. 
Therefore they believed that parents ought not to make any attempt to change 
or to control the characteristics of their children. However, they also confirmed 
that parents can and sometimes ought to intervene in the natural course of 
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pregnancy to guarantee the health of their offspring and to avoid disability, 
including the abortion of a disabled foetus. 
From these results it seems that appeals to the moral authority of nature do 
not provide sufficient guidance in decision making. As we see the same views 
about the significance of nature lead to different choices. However, the fact 
that participants spontaneously referred to the acceptability of intervening in 
nature, indicates that views about the moral status of nature are important for 
them. At this point it is interesting to consider what participants exactly meant 
when they appealed to the moral authority of nature. 
Our results show that participants recognise some value in nature. That 
value is often identified with personal fate, destiny, or the meaning of their 
own life within a rational natural order. Every intention to control or 
manipulate the course of pregnancy has then moral significance. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that participants mentioned those considerations when deciding 
about screening. At the same time, participants also value the possibility to 
gain knowledge about the health of the foetus and to make their own decisions. 
This possibility comes together with new expressions of responsibility that are 
considered to be exclusively the concern of the women tested and not of nature 
anymore. That responsibility has no restrictions and includes the life of the 
future child. The offer of prenatal testing faces women with the choice of the 
kinds of disability that can be avoided and the reasons which justify that 
decision. As Dworkin argues, by providing this choice, prenatal testing 
undermines the assumptions that the health of the foetus lies beyond the 
control of the parents because it is fixed by nature and therefore escapes their 
moral responsibility.21 
From our results it is clear that the expected suffering caused by disability 
plays a central role in decision making. Although participants accepted that 
nature determines the child's constitution, they were concerned with the 
quality of their child's life. Additionally, they had concerns about their family's 
strength and capacity to satisfactorily deal with the care for a disabled child. 
Women decide by balancing the moral risk to interfere in nature against the 
moral risk of carrying the responsibility for the suffering of their future child 
and family. As we found before, women are faced with a conflict of interests.22 
In line with this thinking, the decision both for and against testing might be 
interpreted as an attempt to control in some way the health of the foetus and 
to escape from undesirable pregnancy outcomes. As our findings illustrate, 
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acceptors see screening as a way to assure that everything is going well. 
Although they hoped not to make further decisions about the life of the foetus, 
they did not totally exclude abortion in case of a confirmed disability. For their 
part, decliners opted for avoiding the risks that are bounded with testing as a 
way to assure the health of the foetus. 
Based on these findings we suggest two possible explanations for the 
significance of participants' appeals to nature when deciding about testing: 
First, appeals to nature can be interpreted as an expression of the 
difficulties women face when deciding on the suffering that should or should 
not be avoided given the weight that the well being of other family members 
might have. According to this interpretation "nature" refers to the women's 
beliefs regarding the disabilities that ought to be accepted". 
Secondly, appeals to nature might be associated with the women's 
assessment of the utility of prenatal screening for holding some control over the 
natural outcomes of pregnancy. In this sense "nature" signifies "that what is 
beyond our choice and control". Acceptors might welcome the test as a means 
to make a decision on their own and ruling out at least Down syndrome and 
some forms of disability. For decliners appeals to nature can be interpreted as 
their lack of confidence in a test that only gives a chance approximation and 
therefore does not give certain information about the health of the foetus. 
Our results indicate the complexity of decisions regarding the control of 
offspring characteristics. Some authors fear that a standard offer of screening 
will result in women using arbitrarily the test without making a well considered 
decision.23"25 Contrary to this view our results show that this will not be the 
case. Women feel responsible for the well being of their child and family. Their 
decision grounds in their perception of the capacity to assure a good life both 
for their child and their family. 
The above results show that direct application of moral theories of nature 
within the framework of prenatal testing is flawed. The distinction between 
nature or fate and choice, that comes up in theoretical debates is far from the 
practical considerations women make when deciding about testing. As our 
results highlight, appeals to the moral authority of nature do not function as 
normative moral prescriptions. Consequently, they do not impede women to 
welcome the possibilities of controlling nature neither does it provide prima 
facie justification for (not) engaging the natural course of events. 
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Based on our results we suggest that debates about the acceptability of 
prenatal testing should not be centred on the moral authority of nature. As we 
have showed it does not bring much clarity in the morality of control and 
selection of the offspring's characteristics. Nature is a questionable and dim 
concept, which includes a wide variety of conceptions between matters that 
are beyond our control and those that we ought not to manipulate. We think 
that debates should be centred on the impact of prenatal testing on women's 
views about the characteristics that are necessary and those that are an 
impediment for a good life. Reference to nature always needs explanation from 
those perspectives. 
Future research should investigate the impact of these views on the way 
women shape their moral beliefs about the actions that belong to responsible 
parenthood in the framework of reproduction. 
62 Chapter 3 
References 
1. Economides DL. Early pregnancy screening for fetal abnormalities. 
Ultrasound Obstet Gynecol 1999;13(2): 81-3. 
2. Bennet R. Antenatal test and the right to remain in ignorance. Theor Med 
Bioeth 2001 ;22(5): 461-71. 
3. Williams C, Alderson P, Farsides B. Too many choices? Hospital and 
community staff reflects on the future of prenatal screening. Soc Sei Med 
2002;55(5): 743-53. 
4. Anderson G. Nondirectiveness in prenatal testing: patients read between 
the lines. Nurs Ethics 1999; 6(2): 126-36. 
5. Kass LR. Life, liberty and the defense of dignity: the challenge for 
bioethics. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002: 152. 
6. Blackford R. Sinning against nature: the theory of background conditions. 
J Med Ethics 2006;32(11): 629-34. 
7. President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human dignity. UD-
I I (2002) 
8. Nussbaum M. Human Functioning and Social Justice, in Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism. Polit Theory 1992;20(2): 202-46. 
9. Lippman A. The genetic construction of prenatal testing: choice, consent, 
or conformity for women?, In: Rothenberg KH, Thompson EJ, eds. Women 
and prenatal testing: facing the challenges of genetic technology. 
Columbus: OH: Ohio State University Press, 1994. 
10. Zoppi MA, Ibba RM, Putzolu M, Floris M, Monni G. Nuchal translucency and 
the acceptance of invasive prenatal chromosomal diagnosis in women 
aged 35 and older. Obstet Gynecol 2001 ;97: 916-20. 
11. Have ten HAMJ. Living with the Future: Genetic Information and Human 
Existence. In: Chadwick R, Levitt M, Shickle D, eds. The Right to Know 
and the Right Not to Know. Aldershot: Ashgate,1997: 87-95. 
12. Kornman LH, Wortelboer MJ, Beekhuis JR, Morssink LP, Mantingh A. 
Women's opinions and the implications of first- versus second-trimester 
screening for fetal Down's syndrome. Prenat Diag 1997;17(11): 1011-8. 
13. Suter MS. The Routinization of Prenatal testing. Am J Law Med 
2002;28(2): 233-45. 
14. Garcia E, Timmermans DRM, van Leeuwen E. Impact of ethical beliefs on 
decisions about prenatal screening tests: searching for justification. Soc 
Sei Med 2008;66(3): 753-64. 
15. van den Berg M, Timmermans DRM, Kleinveld JH, Garcia E, van Vught 
JMG, van der Wal G. Accepting or declining the offer of prenatal 
screening for congenital defects: test uptake and women's reasons. 
Prenat Diag 2005;25(1): 84-90. 
16. Williams C, Alderson P, Farsides B. Too many choices? Hospital and 
community staff reflect on the future of prenatal screening. Soc Sei Med 
2002;55(5): 743-53. 
Women's views on the moral status of nature 63 
17. Rapp R. Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of Bioscience in a 
Multicultural World Sci Technol Human Values1998;23(1): 45-70. 
18. Takala T. Concepts of "person" and "liberty", and their implications to 
our fading notions of autonomy. J Med Ethics 2007;33(4): 225-8. 
19. Schummer J. Aristotle on technology and nature. Phil Nat 2001; 38: 105-
20. 
20. Takala T. The (im)morality of (un)naturalness. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 
2004;13(1): 15-19. 
21. Dworkin G. Taking risks, assessing responsibility. Hastings Center Report 
1981;11: 26-31. 
22. Garcia E, Timmermans DRM, van Leeuwen E. Reconsidering prenatal 
screening: an empirical-ethical approach to understand moral dilemmas 
as a question of personal preferences. J Med Ethics 2009;35(7):410-4. 
23. Dormandy E. Better understanding of factors influencing update is 
needed. BMJ 1999;318: 805. 
24. Rothenberg KH, Thomson EJ. Women and prenatal testing: Facing the 
challenges of genetic technology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press 
1994. 
25. Seror V, Ville Y. Prenatal screening for Down's syndrome: women's 
involvement in decision-making and their attitudes to screening. Prenat 
Diagn 2009;29(2): 120-8. 

RETHINKING AUTONOMY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PRENATAL SCREENING 
DECISION-MAKING. 
ELISA GARCiA / DANIELLE R.M. TIMMERMANS / EVERT VAN LEEUWEN 
PRLNAIAL DIAGNOSIS 2010: 28-US 120 
66 Chapter 4 
Abstract 
Objective: Answering the question: Does the offer of prenatal screening impede 
women in making autonomous choices? 
Methods: Semi-structured interviews with 59 women to whom a prenatal 
screening test was offered and who were in the process of taking a decision. 
Results: Women described the offer as confronting but expressed a positive 
attitude towards screening and considered the offer as an opportunity for 
making up their minds about testing. Participants stated that they took 
decisions freely following their individual perspectives. Nevertheless, they 
preferred to share the responsibility of the decision and its consequences for 
other family members with their partner and closely related persons. 
Conclusions: The active offer of an unsolicited prenatal test need not be 
considered as an impediment for making an autonomous choice. The moral 
significance of prenatal testing is inseparably bound with the social context in 
which it is practiced. Influence from other persons and emotional reactions due 
to the test offer can be interpreted as supportive for making a choice. In 
clinical practice, testing should be timely offered in order to give women the 
opportunity of discussing their views with significant others. Caregivers should 
care for the emotions experienced by women so as to help them decide 
according to their values. 
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Introduction 
Ethical discussions about the desirability of offering prenatal (screening) testing 
focus mainly on the autonomy of the women involved. The growing consensus is 
that women will only benefit from the test offer when they are able to make an 
autonomous decision.1 
Authors who underline the importance of a broad offer of prenatal 
screening, establish their arguments on the assumption that more choices will 
enhance reproductive autonomy.2 According to this line of thinking, women 
must be informed about all the tests available in order to make a well-
considered decision.3'5 Still, several studies have shown that a prenatal 
screening test offer may negatively influence women's autonomy. In countries 
where prenatal screening is routinely offered, women use testing without 
considering its consequences.610 Furthermore, an unsolicited test offer may 
limit the women's freedom by forcing them to make a choice.11"13 Therefore, 
opponents of a standard offer of prenatal screening uphold that an autonomous 
choice is only guaranteed when women themselves request for the test.14 
Because of this controversy, it is important to examine the implications that the 
offer of prenatal screening might have for the women's autonomy.15 
Autonomy belongs to the dominant ethical principles of western healthcare 
and bioethics. Central to autonomy is the thought that persons are able to make 
informed decisions, in light of the available information. Elements considered 
to be a necessary condition for autonomous decision making are: the presence 
of valuable options; clear information about the alternatives; and the absence 
of actual constrains.16'19 This consideration entails that external constraints 
should be absent, so also internal constraints, such as emotions, doubts or 
scruples that may limit the capacity for reflecting critically upon the available 
„„* .v>„^ 20,21 
options. 
Applying this reasoning to prenatal screening, the question arises as to 
whether a test offer compels women to decide according to what others expect 
them to do.22 Emotional reactions due to the offer may also impede to act in 
accordance with their underlying values and preferences.22,23 
When this study was performed (2002-2004), offering prenatal screening to 
pregnant women, who are not at increased risk of giving birth to a child with 
congenital defects, was prohibited in The Netherlands.2A Women with low risk 
were allowed to use testing only on request. Because of this situation, we were 
able to conduct a randomised controlled trial (RCT) to study the effects of a 
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explicit test offer on decision making.25,26 Since testing was not routinely 
offered, women confronted with a test offer were likely to make a well-
considered decision. Since January 2007, this policy has changed so much that 
women with low risk may be informed about available tests but then have to 
pay for it themselves. 
A qualitative study was developed on top of the RCT in order to get more 
insight into the impact of ethical beliefs on decision making. This article 
reflects the results of the qualitative study. We explored the impact of the 
test's offer on the decisional process. The central question is: Are women to 
whom prenatal screening is offered able to autonomously decide according to 
their personal values and beliefs? In answering this, we analyse the existence of 
possible external pressures and internal constraints as consequence of the test 
offer. 
A special permit, for explicitly offering of prenatal screening, was granted 
by the Minister of Health, and the Institutional Review Board of the VU 
University Medical Centre. 
Methods 
Women participating in the RCT to whom a prenatal screening test was offered 
and who were in the process of deciding were asked through phone calls to 
participate in an interview. Participants were randomly selected and asked to 
contact within a week after the offer was received and before the test would 
eventually be performed. We approached 81 women and 59 agreed to be 
interviewed. The demographic characteristics of the interviewees are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Of the 59 interviewees (26 from the MST group and 33 from the NTM group), 
21 accepted the screening offer (11 from the NTM group and 10 from the MST 
group) and 38 declined it (22 form the NTM group and 16 form the MST group). 
Two women who refused screening, wanted to undergo another type of prenatal 
test (see Table 2 in chapter 2 at pag. 31 ). 
Since we aimed to study the effect of the active test offer on the decision 
making process, we did not include the control group in the qualitative study. 
Participants of the control group should have to be fully informed about the 
possibility of having the test, thereby breaking up the methodology of the RCT. 
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics of women participating in the study. 
Participants (n=59) 
Age 
<35 
>35 
Educational level 
High 
Middle 
Low 
Marital status 
Married 
Cohabitating 
Single 
Number of children 
0 
1 
2 
>3 
Religion 
Active 
Somewhat active 
Inactive 
Without religion 
45 
14 
25 
23 
9 
39 
19 
2 
29 
20 
7 
3 
1 
10 
18 
29 
The totals of age, degree of religiosity, and educational level do not add up to 
59 because of missing values on these questions. 
Interviews 
Interviews were carried out in the participants' homes. The interviews were 
conducted by E. Garcia and two professional interviewers. To protect their 
anonymity, each woman was allocated a numerical code. 
All the interviews followed the same semi-structured plan. We started with 
open-ended questions about the reasons for accepting or declining. In looking 
for external pressures, we asked which persons had to be approached during 
the decision making. To explore internal constraints, we incorporated questions 
about the women's personal experience regarding the offer and the feelings 
they experienced in making their decisions. The discussion was extended to 
themes identified as important by the participants. The interview questions 
were discussed for their comprehensibility after performing the first five 
interviews. 
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Interviews were recorded and transcribed with prior consent of the 
participants. The analysis was done by using N-Vivo (Nudist-Vivo, 2.0, Q.SR 
software, Durham, UK). Each interview was coded according to the themes 
discussed. In a first analysis, we looked for external and internal constraints to 
autonomy. In a second analysis, external constraints were divided into 
subcategories based on the relationship with the persons approached. Internal 
constraints were subdivided into three categories according to reported feelings 
regarding the women's emotional reaction to the test offer; the women's 
worries about the foetus' health and the women's feelings toward a disabled 
child. 
To test reliability the first three interviews were analysed by other 
researchers. Differences were found in fragments admitting a double coding. 
After some discussion, these differences were resolved. 
Results 
1. External constraints: influence of other persons 
Participants emphasised that they made their own choice without being overtly 
pressed by others. Nevertheless, they reported supportive influences of these 
others during the decision making process. 
1.1. The partner 
Most of the male partners ceded to the decision of their spouses and supported 
their final choice. However, they did have an important impact on the women's 
decision making, especially in the acceptance of the test. Participants stated 
that the decision regarding testing should be made in partnership and 
agreement, and sought input from their partners. They reported some 
uneasiness when their partners differed from their views. In case of 
disagreement, women finally went along with their partners' opinions. Still, 
they maintained that they were at liberty to decide by themselves whether to 
follow their partners' views, without being pressured. One of the reasons for 
going along with their partners' opinions was to avoid tension and conflict in 
the family. 
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"My husband was very much in favour of it. I admit that I don't 
know the consequences for me. And I think that if the results 
become abnormal, that he would be more outspoken than I would. 
He finds it very difficult to gei a disabled child. He doesn't admit 
it, but he acts in his own interest. Well, I expect that I'll set a 
good result to go further without problems." (0609-068; MST-
acceptor) 
1.2. Other closely related persons 
Once the choice was made, participants approached those closed to them with 
the aim of informing them, to seek their reinforcement and to share their 
decision. Participants who discussed their decisions with others, reported that 
these people supported their final decision. 
Although participants mentioned that the influence of relatives was minimal, 
they also reported some pressure to use testing because of the attitude of their 
relatives towards Down syndrome. 
"I do feel some pressure. Suppose I set a Ai/gh risk from the test, 
than my parents would undoubtedly press me. They would try to 
force me to terminate pregnancy, ßut it is comprehensible because 
we had a neighbour g/r/ who had a very severe form of Down." 
(K188-189; MST-acceptor) 
1.3.Midwife and obstetrician 
Participants defined the advice of caregivers as welcome, but were 
unwilling to involve them in decision making. The assistance expected 
was limited to the provision of information about risks and the impact of 
a disability on the child and on the family. 
"The final decision is to the parents. The doctor has absolutely a 
very important role in pointing oui how and what it is. He has the 
medical knowledse about the severity of the disability. I think 
that he also knows very well the consequences of terminating or 
not terminating pregnancy, because of his expertise. " (K027-104; 
MST-decliner) 
Those women who were not completely certain about their choice appreciated 
professional support and recognised that they would change their mind in 
relation to their midwives' advice. 
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"/ completely trust my midwife. If I was to go to my midwife next 
week, no matter how scared I am for having a serum screening 
test, and she tells me that it might be wise to do it, I would 
indeed do it." (K236-136; MST-decliner) 
1.4. Society 
Participants endorsed women's right to freely decide about screening. Despite 
this argument, both acceptors and decliners expressed their concern regarding 
social reactions of intolerance. For instance, decliners feared that they would 
be held accountable for the negative consequences of their decision, even when 
they felt confident that they could deal with an affected child. 
"The ones surrounding, they press you. Your child is disabled but it 
still is your child. And everyone says, oh my God, I am so sorry for 
you, whereas you may be very happy with it. And even when it 
grows older, it still will be that girl or boy next door having Down 
syndrome, instead of just Cathy for instance." (K185-148; MST-
decliner) 
Acceptors mentioned the social assumption that the abortion of a disabled child 
can be the best option, as a pressure that influenced their final decision. On 
their part, decliners gave a reason against testing, the fact that everybody 
knew about their pregnancy, and they would have to justify their decision for 
abortion. 
"You do talk about it with your partner beforehand, and you don't 
go around telling everybody that you're pregnant. In that case you 
are pregnant, but still you do not know whether it will continue. 
Then you also have to let everybody know you ended the 
pregnancy, or you have to make up some excuse, having had a 
miscarriage or something. " (K027-136; NTM-decliner) 
Participants also showed minimal confidence in the medical and financial 
support that they might get from Health Insurance if they decline the 
test. 
"Vour insurance company can oblige you to take a test if you are 
older than 36. And if you decide to keep your child, perhaps you 
would not have any right more. I do not know, but why they should 
make it obligatory then? I do not think they can oblige you to 
undergo testing, but this is another issue." (K236-168; NTM-
acceptor) 
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2. Internal constraints 
2.1. Emotional reactions to the test offer 
Participants were positive about the screening offer and mentioned being 
satisfied with their decisions. Nevertheless, some ambivalent feelings were 
reported. 
Acceptors were reluctant to decide about the birth of the child, in case of a 
confirmed disability. They reported uncertainty about what they should do with 
the results of the test. 
"I want to use it, but I have mixed feelings. I must admit that I 
would have preferred not to have the choice. But because I had it, 
I must think about it. The most difficult thing for me was what to 
do with the test result. For it does not give you 100% certainty. 
The age related risks is also a kind of chance approximation. It is 
almost the same. Your individual chance can only result lower or 
higher and then you have to take one more test. " (K027-133; MST-
acceptor) 
The miscarriage risk connected with diagnostic testing aggravated the 
problematic situation of having to decide about further steps. Acceptors 
reported that they would feel guilty if they were responsible for the loss of a 
healthy child. 
"/ hove never had a miscarriage. It may be awful. A child is not 
miscarried without a reason. There must be something wrong. This 
is what they always say. But in this case, it is not the nature that 
has caused it, but it has been a needle. This feels awful, because I 
have given it a hand. I had given my approval. If something goes 
wrong, I will ask myself: Oh my God What I've done?" (K303-119; 
MST-acceptor) 
Decliners doubted whether they had to use testing in the best interest of 
the child and themselves. They wondered whether being ignorant and 
letting things happen would be considered irrational. 
"The most important reason for not using the screening is that I 
will not terminate pregnancy and if I do not want to terminate, 
then I do not want to know beforehand. I will love it anyway. But 
sometimes rational thoughts overwhelmed me: "it can be very 
hard:/ is not want/ng to know not stupid and naïve?" (K078-142; 
MST-decliner) 
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2.2. Worries about the foetus' health 
Participants made decisions regarding testing with the intention of reducing 
their anxiety about the health status of the foetus and to enjoy their 
pregnancy. 
Acceptors decided to test with the intention of confirming the health of 
their foetus. All of them reported that they believed in obtaining a good test 
result. Therefore, they postponed further decisions until the screening results 
were known. 
"It is quite difficult. What do you do with the consequences? For 
me it is unclear. I try not to think about it. And if it isn't good, 
well, I'll see. I think that I should try to deal with it, but I can't 
know whether I'll think the same at that moment. Actually, I do 
the test with the hope that it is good. " (0609-068; MST-acceptor) 
Decliners followed the same pattern of reasoning in wanting to avoid anxieties. 
A decisive reason for not testing was that they did not want to worry about the 
health of the foetus. They trusted that everything was going well and opted for 
dealing with an unexpected disability at the time of birth. As a result, they 
reported being uncomfortable with the screening test as they felt it was not 
needed for them. 
"/ think that when you are having the test done, you will have 
reasonable doubts. I would wonder: is it affected or is it no? And if 
I would have a screening test done, I would feel very insecure 
during my entire pregnancy. " (K383-164; NTM-decliner) 
2.3. Feelings towards a disabled child 
A central element in the participants' decision was the emotional impact a 
disabled child would have on their lives. Acceptors considered the care for a 
disabled child as an unbearable emotional burden on them and their families. 
"I'm very happy with my life. I have a one-year-old daughter. And 
I think that you get extra worries if you get a child with Down 
syndrome and I should find it very difficult, because you have to 
take care of it for all your life. Your responsibility never ends" 
(K034-074; NTM-acceptor) 
For their part, decliners believed that they could emotionally cope with an 
affected child and take care of it. 
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"In The Netherlands we have enough organisations that help you to 
care for such a child. I think we should be able to take care of it, 
also when I realise that it would require extra efforts. " (K188-167; 
NTM- décliner) 
Discussion 
Prenatal screening aims to help pregnant women to make well considered 
reproductive choices. The ethical principle of autonomy states that women 
should make their choice without being influenced by the opinion of other 
persons.27,28 Our finding that women wanted to share their decision with others, 
even if they were not directly involved in the process of decision making, is 
therefore noteworthy. Participants approached other persons for obtaining 
approval and support. This suggests that relationships do play an important role 
in decision making regarding prenatal testing. As autonomous decision making 
takes into consideration the advice of others, the input from third persons 
should not be evaluated so much as a social pressure. 
Participants tended to follow the opinions of their partners in case of 
disagreement. In opposition to studies that claim that complying with the 
partner impedes women in making their own decisions29 32, participants stated 
that they freely made their own decisions in choosing to follow their partners' 
views. This finding may indicate that women do not want to shoulder all the 
responsibility for their decisions. Taking decisions in partnership would help 
women feel more comfortable with their final choice. The partner may also be 
considered as an intrinsic element in the decision making, since he is part of 
the pregnant couple. 
Participants reported assistance from caregivers as important for 
interpreting the screening results and for making a well considered decision. 
However, participants used the provided information without involvement of 
the caregivers. This finding contradicts studies that claim that trust in the 
medical authority constraints autonomous choice by compelling women to 
decide according to the medical value system.10'13'30'33'35 Participants who were 
ambivalent about their choice, were indeed more likely to follow the advice of 
their caregivers. However, this should not necessarily be interpreted as a 
constraint to autonomy since women did not report any form of involuntariness 
when they indicated that they would follow the advice of their midwives. Data 
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from the RCT confirm that participants embraced their decision and did not feel 
manipulated by their caregivers.26,36 
Researchers see the availability of testing as an external factor that 
constrains women to adapt their individual values and desires to the most 
accepted social opinion.37'39,12 In agreement with this claim, participants 
reported concern about social reactions and intolerance regarding the birth of a 
disabled child. Social and cultural views about the worth of human life with a 
handicap undoubtedly influence the choice taken regarding testing.40 
Nevertheless, the finding that participants emphasised that they were not 
overtly pressed by others in their decision may suggest that this influence would 
not always be considered a social pressure that compromises autonomy. 
Another requisite for autonomous choice is that women are not emotionally 
impeded to act upon what they rationally know is the best. Studies suggest that 
the availability of testing may impede women to decide autonomously by 
generating worries that might conflict with their values and beliefs.4145 In 
agreement with these studies, participants reported conflicting feelings 
regarding their desire to obtain more knowledge about the health status of the 
foetus and the fear to hear that something was wrong with the foetus. Both 
acceptors and decliners shared a reluctance to make further decisions regarding 
their child's future. In spite of this reluctance, participants were positive about 
the screening offer and embraced their final choice, even if they recognise that 
they would have preferred not to have to make a decision. 
The conflicting feelings that women reported might be considered as a 
normal process in making up their mind about the place of testing within their 
parental responsibilities. The availability of prenatal screening requires women 
to adapt their values and beliefs to the new circumstances created by the 
technical developments. In case of indeterminacy, these feelings may have an 
important role as tie-breakers in helping to choose between options that are 
rationally considered to be equivalent.46 Therefore, these feelings do not have 
to be considered as constraints for making a well considered autonomous 
choice. This assumption is confirmed by the results of the RCT where most of 
the women (82%) were found to make value-consistent decisions.36 
Our results are based on a qualitative study in a small group; so it is not 
possible to draw any definite conclusions. However, the views expressed by our 
participants suggest that from the autonomy perspective there is no reason to 
reduce access to prenatal screening. The fact that women cannot evade a 
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choice, even in cases where they prefer not to make one, might be an 
opportunity to shape their personal ethical views. 
Our findings also raise questions about the adequacy of the current concept 
of autonomy within the context of prenatal screening. According to Faden and 
Beauchamp, autonomy is related to a person's capacity to pursue his/her own 
goals and choose according to his/her own values, beliefs and preferences.47 
Only from such a position, it seems clear that influences from other persons as 
well as social values and expectations and internal emotions would constrain 
women's autonomy. However, autonomy should not be limited to a right to be 
free from the intrusion from others. As Nedelsky argues48, autonomy cannot be 
considered independent of the relational network of the moral agents. 
Moreover, autonomy comes into existence and is maintained by the 
responsibilities that spring from relationships with others. Hence, respect for 
autonomous decision making need not be incompatible with recognising that an 
individual's social context inevitably informs and influences his or her choices.49 
We suggest that an ethical analysis of autonomy in prenatal testing should 
reflect upon women's responsibilities and their ties with others. Assuming that 
woman's decision on prenatal testing is only autonomous if it is unmediated by 
external influences, may fail to capture the relationship in which decisions are 
made. Women make their choices in a context where personal and social 
factors need to be integrated along with emotions, personal values and 
judgments on the views of other people.50 As our results show, women prefer to 
discuss options with their partners, family and friends. 
Translated into clinical ethical reasoning our findings suggest that every 
offer should be timely done in order to give women the opportunity to discuss 
testing with significant others. On return, the clinic should check whether the 
influence of others has been impeding or enhancing their free choice. 
Caregivers should also care for the women's emotions when confronted with a 
screening offer. The advice of caregivers may be helpful as clinical 
recommendations for providing guidance in decision making. They should inform 
them beforehand about the difficult decisions that a high-risk result can lead 
to, as well to the different options to follow. One condition would be that the 
degree of "directiveness" should be negotiated. 
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Abstract 
In contrast to most Western countries, routine offer of prenatal screening is 
considered problematic in the Netherlands. The main argument against offering 
it to every pregnant woman is that women would be brought into a moral 
dilemma when deciding whether to use screening or not. This paper explores 
whether the active offer of a prenatal screening test indeed confronts women 
with a moral dilemma. A qualitative study was developed, based on a 
randomised controlled trial that aimed to assess the decision making process of 
women when confronted with a test offer. A sample of 59 women was 
interviewed about the different factors balanced in decision making. 
Participants felt themselves caught between a need for knowledge and their 
unwillingness to take on responsibility. Conflict was reported between wishes, 
preferences and ethical views regarding parenthood; however, women did not 
seem to be caught in a choice between two or more ethical principles. 
Participants balanced the interests of the family against that of the foetus in 
line with their values and their personal circumstances. Therefore, we conclude 
that they are not so much faced with an ethical dilemma as conflicting 
interests. We propose that caregivers should provide the opportunity for the 
woman to discuss her wishes and doubts to facilitate her decision. This 
approach would help women to assess the meaning of testing within their 
parental duties towards their unborn child and their currently offspring. 
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Introduction 
Although prenatal screening for Down syndrome and neural-tube defects has 
become routine prenatal care in most western countries, health policy in the 
Netherlands has been reluctant to offer screening to all pregnant women. At 
the time this study was performed (2002-2004) only women of advanced 
maternal age (from 36 years old) or with medical indications were offered 
invasive testing. Active offering of screening tests to women with a low risk was 
forbidden; the test could be performed only on request.1 
One of the main reasons for the Dutch government to limit prenatal 
screening to women in the risk group was that an unsolicited offer would bring 
women into a moral dilemma when considering whether or not to have the test 
performed. This dilemma can be sketched as follows: because there is no 
therapy available, women receiving abnormal results would be forced to make a 
choice between two equally binding and mutually exclusive ethical principles, 
namely the moral duties of "respecting the life of the unborn" and "avoidance 
of suffering". These two principles support two incompatible options: bringing 
the pregnancy to term (implying direct responsibility for the suffering of a 
disabled child), or opting for termination and therefore violating the right to 
life of the foetus. The impossibility of foreseeing either the degree of suffering 
or the consequences of a particular disability makes it difficult to determine the 
best choice from a moral perspective.3"6 
For their part, proponents of routine offering of prenatal screening claimed 
the right of the parents to be informed about all existing test to make 
autonomous and well-considered decisions.7 
This discussion in the Netherlands indicates a need for more research about 
the issues involved in routine offering of prenatal screening. Many studies have 
been performed on the decision making involved in prenatal testing.8'16 From 
these studies, it seems that women experience difficulty in determining what is 
the best choice.1720 In this paper we analyse whether this difficulty should be 
considered as an ethical dilemma. Although the Dutch policy changed in January 
2007, so that women with low risk have to be informed about the possibility of 
screening, the study we performed was carried out in 2002-2004, and thus we 
made use of an unique opportunity to study the effect of an active test offer on 
women's decision making in a context where prenatal screening was not routine, 
but rather part of a randomised controlled trial (RCT). The RCT consisted of 
three different groups: (1) one receiving the offer of a Nuchal Translucency 
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Measurement (NTM), (2) one receiving the offering of a Maternal Serum test 
(MST), and (3) a control group.12'21 
A qualitative study was developed on the basis of the RCT to obtain more 
insight into the effect of ethical beliefs on decision making. This paper reflects 
the results of the qualitative study. We explored the effect of a test offer on 
the decisional process and the various factors women balanced when deciding 
whether or not to accept the offer.22,23 
Methods 
A special permit for explicitly offering prenatal screening was granted by the 
Minister of Health and by the Medical Ethics Committee of the VU University 
Medical Centre. 
Pori/c/panis 
Participants of the RCT who were in the process of deciding about the test were 
randomly selected and asked by phone to participate in an interview. Interviews 
were performed within a week after the test was offered and before the test 
would eventually be performed. In total 59 women agreed to be interviewed (26 
from the MST group and 33 from the NTM group). As we were investigating here 
only the effect of the test offer, we did not include participants from the 
control group. Participants of the control group would have needed to be fully 
informed about the possibility of testing, thereby breaking the protocol of the 
RCT. 
Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen to make it possible for the participants 
to explain their own experience about the test offer and to allow a deeper 
insight into the women's motivations for their choice. The interviews lasted 
approximately 1 hour and were conducted at the participant's home (by EG and 
other professional interviewers with the VUMC). With the participant's 
permission, all interviews were recorded and transcribed. To guarantee 
anonymity, each woman was allocated a number code. 
Interviews started with open-ended questions about the woman's reasons for 
accepting or declining the test. To explore the various factors involved in the 
decision we included questions about the goals that participants aimed in 
accepting or declining the test; their needs, wishes and preferences regarding 
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testing; the ethical principles they considered when making their decision; and 
their feelings regarding their choice. Subsequently, we extended the discussion 
to the participants' ethical views about issues relating to prenatal testing, i.e. 
parental duties toward the unborn and current offspring; the worth of a 
disabled life; the acceptability of controlling the offspring's characteristics; the 
status of the foetus; and the permissibility of abortion in general and for Down 
syndrome in particular.24'27 The interview questions were assessed for their 
intelligibility after performing the five first interviews, and it was considered 
that no adaptation was needed. 
Data analysis 
Participants' views regarding testing and their reasons for their decision were 
analysed with Nudist-Vivo (N-Vivo), software V.2.0 (QSR Software, Durham, UK). 
Segments of the interview were coded, and codes were then grouped 
together into key themes. Analysis delivered nine categories according 
systematic ordering of the themes (different views) that emerged from the 
responses.22 Within these categories conflicting views were found. For the 
purposes of this paper further analyses were aimed at identifying the themes 
related to the conflicts mentioned by participants. Based on these analyses 
three topics were identified: (1) parental duties, (2) the woman's needs and 
wishes and (3) the woman's ethical principles. 
Results 
The results identify the conflicting aspects reported. 'Participants' indicates 
the whole study group. Where statements are quoted, the woman's code 
number, group, and whether she had decided to accept (acceptor) or decline 
(décliner) the test are given. The findings from the two intervention groups are 
presented together. From the RCT no differences were detected in views 
between participants in the NTM and MST groups.12 
1. Parental duties 
1.1. Towards the unborn 
Participants agreed that parents have a duty to look for the health and well 
being of their unborn child. This duty was not linked to the use of prenatal 
screening, neither to the prevention of disability. Participants limited their 
responsibility to the avoidance of actions that might have a negative influence 
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on the health of the foetus, such as smoking or drinking alcohol. Reasons for not 
including testing as a parental obligation included that the screening does not 
give sufficient information for further decisions and the awareness that testing 
does not guarantee a completely healthy life for the child. 
"Actually, everybody wants a healthy child. But there are so 
many things that can go wrong.' You never have a guarantee that 
everything is good also when you do all those tests. " (0609-079; 
NTM-decliner) 
Acceptors and decliners differed in their view about the significance of testing 
within their duties towards their unborn child. Although none of the acceptors 
aimed to avoid a child with Down syndrome, they used the screening with the 
aim to obtain assurance about the health of the foetus. At the same time, 
acceptors reported their unwillingness to take further decisions because of the 
difficulty in assessing which level of suffering should be prevented in the 
interest of the child. 
"How can you find out what is good for the child? To what degree 
does such a child realise that he has a disability? I find this quite 
difficult. My brother is deaf. For others it is awful, but he does 
not know it can be different, he has always been deaf. He has 
done very well in his life; he has a family, two healthy children. 
You could have decided that he should not be born, while he is 
very happy. " (0609-068; MST-acceptor) 
Decliners considered avoiding unnecessary risks as the best action in the 
interest of the child. Important reasons given were the ambiguity of the 
screening results and the risks of invasive testing. At the same time, decliners 
questioned whether they had to accept the screening offer in the interest of 
their future child. 
"/ think that disabled children have many qualities that can be 
stimulated. On the other hand, which future does such a child 
have? Well, this is quite problematic. The child may suffer, so are 
you not selfish if you allow him to be born? That is a very difficult 
issue." (K078-122; MST-decliner) 
1.2. Towards other children 
Participants reported the expected negative impact of a disabled child on their 
family as important in their decision about screening. Both acceptors and 
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decliners indicated that they would make another choice if their personal and 
familiar circumstances were different. 
In the case of a disability that might be compatible with a reasonably good 
life, participants questioned to what extent family interests should weigh 
against the life of the unborn. Disability was not always entirely considered 
without value. Participants mentioned that a disabled child might have a 
positive effect on the family. In spite of this opinion, they concerned about the 
burdens that their family could face when a disabled child is born. 
"/ think you can learn a great deal from these situations. That in 
life sometimes things happen through which you become more 
aware that little things mean a lot. But I feel some pressure, 
because of the impact on my family. This is quite difficult." 
(K188-189; MST-acceptor) 
A difference between acceptors and decliners was found in the extent to which 
they thought that raising a disabled child would impede them in fulfilling their 
parental responsibilities towards their other children. Acceptors feared that 
they would be unable to give enough attention to their family because of the 
extra care a disabled child would require. 
"You never know how your life will be. But this is one of the things 
you can know beforehand. I am very happy with my life; I have a 
daughter who is 1 year old. It is very important for me that my 
children are happy and this would be very difficult with a child with 
Down syndrome because it will need extra care." (K034-07; NTM-
acceptor) 
For decliners, a reason against testing was their perceived capacity to deal with 
a disabled child and the care for other children. At the same time, they were 
aware of the extra care that a child with Down syndrome needs and questioned 
whether declining the test would not be against their responsibilities towards 
their family. 
"For me this child is number two. A child with Down syndrome 
should require extra care. Perhaps that will be a reason for me to 
terminate my pregnancy because my child would get less attention. 
A child with Down syndrome would be prejudicial for my family. " 
(K078-152; NTM-decliner) 
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2. Women's needs and wishes 
Participants made their decision in order to reduce anxiety during pregnancy. 
All of them said they were satisfied with their final choice, even when they 
reported that it was not an easy one. 
Acceptors chose testing moved by a wish for more knowledge that would 
help them to avoid the anxiety of wondering if their baby was healthy and to 
confirm that everything was good. On the other hand, they reported reluctance 
to make further decisions. They postponed thinking about further options until 
the screening results were known. 
"I'm sure that I want to take the test. What will I do with the 
result? Well I will see. That's the problem. I do not want to think. I 
feel that I want to keep the baby but I also think that I will 
terminate. I have doubts about what is the best choice." (K383-176·, 
NTM-acceptor) 
Decliners chose to avoid the uncertainty and anxiety that might come with the 
screening. The fear for a miscarriage due to invasive procedures was reported 
as not weighing against their desire for reassurance about the health of the 
foetus. At the same time, decliners welcomed information. They admitted they 
would consider testing if the screening gave a sure diagnostic. 
"It is a chance approximation and this implies you have actually to 
perform an extra test. And that test is risk. I think that if I did not 
need to do that extra test I would take the screening. " (0754-09; 
NTM-decliner) 
3. Women's ethical principles 
Participants shared the view that parents ought to accept their children 
unconditionally. An exception to this rule was when the child would be so 
severe disabled that a life full suffering and without expectative would be 
expected. In this case, participants agreed that parents have a duty to decide 
about the birth of the child based upon the child's best interests. Even so, 
termination was reported to be morally problematic because it clashes with the 
right to life of the child. Participants expressed doubt about the reasons that 
would make termination of pregnancy morally acceptable. They voiced worries 
that only perfect children may be born in the future. 
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"I find abortion acceptable when you honestly do it in the interest 
of the child because you cannot care for it and then it would be 
unhappy. But there are so many reasons that I find egoistic. I 
wonder whether we are like sitting on the chair of God, in case He 
exists, that we want to decide about those things. I think that we 
are going too far in this feasible world, that we want everything to 
be perfect." (K188-167; NTM-decliner) 
Termination of pregnancy in case of disabilities that may be compatible with a 
good life was reported as egoistic. Down syndrome was not assumed to be the 
kind of suffering that parents ought to prevent. Nevertheless, participants 
approved termination when parents cannot cope with such a child, for the child 
would not have the care and love that is needed for a good life. 
"If the parents are convinced they cannot care for the child and 
they allow it to be born, that child would not be happy. Neither 
would the parents. I fear that the child would be neglected. 
Certainly, I disapprove of the parents, but on the other hand I also 
think that it is not good for the child to be born with parents who 
do not want it." (K037-101; MST-decliner) 
One of the main reasons decliners gave for not testing was that termination 
would be morally wrong in their personal circumstances. At the same time, they 
reported their difficulty to know in what cases termination would be a good 
option looking to the interest of the child. 
"Actually, you think in terms of quality of life. Is it severely 
disabled or is it a child who should have a good life, also if it has 
limitations? I find it very difficult to know what the best decision 
is. Neither do I know what the boundaries are." (K188-77; MST-
decliner) 
Discussion 
In this paper we explored the effect of an active offer of a prenatal screening 
test in a context where testing is not normal part of prenatal care. In contrast 
to studies that maintain that information facilitates women in making well 
considered decisions, participants described the choice as difficult to make 
because of the implications of the test results not only for the future child, but 
also for their family and ultimately for themselves. Although they were positive 
about their choice, participants mentioned they found themselves caught 
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between a desire for information and reassurance about the health of the 
foetus and their fear of making difficult decisions about their unborn child. 
They were concerned as to what degree family and personal well being may be 
weighed against the right to life of the foetus. The main question at this point is 
whether this difficulty can be defined as a genuine ethical dilemma. 
A moral dilemma occurs when an agent has valid moral reasons to support 
two or more exclusive actions, at least one of which he is required to do. These 
reasons involve moral principles that are equally strong and values that are 
equally central to the life of the agent. Participants in our study claimed their 
right to freely decide whether they want to use testing according to their 
assessment of the usefulness of the screening test in their individual and family 
circumstances. Closely related to this was the physical and emotional burden 
they expected from a disabled child on their family life. Down syndrome in 
itself was reported as a morally insufficient reason for termination. 
Nevertheless, participants judged termination as morally acceptable when 
parents cannot cope with the burdens that such a child would bring on their 
personal and family life. At the same time, participants voiced ethical concerns 
about selection of "perfect" children and questioned what would constitute a 
sufficiently serious disability to justify termination. All of them were reluctant 
to consider having a termination themselves. These results suggest that 
women's preferences about testing often deviate from their ethical values. 
Based on these results, we believe that women to whom a prenatal test is 
offered are confronted with a decision about what interests, preferences or 
needs would be given priority and not about two or more ethical principles they 
are compelled to follow. Therefore, we cannot define it as a genuine moral 
dilemma. Our results indicate that the possibility of testing generates a wish for 
extra information. At the same time, women fear the consequences of testing. 
The conflict that participants reported could be interpreted as the difficulty of 
assessing the usefulness of the screening to their personal situation. As 
Anderson argues the choice regarding the use of prenatal testing, could in 
reality be defined as a moral choice in which women have to decide which 
interests, needs and desires must be given priority in order to find which is the 
best option from a moral point of view.28 For our results it becomes evident that 
participants decided by balancing the interest of the foetus against their 
individual wishes and the family needs to find the option that was most in line 
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with their values. Although participants embraced their decision, they also 
reported that they would decide differently in other circumstances. 
Our findings also indicate the existence of a gap between ethical decisions in 
practice and those based on ethical theory regarding the possibility of moral 
dilemmas. Anderson claims that moral dilemmas are only possible within 
Kantian approach of ethics in which personal and moral matters are separated 
and in which moral principles are universal expressions of moral duties.28 This 
approach reduces the decision about what is right and what is wrong to the 
rational application of ethical principles and norms. According to this approach, 
conflicts between principles must be rationally resolved by consulting a higher-
level principle. When different ethical principles are both equally relevant to 
apply, an agent is caught in a situation in which there is no way to determine 
which choice is morally right for the particular situation.29 31 In this way, ethical 
decisions are reduced to technical decisions undermining the importance of the 
individual desires, preferences, circumstances and the possible consequences, 
in the decision making. However, as our results show, a rational and purely 
abstract analysis of the factors involved without taking into consideration the 
concrete persons who are embodied or implicated in the decision regarding 
testing is unlikely to capture the emotional and circumstantial concerns in 
which decisions are made. Furthermore, rational analyses of normative 
decisions often fail to take into consideration agent's values and desires, which 
are difficult to quantify.32,33 
These considerations suggest a clear need for a new ethical framework of 
thinking in reproductive decisions. A virtue ethical approach might be a 
promising alternative for identifying the nature of the conflicts that women 
reported when deciding about testing. This framework of ethical thinking 
assumes that the morality of an action varies with the circumstances of each 
particular occasion. Within this approach, an action is morally right only if it is 
what a virtuous person would do in the same circumstances. The central 
question when deciding about testing is not "is the action against any ethical 
principle?" or "does it harm anyone?" but "what would a good parent do in 
these circumstances?" Two fundamental characteristics of good parenthood are 
accepting children as they are and safeguarding the children's well being and 
happiness. Parenthood is at the same time a self-directed project. In deciding 
about testing, women are compelled to determine the effect of knowledge 
about the foetus in their acceptance and pursuit of the well being of their 
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children and in their own interest. The individual concept of a good life and the 
consequences of their choice in the short and long term play a central role in 
defining their decision. 
This study was developed in a context where there was no routine screening 
on offer. Despite this, our findings may also have implications for countries 
where testing is a standard procedure. As Suter suggests, the offer of testing 
might be regarded as self-evident and women would be likely to participate 
automatically without considering its ethical implications.34 Moreover, women 
might belief that they are morally compelled to use testing in the interest of 
their child and family. 
In the light of these results, we believe that the nature of the conflict 
women experience when deciding about testing needs to be carefully analysed 
before new screening tests are offered to a general, low-risk population. We 
propose that routine offering of prenatal screening and testing is ethically 
justified when the offer is accompanied by broad-based counselling. As 
counselling aims to assist women to choose the course of action most 
appropriate to them in view of their goals and according to the ethical values 
they hold, identifying this conflict should help caregivers to discern whether 
women make their decisions under pressure from needs, wishes and additional 
duties that might be triggered by the test offer and therefore not in the line 
with their ethical values. To help women to assess the meaning of testing within 
their parental duties, counselling should include discussion of the effect of the 
woman's wishes and preferences regarding testing, her familiar context-
bounded needs and her ethical values. Caregivers should ensure that women 
understand the advantages and disadvantages of testing and the scenarios they 
might face in case of a bad test result. Furthermore, all options, including that 
of not testing should be presented. Some practical points that may be discussed 
are: the women's thoughts about life with a child with Down syndrome; what 
they want to do with the information once they have it (that is whether they 
want to take further tests and whether termination would be an option); and 
whether they would prefer to be confronted with a disabled child at the time of 
birth or to prepare themselves and their family beforehand. 
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Abstract 
Background: In debates around prenatal screening it is frequently argued 
that responsible parenthood implies the acquisition of all available medical 
information about the health of a foetus, and the use of this information to 
benefit the future child. 
Objective: To analyse whether an active offer of a prenatal test leads 
women to believe that they are morally obliged to control the health of their 
foetus. 
Design: A substudy within a randomised controlled trial (RCT) aimed to assess 
the decision-making process of women when confronted with an offer of a 
prenatal screening test. 
Participants: 111 women participating in an RCT were retrospectively asked 
their views on the meaning of testing within their parental duties. 
Findings; Testing was described as a personal option that goes beyond the 
normal parental responsibilities. Participants did not believe that they ought 
to control the health of the foetus or to avoid disability. A duty to test was 
only reported when the birth of a disabled child would have a negative 
impact on family life. 
Conclusion: Women's accounts suggest that two main factors are involved in 
making testing morally obligatory: 1) the woman's views on her moral duties 
to her family; and 2) the expected burden of a disabled child on the well 
being of the family. A family-centred approach would be more suitable to 
assess the moral imperative character of testing. 
Implications: A test offer should not be limited to communication of the 
technical characteristics of the test and the test results. In helping women to 
assess the meaning of testing within their parental duties, counselling should 
include the family situation in which women have to decide, the women's 
expectations about living with a child with Down syndrome or any other 
disability, and the women's views on their commitments towards their 
family. 
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Introduction 
Prenatal screening by means of Nuchal Translucency Measurement (NTM) and 
the Maternal Serum screening test (MST) provides pregnant women with 
information about the risk of the foetus having Down syndrome and other 
trisomies. In addition, the MST gives information about the risk of neural tube 
defects. The aim of prenatal screening is to provide women the information 
they need to make their own reproductive decisions.13 These tests give an 
estimation of the chance that a foetus has a particular abnormality. Although 
the consensus on free parental decision making with regard to testing still 
prevails, the tendency to appeal to responsible parenthood is growing, with 
the claim that all relevant information concerning the health of the foetus 
should be obtained and used to benefit the prospective child.4'7 It has been 
argued that women who decide not to undergo testing are morally 
responsible for intentionally bringing a disabled child into the world, for 
whom future suffering could have been avoided.8"10 Consequently, women 
who are offered a prenatal test may believe they have a moral duty to be 
tested in order to ensure the health of their future child.4,1115 
Duty is a central issue in ethics. Having the moral duty to perform an 
action means that one 'ought to' perform that action. In other words, not 
fulfilling one's duties is considered to be morally wrong.16 Moral duties arise 
from undertaking particular commitments. Within the field of reproduction 
the intention to have children simultaneously entails obligations relating to 
that intention.17 Parents have the duty to look out for the well being and 
happiness of their children. This duty entails making use of all available 
means to provide their children with a satisfactory life.18 
The use of prenatal testing is often justified by the parental moral duty of 
'preventing avoidable suffering' and 'seeking the best health of the 
offspring'.2·4'13 In practice, it is not easy for parents to foresee the impact of 
disability for their child. In case of prenatal screening the decisions would be 
more complex since a increased risk result does not necessarily mean that 
the foetus is affected. Invasive diagnostic with a risk of foetal loss is 
necessary to confirm or to exclude the presence of a disability. Furthermore, 
diagnostic tests do not give any information about the consequences of the 
disability for the child. Therefore, it may not be easy for parents to 
determine whether testing is a parental duty. In the case of a higher risk of 
minor disabilities that may be compatible with a fair quality of life, such as 
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Down syndrome, the decision would be even more difficult than in the case 
of severe disabilities with intolerable suffering. Due to these difficulties, it is 
important to examine the effect of the availability of prenatal (screening) 
tests on women's ethical views and beliefs regarding their moral duties 
towards their offspring. 
Some studies on the factors that influence decision making regarding 
prenatal screening include moral values and beliefs.19"24 Most of them 
describe situations in which prenatal screening is already part of customary 
antenatal care. Consequently, women may deal with screening in a routine 
manner without explicit consideration of its moral significance.5,25 Studies 
have shown that the routine offer of screening places a moral responsibility 
on women to comply with screening, making women believe that the 
prevention of disability is a matter of responsible parenthood.5,26 In contrast 
to other Western countries, health policy in the Netherlands has been more 
reluctant to make screening available to all pregnant women. At the time 
when this study was performed (2001-2004), prenatal screening (NTM and 
MST) was not offered in the Netherlands as part of prenatal care. The active 
offer of prenatal testing to pregnant women was forbidden by law. Only 
women of advanced maternal age (aged > 36 years) or women at increased 
risk of having a disabled child because of medical indications were offered 
invasive tests. Women with a low or normal risk had to request the test 
themselves. Health-care workers have only been allowed to inform all 
pregnant women about the options for prenatal screening at the booking visit 
since January 2007. 
The Dutch situation before 2007 created a unique opportunity to study the 
different motives involved in decision making. A randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) was designed to assess the decision-making process when women were 
confronted with the offer of a prenatal screening test.27 The RCT was 
developed with an intervention group (women offered an NTM or an MST) and 
a control group (women who were not offered a prenatal screening test).27 
Data were collected using open-ended questionnaires at five different times 
during pregnancy: before any information about screening was given, and a 
decision about whether or not to have screening was not actual (T1); after 
women had decided for or against prenatal screening (T2), but (if applicable) 
before they had received the screening result; after the screening result was 
known or at a comparable point in time when screening was denied (T3); at 
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28 weeks of pregnancy (T4); and within two months after delivery (T5). 
Questionnaires included open-ended questions about background variables 
such as age, education, parity and religion (T1); participants' reasons for 
accepting or declining the prenatal screening test (T2); and participants' 
view on and satisfaction with the decision they made (T3, T4 and T5).27 
In addition to the RCT, a qualitative study into the impact of the 
participants' ethical beliefs on decision making was undertaken. This 
qualitative study consisted of interviews on T2. These interviews revealed 
that the offer of prenatal screening compelled participants to reflect on the 
value of information about the health of the foetus in their individual family 
and personal situation, and ultimately about the meaning of testing within 
their parental and reproductive duties.28,29 
Methods 
In order to gain a better understanding of the concrete impact of the 
availability of prenatal screening on the way in which women shape their 
moral duties to their prospective child, a second substudy was developed at 
the end of the RCT. All women who were still participating in the RCT were 
approached to answer an additional open-ended questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was designed to assess whether the availability of prenatal 
screening leads women to believe that they have a moral duty to accept 
testing. 
The questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part focused on the views 
of participants on prenatal screening. Participants were asked to give their 
opinion on the screening offer, and to indicate which decision they would 
make in a subsequent pregnancy and their reasons. The latter question aimed 
to assess the relationship between the theoretical view of participants 
regarding screening and actual decisions. 
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of eight ethical axioms 
about reproductive and parental duties and rights in relation to prenatal 
testing. The participants were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed 
with each statement, and to explain their reasons. The topics assessed by the 
axioms were drawn from analysis of the participants' interviews at T2. The 
selected topics were confronted with themes that were mentioned in the 
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literature.24,30 To test the comprehensibility of the axioms, eight pilot 
questionnaires were performed with colleagues and students who were not 
involved in the research. Axioms that were dif f icult to interpret were 
adapted. The questionnaire is given in Table 1. 
This substudy was approved by the Minister of Health and the Medical 
Ethics Committee of the VU University Medical Centre. 
Table 1. Questionnaire. 
First part: View on prenatal screening and the decision regarding the 
acceptance of the screening offer in the past pregnancy. 
1 - You were offered a prenatal screening test during your pregnancy. What, at 
this moment, is your opinion regarding this offer? Could you please indicate 
the reason (s) why you find it good or not? 
2- Did you perform a prenatal (screening) test? 
If you did, which test did you perform? 
Will you make the same choice regarding testing in a subsequent pregnancy? 
Could you specify the reasons for your decision looking to the interests of 
your child, your partner and yourself? 
Second part: Moral views about the meaning of prenatal testing and abortion 
Below there are some statements related to prenatal testing and termination of 
pregnancy. Could you indicate whether you agree and give the reason(s) why? 
Please use the subsequent form in your answer: I agree/ do not agree with this 
statement because...] 
3."An unborn child has an absolute right to life even if it is (severely) disabled 
4. "If prenatal screening/ testing is offered as normal pregnancy care parents 
would believe that it is good to test the foetus" 
.Parents have the moral duty to use prenatal screening/testing in order to get 
more knowledge about the health of their child" 
4. "Parents who do not want to use testing are accountable for the personal and 
social consequences of a disabled child" 
5. "Parents have the duty to take all the available measures to assure a health 
child" 
6 "Parents have the duty to protect the life of their unborn child " 
7. "Parents have the right to freely decide about the birth of a disabled child" 
8. "Termination of pregnancy is morally good when performed in the best 
interests of the child" 
Port/c/ponis 
The questionnaire was sent to 136 women who were sti l l participating in the 
RCT. In tota l , 111 women (44 from the MST group and 67 from the NTM 
group) returned a completed questionnaire. Of these women, 109 delivered 
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healthy children and two delivered a disabled child (Down syndrome and anal 
atresia). The latter two women did not make use of prenatal screening. 
The demographic characteristics of the participants in this substudy were 
compared with the participants in the RCT. The subgroup was found to be a 
representative sample of the RCT participants in terms of social status, level 
of education, age and religious convictions. The demographic characteristics 
of the participants are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of participants. 
Age (years) 
<26 
26-30 
31-35 
>35 
Educational level 
Low 
Middle 
High 
unknown 
Marital status 
Single 
Married 
Cohabiting 
Number of children 
0 
1 
2 
>3 
Professional work 
Yes 
No 
Religion 
Without religion 
Christian 
Muslim 
Other 
Number 
participants 
9 
45 
46 
11 
9 
48 
51 
3 
2 
78 
31 
56 
40 
12 
3 
96 
15 
45 
58 
3 
3 
Percentage (%) 
8.1 % 
40.5% 
41.4% 
9.9% 
8.1% 
43.2% 
45.9% 
2.7% 
1.8% 
70.3% 
27.9% 
50.4% 
36.0% 
10.8% 
2.7% 
86.5% 
13.5% 
42.3% 
52.2% 
2.7% 
2.7% 
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Analysis of the data 
The first part of the questionnaire was analysed both quantitatively (SPSS 
11.0) and qualitatively (Nudist-Vivo, 2.0, QSR software, Durham, UK). 
Answers were coded according to the different reasons that women gave 
when describing their view on the screening offer, whether or not they had 
decided to have a prenatal screening test, and the decision they would make 
in a subsequent pregnancy. 
The comments to the ethical axioms of the second part of the 
questionnaire were analysed qualitatively (Nudist-Vivo, 2.0, QSR software, 
Durham, UK). Responses were divided into meaning units that corresponded 
to the issues discussed in the questions. The meaning units were subsequently 
condensed and shortened into codes. The codes were compared based on 
differences and similarities, and sorted into four categories that correspond 
with two main underlining themes: "making one's own reproductive decisions 
regarding the offspring's characteristics" and 'duty to assure the well being 
of the offspring". 
All the questionnaires were analysed separately by two researchers (EG 
and trainee), and codes fragment were compared. Differences were found in 
fragments with a double coding (i.e. 'the duty to terminate an affected 
pregnancy' versus 'the duty to guarantee a good life for the future child'). 
After discussion, these discrepancies were resolved. The final version of the 
coded document was revised by EvL and DT. 
Findings 
Participants' views on the screening offer and the decision they made during 
pregnancy and their views about their parental rights and duties are 
presented below. Citations are quoted with the code assigned to each 
participant. The data in parentheses indicate: the screening test that was 
offered to the participant; whether or not the participant decided to have a 
screening test (acceptors are women who accepted the offer of a screening 
test; decliners are those who decided not to have a screening test); and the 
decision the participant would make in a subsequent pregnancy. 
1. Women's view on the screening offer 
The majority of participants (91/111) had a positive view of prenatal 
screening and opined that screening should be offered to all pregnant 
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women. Both the women who accepted a screening test and those who 
declined it described the offer of the screening test during our study as an 
opportunity to shape their views about testing. However, they recognised 
that the decision was not easy to make: 
"I appreciate the possibility to think about these issues. And the 
choice was on me. I didn't accept the screening because I 
decided that my child was welcome, it didn't matter anyhow. 
But it was a difficult choice." (K236-180; MST-decliner, would 
not test) 
Participants who described the offer of prenatal screening as negative 
(11/111) reported that they were compelled to think about everything that 
could go wrong with the foetus. The fact that screening only gives a risk 
estimation was seen as an additional source of worry. 
"I was forced to think about things / didn't want to think about. 
The test does not give any assurance. Nothing is completely 
sure. I would become insecure as the screening gave a bad 
result." (K027-133; MST-acceptor, would test) 
An overview of participants' views on the offer of prenatal screening is given 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. View of participants of the offer of prenatal screening. 
Prenatal screening 
performed 
Prenatal screening not 
performed 
Total 
Positive 
Number (%) 
39 (92,9 %) 
52 (75.4%) 
91 (81,9%) 
Negative 
Number (%) 
3(7,1%) 
8(11,6%) 
11 (9,9%) 
Positive and 
negative 
Number (%) 
9(13%) 
9(8,1%) 
Total 
42 
69 
111 
2. Women's decision in a subsequent pregnancy 
Most participants who made use of prenatal screening (39/42) embraced their 
decision and would make the same decision again in a subsequent pregnancy. 
The main reasons given for opting again for screening were: to get assurance 
about the health of the foetus; to avoid the burdens of a disability for the 
child itself and for their family; to obtain useful information for further 
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decisions; because of a higher personal risk due to a more advanced age in a 
next pregnancy; and to prepare emotionally for the birth of a disabled child. 
"I would use screening again because it gives me and my partner 
the possibility of the presence of a disability in the child. You 
get clear information. So we can prepare us for the birth of a 
disabled child. " (K372-052; MST-acceptor, would test) 
Few acceptors (3/42) reported that they would not have a screening test in a 
subsequent pregnancy. The reasons they gave were: the lack of personal risk; 
the impossibility of excluding all disabilities; their unwillingness to make 
further decisions about invasive testing and abortion; and the fact that 
screening only gives a risk approximation. 
"Actually you don't know anything and you have to make very 
difficult decisions based on a risk approximation." (K027-134; 
MST-acceptor, would not test) 
Most decliners (67/69) were happy with the decision they made. Many of 
them (54/67) considered screening to be unnecessary because they thought 
that a child with Down syndrome can have a good life. The reasons they gave 
for not making use of screening were: the belief that parents ought to accept 
every child regardless of its health status; the unwillingness to decide about 
termination of pregnancy; and the lack of a personal risk. 
"A disabled child can be happy. Children with Down syndrome 
are often happy. I don't want to have to decide about 
termination. It is not good that parents choose which kind of 
children they want and which they do not." (K078-157; NTM 
décliner, would not test) 
Decliners also mentioned the ambiguity of a risks assessment test as an 
additional reason for their decision against screening. 
"You can use screening, but what for? The screening does not 
give any clear result. It only gives a likelihood of your child 
having a disability or not. You cannot do anything with that 
information." (K380-195; MST-decliner, would not test) 
Some decliners (13/69) would make use of prenatal screening in a subsequent 
pregnancy. The main reason they gave was the impact of a disabled child on 
their family life. Most of these women (11/13) reported that even if they 
believed that a disabled child has a right to live, they would choose to have a 
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screening test due to the impact of a disabled child on the well being of their 
family. 
"I think that a disabled child also has right to live. But looking to 
my partner and family, I would use testing in a next pregnancy 
because a disabled child would have an enormous negative 
impact on my family. " (K027-136; NSM décliner, would test) 
A second reason given by decliners for using screening in a subsequent 
pregnancy was the increased personal risk of a disabled child because of 
more advanced age (6/13). Additional reasons were: to prepare for the birth 
of a disabled child; and to reassure that everything is going well. 
Information about the view of participants on their decisions and the 
decision that they would make in a subsequent pregnancy are given in Table 
4. 
Table 4. View of participants on their own decision regarding the 
acceptance/non-acceptance of prenatal screening and the decision that 
they would make in a subsequent pregnancy. 
Prenatal screening 
performed 
Prenatal screening 
not performed 
Total 
View on own decision 
Positive 
Number (%) 
39 (92.9%) 
67(97.1%) 
106 (95.5%) 
Negative 
Number (%) 
3 (7.1%) 
2 (2.9%) 
5(4.5%) 
Decision in a subsequent 
pregnancy 
Would test 
Number (%) 
39 (92.9%) 
13 (18.8%) 
52(46.8%) 
Would not 
test 
Number (%) 
3 (7.1%) 
54 (78.2%) 
57 (50.4%) 
Would see 
Number (%) 
2 (2.9%) 
2 (1.8%) 
3.-Women's views on the meaning of prenatal screening within their 
parental duties and rights 
Two main categories came to the fore from the analysis of the open-ended 
answers to the ethical axioms: 1 ) the right of the parents to make their own 
decisions regarding the characteristics of their child; and 2) the parental duty 
to assure the well being of the offspring. A summary of the themes and 
subthemes is given in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Summary of the themes and subthemes that emerged from the 
analysis of the questionnaires. 
Women's views on the meaning of prenatal screening within their parental duties 
and rights 
Making their own reproductive Following their own needs and preferences 
decisions regarding the offspring's Carrying the responsibility for one's 
characteristics offspring 
Duty to assuring the well being of the Assuring a healthy child 
offspring Avoiding disability 
3.1. Making their own reproductive decisions regardins the 
characteristics of the child. 
- Following the own needs and preferences. 
Participants claimed that parents have a right to freely decide whether they 
want to use screening according to their individual and family needs. In line 
with this view, they stated that caregivers must give women the chance to 
follow their own priorities without being pressured to conform to medical and 
social norms. 
"Parents have to freely decide what the best for their child is. 
They are the ones who have to care for it!" (K383-158; NTM 
acceptor, would not test) 
Many of the participants reported the concern that autonomous decision 
making would be compromised if screening becomes standard prenatal care. 
They feared that women would see screening as part of normal care, having 
the test without making well considered decisions. 
- Carrying the responsibility for one's offspring. 
All participants reported that parents always have responsibility for their 
children. This responsibility was limited to ensure that children have a good 
and happy life. However, participants did not think that this responsibility 
includes the duty to control the health of the foetus through prenatal testing. 
On the contrary, they believed that parents can make responsible choices by 
ignoring information if they think that extra knowledge would not contribute 
to better decision in the interest of the child. 
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"Parents have the only duty to create an optimal environment 
where their children can grow up and develop. This does not mean 
that they have a duty to seek information about the health of 
their unborn child." (K194-158; NTM décliner, would not test) 
3.2. Duty to assure the well being of the offspring 
- Assuring a healthy child. 
Participants recognised the wish to have healthy children as a legitimate 
parental concern. They reported that women have an absolute duty to use all 
available means to assure and improve the health of their offspring. Most of 
them associated this duty with the avoidance of those substances that could 
harm the foetus. Causing impairment to the foetus due to negligence was 
reported as irresponsible and unethical behaviour. 
"The unborn depends completely on the mother. When you 
decide to brins a child into the world, you have to $ive some 
things up and try to live healthily. You must avoid everything 
that can negatively affect the foetus." (K188-189; NMT 
acceptor, would test) 
Prenatal screening was not reported as part of the parental duty of seeking 
the best health for the foetus. The main reason given for not considering 
screening as morally mandatory was the uncertainty about the best course of 
action in the case of an unfavourable screening result. 
"What do you with the information if the screening is positive? 
There are not concrete indications about which is the best 
option by each test's result." (K187-189; NTM acceptor, would 
test) 
The right of parents to avoid difficult decisions regarding termination was 
also reported as an argument against a parental duty to use screening. 
Contrary to the above, participants reported that screening should be 
advised for women who already know they are at a higher risk for a disabled 
child because of their personal or family history. 
- Avoiding disability. 
Participants believed that parents are not morally bounded to avoid those 
disabilities that are no consequence of voluntary undertaking. The parental 
decision to allow a disabled child to be born was considered to be a 
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responsible line of conduct when parents think that they can guarantee a 
good life for the child. In the case of a child with Down syndrome, this view 
was supported by the fact that participants believed that such children are 
generally happy. 
Participants manifested their concerns about the changes in societal 
attitudes to disabled children, and feared that parents would be compelled 
to only have perfect children. 
"If a disabled child has a happy life, then that life is a worthy 
life. We cannot make a society where everybody has the choice 
to have only perfect children. " (K037-089; MST acceptor, would 
test) 
Both participants who welcomed screening and those who opposed it believed 
that parents ought to accept their children and to care for them regardless of 
their health status. They reported termination as morally acceptable only in 
the case of severe disabilities when a life full of suffering could be expected. 
"It is up to the parents to decide about the life of the child. 
They are the only ones who know whether they are able to care 
for him. But I think it is better for a severely disabled child not 
to be born. Parents can avoid such a child coming into the world 
if they know this on time. But this only when the child would be 
severely disabled. " (K236-130; NTM acceptor, would test) 
Discussion 
This study explores whether the offer of a prenatal screening test leads 
women to believe that they are morally obliged to control the health of their 
foetus. In ethical literature, it has been argued that the availability of 
prenatal testing results in a morally binding perspective for pregnant 
women.5,12·15·18'26'30'31 The results of this study contradict this argument. Both 
the participants who were personally in favour of screening and those who 
were against it considered that testing goes beyond the normal parental 
duties towards a prospective child. Although most of the participants had a 
positive view about the offer of screening tests and agreed that screening 
should be offered to everyone, they defended the autonomy of women to 
freely decide whether or not to undergo a test and whether or not to 
continue with the pregnancy in the case of a confirmed disability. 
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Participants opined that mothers have the responsibility to seek the best 
health for their child. This responsibility was limited to those measures that 
contribute to a healthy pregnancy. Testing was not reported as part of this 
responsibility. The only case in which participants reported a moral duty for 
screening was in the case of a pregnant woman who is high risk for a foetus 
with disabilities due to personal or family history. In this case, testing was 
described as prudent for assurance of the health of the foetus. Still, 
participants claimed that further decisions about the birth of a disabled child 
always belong to the parents. 
In contrast to the participants' standpoint that testing should be in the 
best interests of the child, the main reason they gave for the use of prenatal 
screening in a subsequent pregnancy was the negative impact of a disabled 
child on their commitments to their existing children. Most participants 
believed that a child with Down syndrome could have a good and happy life. 
Nevertheless, they feared that the care for such a child would result in loss 
of time and attention for the other children in the family. Even if 
participants believed that good mothers should care for a disabled child and 
protect its life, they argued that the cost to families of raising a disabled 
child might justify the abortion of a foetus with Down syndrome. 
Women's accounts suggest that two main factors underline the decision 
regarding testing: 1) the women's views on their moral duties to their 
offspring; and 2) the expected burden of a disabled child on the well being of 
their partner and other existing children. Women confronted with a prenatal 
screening test are compelled to balance their moral duties towards their 
future child and their family. The parental duty to ensure that children have 
a good and happy life may lead women to believe that they ought to undergo 
prenatal testing if they believe that the extra care needed for a disabled 
child would impede them from giving their existing children the necessary 
time and attention. 
The findings of this study highlight the importance of the social context in 
decision making regarding the use of prenatal testing. What is considered to 
be a minimum condition for a good life is, to a large extent, socially 
determined.32 The general social views about the quality of life of a disabled 
child and the alleged burdens that such a child may inflict on the family may 
place a moral responsibility on women to comply with screening, making 
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them believe that the prevention of disability is a matter of responsible 
parenthood. 
Conclusions and implications 
The strength of this study lies in the fact that the offer of screening during 
the RCT gave participants the opportunity to make up their minds about the 
place of testing within their parental responsibilities. The retrospective 
approach allows women to (objectively) manifest their views regarding 
testing without being influenced by the pressure of making a decision. 
Furthermore, it allows women to incorporate their experience with screening 
not only during pregnancy - and therefore in relation to a prospective child -
but also in relation to the concrete child they decided to test or not to test. 
Some limitations of this study must be mentioned. Firstly, the finding that 
participants did not consider screening to be morally obligatory may be 
related to the fact that the offer of screening in the Netherlands emphasises 
the free character of the choice. At the same time, this fact does confirm the 
impact of the societal and cultural context on women's decisions. Studies in 
countries where prenatal screening is performed as routine prenatal care 
show that it is generally expected that women participate in testing. A 
comparative study on the offer of prenatal screening showed that choice was 
mentioned only briefly or not at all in most of the leaflets.33"35 In these 
countries, the rates of termination of pregnancy for foetal anomaly following 
prenatal testing are high.36 The concrete impact of the cultural and social 
framework on the ethical deliberation of pregnant women on accepting or 
declining a prenatal screening test is the subject of further research. 
Another limitation of this study is that most participants were not 
confronted with undesirable pregnancy outcomes. This fact may mean that 
the decliners did not consider screening to be necessary. Also, for most 
acceptors, the screening test was a confirmation of the health of their 
foetus, and therefore they would repeat this positive experience in a next 
pregnancy. 
The percentage of well-educated women in the study was higher than the 
percentage in the total population. This difference may have affected the 
pattern of acceptance and decline of screening tests.37 However, results from 
the RCT and the qualitative study did not show any significant difference in 
the acceptance of testing or ethical beliefs between women with low and 
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high levels of education. This conclusion can only be confirmed by future 
research including a representative percentage of low-educated women. 
Translated to medical practice, these results indicate that in order to help 
women to assess the meaning of testing within their parental duties, the 
personal and family situation in which women have to decide should be 
discussed when screening tests are offered. Counselling should also include 
discussion about the women's expectations about living with a child with 
Down syndrome or other disability, and the women's views on their 
commitments towards her family. 
The results of this study do not only have clinical relevance but are also 
relevant for ethical theory. Debates about the ethical convenience of 
offering prenatal screening tests to all pregnant women are focused on the 
duties of pregnant women towards their unborn child, and on the rights of 
the foetus to (a good) life.3 8 , 3 9 The study findings indicate that practical 
decisions are driven by perceptions of the burden of a disabled child on a 
woman's commitments to her family. This reveals the importance of the 
interplay between the decision regarding the acceptance of prenatal testing 
and the family context in which the decision is made. This interplay is often 
omitted in discussions about testing.Λ0 A family-centred approach may be 
more suitable to assess when and how prenatal testing involves a parental 
duty than ethical discussion about the rights of the foetus and the woman's 
duties towards her unborn child. 
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CASE STUDY: 
HOW THE AVAILABILITY OF PRENATAL SCREENING 
SHAPES WOMEN'S ETHICAL VIEWS 
REGARDING 'IHEIR 
PARENTAL DUTIES. 
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Introduction 
Precedent chapters in this thesis have shown the central role of the context in 
which choices are made in case of prenatal screening and testing. The women's 
duty to provide the best possible life for their family can morally compel 
women to make use of screening when they expect that they will not be able to 
give a disabled child and their family the care and attention they need. The 
choice regarding prenatal testing appears to be determined by: 1) the women's 
physical, emotional and financial capacity to guarantee a good life for a 
(disabled) child and their family; 2) the care they owe to their family and 3) the 
women's willingness to take responsibility through choice. 
To illuminate these findings, we offer in this chapter a reflexive analysis of 
the experience of one participant in our qualitative study who declined the 
offer of a Maternal Serum screening test (MST) and delivered a child with Down 
syndrome. She was married and younger than 35 year. This child was her second 
child. Her first child (a girl) was born healthy. She declined the MST because 
she did not want to be confronted with further decisions about invasive 
diagnosis and abortion. Furthermore, she did not consider Down syndrome as 
severe enough to justify termination of pregnancy. Therefore, she preferred to 
be confronted with a disability at the moment of the birth. Also if her ethical 
views regarding testing and abortion did not change after the birth of her 
disabled child, she reported that she would use prenatal testing in a next 
pregnancy in order to avoid the birth of a (second) disabled child. 
Data collection 
Data collection took place at four different times: before the screening was 
offered (T1); within a week after the test offer was received and before the 
test would eventually be performed (T2); in the last trimester of pregnancy 
(T4); within two months after delivery (T5). 
T1, T4 and T5 took place through open ended questionnaires. All 
questionnaires included items about the woman's ethical views regarding the 
selection of the offspring's characteristics and abortion. In questionnaire T4 we 
included additional questions about her feelings regarding the test offer and the 
decision she made. An additional question concerning her view about the right 
decision in case of a foetus with Down syndrome was included. In questionnaire 
T5 we asked her whether she would make the same decision in a next 
pregnancy and the reasons for her decision. In this questionnaire some items on 
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the meaning of prenatal screening within the parental reproductive duties and 
rights were included. 
Data collection at T2 took place through a semi structured interview. We 
opted for an interview to facilitate participant in the manifestation of her 
motivations for her decision. 
Results 
1. View on the offer of prenatal testing 
Participant described the offer of prenatal screening as confronting because it 
made her aware of the possibility that her unborn child could be disabled. She 
also feared that the midwife would compel her to accept the test. 
"I became scared. I felt uncertain and confused. I worried that I 
would be pressured to test. I called the midwife and I thousht that 
she would tell me that I have to accept it. " (From T2) 
She was also concerned about medical dominance over pregnancy. Therefore, 
she did not think that testing should be offered to all pregnant women. 
"Everythins is becoming so medical! You can no longer enjoy your 
pregnancy. You worry all the time about your baby. You are 
supposed to enjoy a little bit. It seems that pregnancy is a medical 
condition, but it is something natural. I do not think it is good that 
testing become something normal. " (From T2) 
At the same time, she believed that parents always have a right to decide about 
the birth of a disabled child. Therefore, she considered that testing should be 
offered to all pregnant women even if she considered screening as ethically 
unacceptable for her. 
"/ think it is good that people get the chance to have a test 
performed. Everybody must get the opportunity to decide whether 
they want such a child. " (From T4) 
2. Reasons for declining the test 
The main reason she reported for declining MST was that she did not want to 
have an abortion. She justified abortion only in case of a severely disabled child 
when a life full of suffering could be expected. She did not see Down syndrome 
as severe enough to justify termination. She believed that such a child can be 
happy and have a good life. The only reason she saw for accepting screening 
was to prepare herself for the birth of a disabled child. 
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"Down syndrome is not a reason for abortion. If I were to know 
that my child would have a worthless life, then I think I would opt 
for abortion. It is irrational to continue pregnancy when a life full 
of pain and suffering could be expected. But this is not the case for 
a child with Down syndrome. I think that children with Down 
syndrome can have a happy life. You have of course severe forms 
of Down syndrome but in general they are happy children. Well, it 
is a very ethical issue. " (From T2) 
Her personal experience with a disabled sister made her positive about the 
potential of living a full life with a disability. 
"I will only think about abortion if my baby is severely disabled. 
But a minor disability, say blindness, would not be a reason for me 
for termination. Such a child can have a fairly normal life. I think 
it is ethically acceptable to terminate the pregnancy. But only in 
case of severe disabilities. " (From TI) 
Participant was of the opinion that good parents and especially mothers ought 
to accept their children as they are unconditionally. She described striving for 
perfect children as being against good motherhood. 
"You bring a baby into the world and you hope that everything is 
good. If it has a disability, you must love him as much as other 
children. It is not the fault of the child! Sometimes you hear 
about mothers who abandon their child immediately after birth 
because it has Down syndrome! I think: what kind of mother are 
you? You are still its mother! It is so odd that she doesn't have 
any feeling for the child. It is a baby!" (From 72) 
Participant reported that mothers bear the responsibility for the well being of 
their children. She extended her responsibilities toward her unborn child to live 
healthy during pregnancy. 
"Mothers ought to seek for the health of their baby. They have a 
duty to avoid risk for the health of their future child such as using 
alcohol and drugs. They have to try to eat healthy and to avoid 
places where people smoke. If you want children you have to try 
to live as healthy as possible. " (From TI) 
Additional reasons she gave for declining the screening offer were the lack of 
personal risk since her health was good and her first pregnancy was without 
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problems. Therefore, she believed that there was no need for her to have a 
screening test. 
"/ didn't have any problem in my first pregnancy. And I don't think 
that I have a high risk to get a child with Down syndrome. We both 
have healthy families. No I don't think I have a high risk." (From 
T2) 
During the interview at T2 it became clear that the most important reason for 
declining screening was her fear of an unfavourable screening result. She 
acknowledged that she did not want to take the responsibility of further 
decisions about invasive diagnosis with a risk for the foetus and eventual 
abortion in case of a confirmed disability. Therefore, she preferred to be 
confronted with a possibly disabled child at birth. 
"When I got the booklet with information about the Maternal 
Screening test I got upset. I read it and I saw that you should 
consider an amniocentesis if the screening result is too high. I 
don't want a needle in my belly. My first reaction was to throw 
the booklet away. But later I picked it up and I thought, well I 
must have a blood test because I'm Rhesus negative. They can 
test the baby at the same time. Perhaps it is good that I got this 
chance and I should take it. But the fear won! For suppose they 
find something wrong. Suppose that it is not good! I know what 
the consequences are and that scares me. You have to wait, I 
don't know how many weeks, and I don't think I could sleep till I 
knew the results. I'm so afraid for the results. " (From T2) 
Although she believed she had no reasons to fear that something was wrong with 
the baby, she expressed her need to have assurance that everything was going 
well. One of her reasons for declining the screening offer was the uncertainty of 
the screening results. Despite her desire for reassurance from the test, she 
weighed this up against the anxiety related to a high risk. She expected that the 
20th week ultrasound would confirm that the baby was healthy. 
"If the test would give 100% certainty about the presence of a disability I 
might accept it. Well I hope that they can say anything in the 20th week 
standard ultrasound. It is a pity that I've not received the other 
screening test, I mean the Nuchal Translucency Measurement, because I 
think that I might have accepted it, just to see my baby and know that 
everything is going well. " (From T2) 
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3. input of other persons in her decision 
Participant shared her decision to decline the screening with her partner. 
Although, he liked her to accept the MST he could understand her motives and 
agreed that the screening test would make her uncertain and more worried. 
"We (she and her husband) have talked about and discussed these 
issues. He save me his opinion. He said: "you have the 
opportunity to do it, why don't you take it?" But he could also 
understand me, and he agreed with me- He agreed that it was 
better for me not to take the test. Because he knows how I am. 
He said I know you and I understand that you do not want to do 
it." (From T2) 
The positive attitude of her partner about screening made her doubt about her 
decision to decline the test. After discussion with her partner about their 
capacity to care for a child with Down syndrome, she was confirmed in her 
decision. The fact that her partner also believed that a child with Down 
syndrome has a right to live made her more confident. 
"When he said that he would prefer to have the screening, I began 
to doubt about it. We talked again about it. He said: "you must 
decide, you are the one who is pregnant, you're the one who will 
be with child most of the time and if you say that you can cope 
with it ..." And he beliefs that I can. I carry the baby! I'll care for 
the child. He wouldn't. He is at his work most of the time. Of 
course, he is at home in the evening, and he helps me. Therefore, 
I think that we can manage it. And he also believes that a child 
with Down syndrome or with a minor disability has a right to live. " 
(From T2) 
Participant approached one of her sisters who had used testing during 
pregnancy because of medical reasons. Her sister confirmed her in her decision 
that it was not necessary for her because she did not have any reason to fear 
that the child would be disabled. Like her husband she could understand her 
fear for the MST. 
"My sister used testing. But she told me that she had to do it 
because she had cancer when she was young and got 
chemotherapy. She did not have another option. But that is not my 
case! And she said to me: We all know you. You are always so 
scared. "Miep panic. " That is my nickname!" (From T2) 
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4. View on her decision of not using screening 
The offer of prenatal screening during our study confronted her with the 
possibility that her child will be disabled. During the interview she reported 
ambivalent feelings about her decision not to use screening. She wondered 
whether she had to accept the test in order to confirm that her child did not 
have Down syndrome. 
"I already knew that there is always a chance that something goes 
wrong with your baby, but the offer made me more aware. I think 
that 1/900 is a very high risk. I hadn't realized this before. I'm 
now aware that I can be just that one among the 900.(..) What if I 
get a child with Down syndrome? Sometimes I think that I would 
have to accept the test. " (From T2) 
She demonstrated her feelings of uncertainty through searching for 
information about Down syndrome. She also talked with a work colleague 
who was mother of a child with Down syndrome. Her colleague made her 
aware of the burdens of raising a child with Down syndrome. 
"I've looked for information before I finally made my decision. I 
think it is very important to be informed before you decide what 
to do. I also talked with a colleague who has a child with Down 
syndrome. She said that they couldn't detect it by her. And she 
told me that such a child is an economic burden because they (the 
government people) do not give her much money and she has more 
children!" (From T2) 
She continued to manifest ambivalent feelings during the course of pregnancy. 
At one side she reported her doubts about whether she had to assure that her 
child was not severely disabled. On the other side she believed that she had 
made the right decision. She considered screening not acceptable for her 
because she did not want to decide about abortion. Furthermore, she reported 
that screening can never guarantee that the child would not be disabled. 
"Suppose that it is severely disabled. Then I would doubt all my 
life whether I've made the right choice for the child. But I think 
that screening is not acceptable for me. I do not know whether I 
could live with the idea that I did not allow my child to be born. 
And it is not sure that you get a healthy child also when you get a 
good screening result. " (From T4) 
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After the birth of her child with Down syndrome she reported that she was 
happy with the decision not to accept the screening test. Otherwise, she would 
not have enjoyed her pregnancy knowing that her child was disabled given that 
she had not chosen for abortion. 
"I can only speak for myself. I'm very happy I didn't take the 
screening! My baby has Down syndrome! I would not have enjoyed 
my pregnancy if I knew this before. " (From T5) 
Some days after she returned the last questionnaire (T5) she spontaneously sent 
us an e-mail where she manifested her concerns about the pro-abortion 
mentality that she thought was bound to prenatal testing. She asked us to give 
positive information about Down syndrome. 
"I am now the mother of a child with Down syndrome. I've 
experienced the test as anti-Down. Testing pressures you to abort 
if it shows that the child is disabled. I've not read anywhere about 
the happiness such a child gives you. Please give the right 
information about Down syndrome. It is not so awful!" 
5. Decision in a next pregnancy 
Regardless of her ethical views about the acceptability of abortion for Down 
syndrome she reported that she would use screening in a next pregnancy to 
avoid the burden of a disabled child on her family. She feared that she would 
not be able to assure a good live for her daughter and two disabled children. 
"In a next pregnancy I would accept screening in the interest of my 
family and partner. It should be an extreme burden to have two 
disabled children. I don't know whether we would be able to cope 
with this." (From T5) 
Still, she considered abortion only acceptable for severe disabilities and 
remained concerned that only perfect children would be born. 
"I think that abortion is acceptable in case of severe disabilities. 
But not for minor disabilities. I fear that only perfect people will 
be born in the future. Many parents will not choose for a child 
with Down syndrome. We cannot create a world where only 
perfect children are welcome. " (From T5) 
Discussion 
This case illustrates the different considerations that shape women's choices 
regarding the acceptance of prenatal screening. It also reveals the importance 
of the interplay between the decisions regarding prenatal testing and the 
context in which choices are made. This interplay confirms the adequateness of 
a relational concept of autonomy for ethical deliberation regarding prenatal 
testing. 
For this participant, screening was closely linked to the decision of aborting 
an affected foetus. Therefore, she did not see the test as a personal option. 
Although, she believed that parents have a right to decide whether they can 
cope with the care of a disabled child, she judged Down syndrome as not severe 
enough to justify termination of pregnancy. 
The screening offer during our study caused a conflict between her wish for 
reassurance about the health of the foetus and her unwillingness to make 
further decisions about her unborn child. Despite her desire for reassurance 
from the test, she decided to avoid the difficult decisions that might come with 
knowledge about the health status of the foetus. 
She also reported a conflict between her duty to avoid suffering due to 
(severe) disability and the duty to accept children unconditionally. This conflict 
was expressed in feelings of guilt and moral concerns about whether she had to 
accept the screening offer in order to exclude a severe disabled child. She 
reported these feelings both during decision making and in the course of 
pregnancy. Her way to escape from this conflict was to avoid the responsibility 
of further decisions that might come with knowledge about the health of the 
foetus and to leave the pregnancy to follow its natural course. Regardless of her 
doubts and ambivalent feelings about her decision, her moral beliefs about the 
right of life of the foetus and the parental duty to unconditionally accept every 
child gave her enough reasons to believe that their decision to declining the 
screening was right. 
After the birth of a disabled child, however, she reported that she should 
test in a next pregnancy, in order to avoid the burden of a disabled child on her 
family. Although, she still did not agree with abortion for Down syndrome the 
responsibility for the care of a disabled child produced a change towards 
acceptation of prenatal screening and abortion in a next pregnancy. In contrast 
to early attitudes toward testing and termination she puts the well being of her 
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family in the first place and concludes that her initial moral standpoints would 
not justify another disabled child. 
The apparent inconsistence between the participant's ethical beliefs and her 
decision in a next pregnancy can be seen as part of moral development. 
Although she was aware during her pregnancy that there can be always 
something wrong with the health of the foetus, she hadn't any reason to fear 
that she belonged to a high risks group. Therefore, she did not believe that she 
had a moral duty to accept the screening. However, the birth of her child with 
Down syndrome made her aware of her real possibility of getting a disabled 
child. Knowing about this risk, should make the birth of a subsequent child with 
a disability not more the result of "misfortune" of the work of nature but 
matter of personal responsibility. This shift in moral responsibility led 
participant to see testing as morally imperative in order to ensure her family 
the care and attention she considered necessary for its well being. 
The central role of the wellbeing of the family on decisions regarding the 
acceptance of testing highlights the nature of the conflicts women face when 
confronted with a prenatal test offer. Women are compelled to review their 
moral beliefs about their responsibilities toward the foetus and their other 
existing children and partner and sometimes modify them. 
Results also confirm the relational aspect of decision making regarding 
testing. Participant freely sought to share the decision with their partner and 
with other closed persons (her sister and a colleague with a disabled child) to 
confirm she had made the right decisions. The support and understanding of 
these persons helped her to embrace her decision. In ethical literature it is 
argued that autonomous decision can only be guaranteed when women decide 
on their own without any interference of other persons. Our findings contradict 
this individualistic concept of autonomy. Terms and concepts such as individual 
choice, autonomy, and non interference, do not capture all the emotional and 
circumstantial concerns in which decisions are made. As we have indicated 
above, support and approbation of closed ones might be seen as an important 
factor that help women to make well considered choices. 
8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of ethical beliefs on 
decision making regarding the use of prenatal screening. A second purpose was 
to assess the effect of an unsolicited offer on the way women shape their 
parental moral duties: whether the test offer leads women to believe that they 
ought to use testing in order to avoid inflicting harm and to assure the well 
being of their future child. Two additional questions are closely bounded with 
these main topics we addressed in this thesis: 1) whether an active offer of a 
unsolicited prenatal test hinders women to make decisions that meet their 
norms and values1,2 and as consequence of this, 2) whether the test offer brings 
them into an ethical dilemma. 
In this chapter the answers to these questions are discussed. We first 
summarize the main findings. Subsequently the relevance of our findings for 
ethical theory and the practice on prenatal screening (testing) is discussed. The 
chapter finally presents some ideas for future research. 
Main findings of this thesis 
Secondary role of ethical beliefs in decision making as ethical justification 
post hoc of the women's reproductive preferences 
Contrary to studies that assert that different ethical views lead to different 
choices regarding prenatal testing3"9 we found that choices about prenatal 
screening were not primarily driven by the women's ethical views. 
We conclude this from the following findings: 
1) Acceptors and decliners appeared to be more alike than different in their 
ethical views about the control and selection of offspring characteristics: 
they believed that parents can and sometimes ought to intervene in the 
natural course of pregnancy to avoid the suffering caused by a severe 
disability, including the abortion of a disabled foetus. At the same time, 
they stated that perfection should not be strived for, neither perfect 
children nor a perfect society. The only difference between acceptors and 
decliners was their personal attitude toward abortion in case of Down 
syndrome. This difference was mainly based on their capacity to assure the 
child and their family a good life. Decliners did not consider abortion as an 
option for themselves while acceptors were open for abortion, although they 
hoped not to be confronted with the decision (chapter 2). 
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2) The main reasons that participants gave for their decisions were mainly 
related to the following factors: the reassurance provided by the screening; 
the emotional consequences of further decisions regarding the use of 
invasive diagnostic and abortion; and their view about parenting a child with 
Down syndrome. Acceptors opted for screening as attempt to assure the 
health of the foetus and to escape from unwilling effects of nature by ruling 
out at least Down syndrome and some forms of disability. Decliners reported 
the uncertainty that may come with the test results as the main reason for 
not using screening. They tried to assure the birth of a healthy child by 
avoiding the risks of a wrong decision regarding invasive testing (chapters 3 
and 5). 
3) Both women accepting and declining afterwards appealed to normative 
ethical principles to justify and support the decision they had already made 
regarding the acceptance of screening (chapter 2). 
Based on these findings, we distinguish two levels in decision making: on the 
first level, women balance the psychological and emotional effects of the 
information acquired by the test, against the expected burdens of a disabled 
child on their family and their own life perspective. On a second level, 
normative moral principles are introduced as additional arguments, backing and 
supporting the decision made on the first level. On this level, ethical norms 
appear to perform an instrumental role as normative reasons, being brought 
into play in order to give a moral justification to the women's reproductive 
preferences regarding the place of a disabled child in their lives. 
These findings must be interpreted with caution. Previous research showed 
that cultural and religious convictions and experience with disabled children 
have impact on ethical beliefs and decision making. Our finding that the 
decision is not lead by the woman's ethical beliefs might be due to the low 
proportion of active religious women in this study (ca 23%). The acceptability of 
abortion between participants may be also due to the fact that abortion is 
legally permitted in The Netherlands. 
Impact of an unsolicited test offer on the women's autonomy 
Prenatal screening aims to enhance women's reproductive autonomy by offering 
them the information needed to make an informed decision.10 In accordance 
with the ethical principle of autonomy, decisions regarding the use of prenatal 
screening should be guided by the women's own ethical views. Some authors 
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however question whether reproductive choice is actually enhanced. They fear 
that external pressures coming from close related persons and caregivers could 
compel women to make a concrete choice, and consequently dismiss them in 
their autonomy. The social views of disability as a tragedy together with the 
presumption that preventing disability is a desirable goal and a worthy pursuit 
would also lead women to believe that they ought to accept testing in order to 
avoid the birth of a disabled child.11"13 Social attitudes to women who declined 
testing or decide to give birth to a disabled limit the women's autonomy rather 
than the enhancement of their reproductive choice.14"21 
Women's relationship with their surroundings plays an important role in 
decision making. Participants freely decided to share the decision with their 
partner, other important persons and their midwife or gynaecologist. Analysis of 
the interviews we performed during the process of decision making showed that 
participants tended to comply with the opinion of their partner especially in the 
acceptance of the screening offer, also if they would decide differently on their 
own. Family and friends were approached in order to seek their approval and 
support for their decision. They were not directly implicated in the process of 
decision making. Although participants reported being influenced by their 
family's feeling about having a child with Down syndrome they stated that they 
were not constrained to follow the advice of these persons. Participants also 
appreciated the support of caregivers in the form of information and medical 
advice. In spite of these external influences participants stated to have freely 
made their own choice without pressure from other persons. Societal influence 
was expressed in the form of concerns about reactions and intolerance of 
colleges and neighbours regarding their decision about testing and the birth of a 
disabled child. These concerns did not appear to impact the final choice 
(chapter 4). 
Opponents of standard practice of prenatal screening argue that an 
unsolicited test offer may impede women to make an autonomous choice by 
generating an internal desire to have a healthy child that might conflict with 
the women's values and beliefs. In accordance with this claim, both acceptors 
and decliners reported conflicting feelings regarding their wish to reassurance 
about the health of the foetus and their unwillingness to make difficult 
decisions about their unborn child. Regardless of these conflicting feelings, 
participants showed a positive attitude towards prenatal screening offer and 
argued that the test should be offered to all pregnant women. They managed to 
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embrace their choice, even if they recognise that they would have preferred 
not to have to make the decision (chapters 4 and 6). The conflicting feelings 
reported by participants should not be seen as an impediment to rational 
choice. Experiencing uncertainty during decision making belong to choices in 
which it is difficult to foresee the consequences of the different options. This 
uncertainty can be interpreted as a normal process in forming their personal 
view about the place of testing within their parental responsibilities. 
These results indicate that an unsolicited offer of a prenatal screening test 
does not necessarily impede women to make an autonomous free choice. 
Participants expressed a clear awareness of the optional character of screening. 
Therefore, from an autonomy point of view, there is no reason to reduce access 
to prenatal screening. On the contrary, the offer of prenatal screening might 
help women to shape their own view about the ethical significance of control of 
the offspring characteristics. Women in our study carefully balanced the 
different goods and interests that should be affected by a disability. They also 
foresaw the risk of diagnostic testing in case of a high screening result and the 
consequence of a confirmed diagnostic. 
Dilemmas due to the offer of screening as expression of conflicting 
interests; Central role of the parental duties 
The conflicting feelings reported by participants might be interpreted as an 
expression of the difficulties women face when deciding about the ethical 
acceptability of testing. 
Most participants stated spontaneously that decision making was a difficult 
ethical issue. They reported unease to decide when a termination of pregnancy 
is justifiable. They worried about the selection of the offspring's characteristics 
and questioned the limits we need to set. Disability was described as something 
that belongs to human life and is not without a meaning. Participants also saw 
getting s disabled child as the manifestation of their own destiny against which 
they cannot do anything (chapter 3). Decisions were felt to be particularly hard 
in case of anomalies as Down syndrome which may be compatible with a good 
life or when diagnosis and prognosis are uncertain. They pointed out that during 
pregnancy no one can foresee what a child's life will be (chapter 5) 
A second issue raised by participants concerned the level of family suffering 
that justifies abortion of a foetus with Down syndrome. Participants worried 
about the negative impact of a disabled child on their commitments to their 
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existing children and partner. Regardless of their doubts about the 
appropriateness of testing and, both acceptors and decliners reported that 
women ought to use testing accept testing when the care required for such a 
child would be an impediment to give other children the attention they 
considered necessary. 
The views above highlight the nature of the quandary women experience 
when they have to decide about prenatal testing. As we pointed out above, 
prenatal screening compels women to reconsider their personal beliefs about 
respect for (unborn) human life or unconditional acceptance of children against 
the aims that may be attained by testing. Participants balanced the interests of 
the family against that of the foetus in order to find what is in line with their 
values and their personal circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they are 
not so much faced with an ethical dilemma as well as a conflict of interest. 
Discussion of our results 
Our results suggest a gap between ethical theory about and the practice of 
decision making in prenatal screening. 
Theoretical discussions on prenatal testing claim the right of the pregnant 
women to autonomous decision making without any interference from other 
persons that might constrain them to decide according to their ethical views 
and preferences. This interpretation of the concept of autonomy is unlikely to 
capture the emotional and circumstantial concerns in which decisions are made. 
The instrumental role that individual ethical beliefs play in decision making 
together with the central role of the family interest and the women's need for 
social support suggest a clear need for a new ethical framework of thinking in 
reproductive decisions. Ethical deliberation on prenatal testing is still mainly 
based on deontological or consequentialistic theories. Within these theories 
ethical deliberation limits itself to a pure rational application of some universal 
principles (deontological) or to an evaluation of the consequences of each 
available option (consequentialistic) without taking into consideration the 
concrete persons and each particular situation.22 Our results demonstrate that a 
context-bounded ethics in which the moral responsibilities and duties that 
spring from relationships within the women's relational network are central 
would be more adequate to understand the decisions women make in the 
practice. This ethical approach might also offer a promising alternative for 
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identifying the nature of the conflicts that women reported when deciding 
about testing. 
A new approach of reproductive autonomy 
Traditionally decision making in the area of prenatal testing is discussed within 
an ethical framework of supporting individual choice free from external 
pressure. According to this concept autonomous decision making can only be 
guaranteed when women are free to decide based upon their personal values 
and beliefs without any influence coming from the views and interests of other 
persons.4, 23"25 In contraposition to these studies, our results show that the 
impact of other persons does not impede women to decide according to their 
own views and preferences. These results raise questions about the typical 
concept of autonomy and its use within the context of reproduction 
technologies. 
Participants freely sought to share the decision with their partner and other 
closely related persons even if this involvement limits them in their choice. It 
can be argued that influence of the partner may be considered as being against 
the women's autonomy, since some women accepted screening only to comply 
with the partner's opinion. On the other hand, active participation of their 
partner in decision making might help to avoid that women shoulder all the 
blame for making a wrong decision (chapter 4). On the same way, family and 
friends appear to have a role in reassuring women that they made the right 
decision, since they are approached with the aim of obtaining approval and 
support. From this perspective the input of third persons should not be 
evaluated so much as undesired influence but as a way to help women to 
embrace the decision they made and therefore to increase their feeling of 
autonomy. This conclusion is confirmed by our finding that participants were 
satisfied with their choice and stated that they decided without being forced to 
follow the views of other persons. Quantitative analyses within the RCT also 
confirmed that women decide autonomously without being pressured by 
others.26 The advice of sharing the decision with others, especially with those 
who are the most closed to the women help women better assess the 
appropriateness of their desires, motives, preferences and aims in order to 
shape their mind about the significance of testing within their personal moral 
framework and to feel secure in their choice.27 
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Our results suggest that the moral significance of prenatal testing is 
inseparably bound with the (social) context in which it is practiced. This 
context serves as an interpretative framework for the ethical assessment of 
prenatal testing. Hence, respect for autonomous decision making needs not to 
be incompatible with the recognition that an individual's social context 
inevitably informs and influences his or her choices. As our results show, 
autonomy and relationallity need not to be positioned as mutually exclusive 
concepts, but rather as mutually informing and reinforcing aspects. Women do 
not make their decisions in a vacuum but within an a priori family, social and 
cultural context that both shape and is affected by their choices.28, 29 
Pretending that women decide without involvement of valued relationships is 
confusing autonomy with independence and individualism.30"37 This account of 
autonomy fails to recognize the women's need for support and advice from 
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important ones. • 
If prenatal screening is intended to stimulate and guarantee responsible 
reproductive decisions, then a broader conception of autonomy that recognizes 
the role of the partner in decision making and the influence of women's family 
and social contexts in which decisions are made is required.40,41 We propound a 
concept of relational autonomy that takes into consideration the framework in 
which decisions take place, and the limitations that relations within that 
context impose on the self determination of the individuals. Understanding the 
relational, social and cultural factors behind the decision may illuminate 
women's practical responses to prenatal screening and testing. This 
understanding may help clinical practice to support women to act according to 
their moral framework when confronted with the moral choices inherent within 
the offer of prenatal screening. 
Pragmatic character of the decision 
The instrumental role of moral principles and beliefs in decision making and the 
guiding role of the family needs might be interpreted as an expression of a 
pragmatic ethics in which women determine what they ought to do according to 
their view of a worthy life and based upon what they judge good for them in 
accordance with the actual context of their lives by weighting up the 
consequences of his action for himself and others. Within this ethical framework 
the family and women well being and the women's strength to guarantee the 
child a good life becomes central. 
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This ethical pragmatism can be interpreted as a consequence of the moral 
relativism in the Netherlands where there are no absolute values that function 
as moral guiding rules for everybody. However, the finding that women appeal 
to moral principles as post hoc justification of their choice indicates that 
women struggle with moral questions -often without defining or recognising 
their moral character- and try to find the most acceptable ethical option. 
Reproductive decisions take place in a relational context where competing 
goods and desires must be carefully negotiated, balanced and fused. Prenatal 
decisions have consequences not only for the future child but also for the 
women and for their family and other loved persons. The relational constructed 
deliberation informs decision making and thus may explain that women do not 
focus on discerning the good decision that is in accordance with ethical 
principles but try to find the option that can be integrated with the good, 
desires and expectations of the persons whose lives will be significantly 
affected their decision. 
The uncertain character of the information provided by prenatal screening 
might make it difficult to interpret the practical significance of odds for the 
application of moral principles that are central in ethical theory over prenatal 
testing i.e. "avoiding suffering", "worth of human (disabled) l ife", "moral 
status of the foetus" and "abortion".42·6 Quantitative results of the RCT also 
show that women find it difficult to interpret the results of prenatal screening 
and to make further decisions that imply risks for the foetus.43,26 The difficulty 
to interpret the information given by prenatal screening might explain the 
guiding role of the women's views about the impact of a disabled child on the 
conditions the consider necessary for a good life and the individual and family 
circumstances in decision making. Our finding that ethical principles do play a 
guiding role when there is a known, clear and direct relation between action 
and the foetus health support this conclusion. Participants (acceptors and 
decliners) believed that women that have sufficient reasons to fear disability 
ought to test. All of them found abortion acceptable in case of severe 
disabilities. 
Change in ethical beliefs: Transition phase 
Prenatal testing gives women the possibility to prevent the suffering that 
accompanies disability and to fulfil their desire to have a healthy child. This 
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possibility has changed the traditional paradigm according to which disability is 
considered to be beyond our control because is fixed by nature. 
While this possibility may give women the possibility to exert rational control 
over the outcomes of pregnancy it also confronts women with new moral 
responsibilities. Before the introduction of testing there was no way for parents 
to prevent a congenital disability except by not having children. With the 
introduction of prenatal testing, women come to face a choice about the 
characteristics that are acceptable in their children and which disabilities 
justify -and for some demand- the abortion of an affected foetus. As Dworkin 
argues, by providing this choice, prenatal testing has challenged the assumption 
that disability lies beyond the control of the parents because it is fixed by 
nature and therefore escapes their moral responsibility.44 This shift in moral 
responsibility undermines our most basic assumptions about the boundary 
between what we are morally responsible for in choosing and what lies beyond 
our control. As such it destabilizes much of our conventional morality. 
Consequently, it is argued, that the possibility to know in advance about the 
health status of the foetus leads to a shift in the ethical beliefs regarding our 
reproductive responsibilities and the ethical significance of testing within good 
parenthood. Long lasting values within the field of reproduction and parenting 
such as the unconditional acceptance of children; the worth of every child as a 
gift becomes substituted by moral values and being the author of your own 
life.14 
This shift in ethical beliefs regarding reproductive responsibilities and good 
parenthood came to the fore in the narratives of our participants. Participants 
reported conflicting feelings regarding their wish to avoid the negative impact 
of a disabled child on the care they owed to their other children and partner 
and their reluctance to take responsibility through choice. They were concerned 
about the acceptability to intervene in the natural course of pregnancy. As we 
pointed out above, decliners tried to escape the difficulty of decision making by 
delegating the choice to nature, fate or God. Acceptors, on the contrary, 
performed testing as an attempt to confirm that the foetus is healthy in order 
to avoid further decisions. These feelings and concerns suggest that women's 
preferences about testing often deviate from their hold ethical values. This 
conflict may also be seen as an indication that the values embodied by prenatal 
testing were not yet incorporated in the women's ethical beliefs. Women 
deciding about prenatal screening are faced with the difficult task of specifying 
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and interpreting their hold moral principles and beliefs and adjusting them to 
the new ethical values embodied by testing with which they have not yet 
identified totally. 
Implications for ethical theory; Need of a new situation related ethical 
approach 
Up to now we have shown that decisions regarding prenatal testing acquire their 
ethical significance within a relational and social context that shape women's 
beliefs, values, desires and aspirations. This conclusion draws us to question the 
necessity of an ethical theory that incorporates the contextual frame work in 
which decisions take place and the emotional and relational aspect of decision 
making. Ethical theory regarding prenatal testing has long been dominated by 
deontological and consequentialism ethical theories. Results of this thesis 
indicate that these theories do not catch the complexity of the reality in which 
decision are made. 
The flaw of both deontological and consequentialist theories is that they rely 
on one rule or principle that is expected to apply to any moral situation and 
decision (e.g. Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and Kant's Categorical 
Imperative). The personal, family and social circumstances in which decision 
making takes place vary from one woman to another. We should not expect that 
simple rules that do not admit exception provide a standard solution regarding 
the permissibility or impermissibility of testing. Furthermore, moral principles 
do not offer clear direction to resolve the (moral) dilemmas and conflicts that 
women face when confronted with a test offer. The same moral principles may 
pull women in different directions. This is evident from the fact that both 
acceptors and decliners mentioned the same moral principles as justification for 
their decision. 
The same can be said about a consequential approach. Certainly women 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of testing for themselves, the foetus 
and those affected by its birth. However, the consequences are difficult to 
predict since testing does not give accurate information about the prognoses 
nor about how life will be with such a child. The interest of those involved: the 
future child, the woman, parents, other children and closely related persons 
often conflict and lead women to different options in practice. 
Based on the results of this thesis we propose that a context-bounded ethics 
in which the moral responsibilities and duties that spring from relationships 
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within the women's relational network play a central role would be more 
adequate to understand the decisions women make in the practice. The birth of 
a (disabled) child has not only impact on the life of the child itself but also on 
other family members and on the women's social network. Therefore, decisions 
about testing cannot be considered apart from the values and goods that 
women aim for their family and closely related persons. 
A virtue ethics approach 
Within a relational concept of autonomy we propose a virtue approach of 
ethical theory as a more promising alternative for (enhancing) the moral 
discourse on prenatal testing. Virtue ethics maintains that the right action is 
that which a virtuous agent in said circumstances, would choose. Unlike 
deontological and consequentialist theories, virtue ethics entails that ethical 
deliberation does not limit itself to a pure rational application of universal 
principles neither to an evaluation of the consequences of each available 
option. Virtue ethics is concerned with the good life and what kinds of persons 
we should be. According to this ethical approach the central ethical question is 
not "is the action against any ethical principle?" or "does it harm anyone?" but 
"what would a good (virtuous) person do in these circumstances?"49 Virtue 
related ethical concepts and ethical questions could be identified in the 
narratives of participants: 
- Women decide motivated by their responsibility to look for the well being of 
their family. Their choice can be interpreted as an expression of their wish to 
be a "good mother". Acceptors opted for screening as a way to guarantee a 
good life for their existing children and partner (chapters 5 and 6).The main 
reason for the acceptance of prenatal screening was the belief that a disabled 
child would be an obstacle to fulfil their responsibilities to their family. 
Participants who chose not to have screening reported that the information 
gleaned about the risk of a disability was irrelevant to them since they could 
care for both their child and their family. 
- A key component of virtue ethics is the virtue of prudence that is associated 
with wisdom, insight and knowledge. Prudence consists in the ability to 
accurately perceive, and to rationally interpret and evaluate the relevant 
aspects within a given situation. As consequence a prudent person is able to act 
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always in a fitting manner. An aspect of prudence is seeking for information and 
for the advice of reliable persons. Someone who wants to make responsible 
decisions seeks to be influenced by all the relevant facts and points of view; in 
short, such a person wants to be able to decide on the basis of all the good 
reasons available.50"52 
Participants in our study did not decide motivated by irrational or emotional 
considerations. As our results show women make their decisions by rationally 
deliberating about i.e. the significance of the screening odds for further 
decisions regarding further testing; the risks factors related to invasive tests 
and the consequences of their decisions for the future child and the lives of 
those affected by the birth of a disabled child. They also reflect about the 
meaning and appropriateness of their feelings and try to incorporate them to 
rational decision. 
Participants also seek the advice and support of closely related persons when 
deciding about prenatal testing. Advice of others gives women additional 
arguments to consider during decision making. As we have mentioned above the 
advice of important ones might also enhance the women's autonomy by helping 
them to assess the moral value of the different options and the appropriateness 
of their desires, and aims. 
Another distinctive feature of virtue ethics is the central role that the 
circumstances in which the choice is made play in determining the ethical right 
decision. Virtue ethics entails the application of the principles of morality to 
the concrete events and circumstances of each particular occasion. It is the 
virtuous application of rules to the concrete circumstances which makes those 
action and rules morally valid.22 
The dependence of the circumstances was evident from our results. 
Women's choices are based upon an evaluation of their capacity of care for a 
disabled child and their family within their family and personal circumstances. 
Although, participants did not believe in a moral duty to avoid disability neither 
to guarantee health, they believed that testing becomes imperative when the 
extra care that a disabled child demands would prevent them to give other 
members of their family the time and attention they owed to them. They also 
reported that women who have a higher risk of having a disabled child should 
use testing. When values, beliefs, goods, interests and emotions conflict -as it 
appears from our results-, there are rarely answers that are clearly "right". At 
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best, there is an answer that is most acceptable for women within their 
concrete family and individual circumstances at that particular time in their 
lives. In fact, most women who declined the screening offer indicated that their 
decision was not necessarily the result of strong opposition to the test itself. 
Even those who declined the test offer reported that they could see themselves 
accepting it in different circumstances. 
- According to virtue ethic the aim of the moral decision is to reach the good 
life which is based on the Aristotelian idea of eudemonia of happiness, which 
means living well.53 This eudemonia is achieved when the moral choice is in line 
with the (moral) values of the agent, and the moral good that she wants to 
achieve. The virtue of prudence is just aimed at making the right choice for 
action concerning what is good and useful for a successful life. 
From our results it became evident that the moral motive behind the 
decision is the well being and happiness women want for their family, the child 
and themselves. The main motivation for accepting screening was assuring their 
future child and their family a good and well life by protecting them of the 
burdens of disability. A main motive for declining the screening was the 
possibility to give a disabled child and the family the care and attention that 
they need to have a good and happy life. Motives of personal wellbeing as 
psychical and emotional health and a good relationship with the partner were 
also indicated as important in the decision. Women decide by balancing the 
personal psychological and emotional effects of the test's information, against 
the burdens they expect a disabled child would have on the well being of their 
family. 
- The Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is perhaps the most important, and 
distinctive, aspect of virtue ethics that can be applied in interesting ways to the 
issue of prenatal testing. Virtue "lies in a mean" between two (vicious) 
extremes because the right response to each situation is neither too much nor 
too little. Within reproductive decisions virtuous mothers seek the mean 
between the vices of over-caring and neglecting parents. 
Participants struggle with the meaning of testing within their moral duties to 
the unborn and their family. They questioned the limits of their desire to know 
and to control the offspring characteristics and their moral duty to employ all 
the available means to ensure the well being of their children. They seek to find 
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a compromise (a mean) between their moral duties for the unborn and the 
other children and partner. 
- Contrary to deontological moral theories, virtue ethics is based on a model 
of moral choice that does not see emotions as contrary to rational decision 
making. Virtues are considered to be the right expression or moderation of the 
passions and emotions 'in the right place and at the right time'.53"56 Within 
virtue ethics the distinctive of right moral choice is the satisfaction with the 
decision made that is expressed in sentiments of gladness and peace of mind. 
These sentiments are important in theories of decision making as indicators of 
agent's autonomy.57 
From the narratives of our participants it came to the fore that emotions 
help women as tiebreakers, to decide in a conflict situation in which it is 
difficult to determine the practical fulfilling of ethical principles and which 
interest must be given preference. Feelings of satisfaction with the decisions 
were reported by participants as indication that they had made the right 
decision in line with their values and preferences. 
Practical implications 
What are the implications of our findings for health care provision? From our 
results it follows that the decisions regarding prenatal screening are not easy 
for many women. Its purposes, benefits, and limitations are difficult to 
comprehend. Even though most women in this study felt that prenatal screening 
gave them the opportunity to make informed reproductive decisions, they also 
reported that they found it difficult to assess the significance of testing within 
their parental duties and to find which option is the most acceptable form an 
ethical viewpoint. 
The above indicates that although the decision is not guided by ethical 
beliefs, women struggle with moral issues, often without explicitly defining or 
recognizing their moral character. Therefore, we propose that the moral 
aspects of the choices deserve more emphasis. At present, the moral character 
is not denied, but neither receives it much active attention. The medical model 
of counselling which is still influential in the context of prenatal testing deals 
mainly with psychosocial and medical aspects of the test. Such features only 
present a partial picture of all aspects implicated in the decision. Emphasis on 
the moral character would be more in touch with the reality of decision-making 
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process and render women more prepared for assuming the consequences of 
their decision. Decisions regarding prenatal testing affect the women's view 
about what sort of mother they should be, their reproductive responsibilities 
and their relationships with their partner. It also confronts women with the 
responsibility of the impact of their decision on their family. Counselling should 
discuss the impact of the availability of prenatal testing on the women's views 
about these issues. Caregivers should also take into consideration that the 
women's personal views about their responsibilities toward their existing 
children are of primary importance in the decision being made. Furthermore, 
caregivers should assure that women understand that a positive result does not 
mean that they are in the clear. Giving this information would enable women to 
make up their mind about the place of prenatal testing within their parental 
duties 
The moral dimension of decision making becomes more relevant with the 
possibility to isolate and analyse free foetal DNA and RNA (ff DNA cf f DNA/ RNA) 
or whole foetal cells in maternal blood.58,59 This development holds the promise 
of non invasive prenatal diagnostic early in pregnancy and without the risk of 
foetal loss that the current invasive procedures of Chorionic Villus Sampling and 
Amniocentesis carry.60"62 The feasibility of NIPD for trisomy 21, 13 and 18 has 
already been shown.59 Since the most important reason for declining screening 
are absent, the women's views about their duty to avoid preventable suffering 
and the acceptability of abortion might become central in the decision. 
Given the impact of the expected burdens of a child with Down syndrome on 
the women commitments to other family members counselling should find out 
what women know about the condition, the accuracy of their knowledge and 
their beliefs about raising children with disabilities. Care givers should discuss 
the women's view on the life with a child with Down syndrome and the 
implications that living with such a child for the women and their family. In 
order to help women to assess the role of testing within their parental duties, 
additional information should be given about the (symptoms of the) disabilities 
they are testing for and the available treatments. Such information should 
include, at a minimum, a detailed description of the biological, cognitive, or 
psychological impairments associated with specific disabilities, and what those 
impairments imply for day-to-day functioning. The costs of available treatments 
and the existing forms of societal support should be also discussed. 
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The actual offer of prenatal screening presupposes that pregnant women 
decide on their own regardless of the social and cultural context in which 
decisions take place. Therefore, it emphasises the personal character of the 
decision, ignoring the necessity of women on support and advices of closely 
related persons and care providers. Our results indicate that women are more 
concerned about how to ensure that they made the correct decision, than about 
the possibility to make an autonomous choice. They need and value the support 
of partner and other persons. They also welcome objective medical information 
and the advice of the caregivers. These findings suggest that every offer should 
be timely done in order to give women the opportunity to discuss testing with 
significant others. Furthermore, if others' views are highly valued, caregivers 
should encourage discussion with significant others. On return, the clinic should 
check whether the influence of others impedes or enhances free choice. 
Caregivers should avoid that women are forced to accept or decline prenatal 
testing by medical, social or cultural pressures. 
In sum, some practical points that should be discussed are: the 
understanding of the pros and cons of testing and the scenarios they might face 
in case of a high test result; what they want to do with the information once 
they got it i.e. whether they want to take further tests and whether abortion 
would be an option; the women's feelings about a positive result and how they 
will cope in response to this; the women's values and beliefs regarding their 
reproductive rights and duties, abortion, worth of disabilities; the view of their 
partner and his input in the decision; the implications that living with a child 
with Down syndrome would be for the woman and her family. To facilitate 
reproductive autonomy, counselling should provide all relevant information 
about the characteristics of the test and of the disabilities tested. Accurate 
information about the testing procedure, the possible risks, and the possibility 
of ambiguous results should also be provided. Women should also be informed 
beforehand about the difficult decisions that a high screening result can lead 
to, as well to the different options to follow. 
It would be useful to develop an aid for decision making that incorporates all 
the above mentioned practical issues. This aid or guide could be offered to 
women together with the offer of prenatal screening. It should encourage 
women to consider the ethical aspects related to prenatal screening, the 
motives for their decision and the consequences of the different options. It 
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should also encourage women to discuss the decision with their partner and the 
importance that they attach to the view and support of their family and friends. 
Future research 
The present study pleads for a virtue ethics approach for ethical reasoning 
regarding the decision about prenatal screening and testing. Future research 
should establish the relevance of virtue ethics in decisions regarding the control 
and interference in the characteristics of the offspring. Research should analyse 
the virtues that are relevant to these decisions. This research should also 
elucidate the relation between the fulfilment of the women's commitments 
toward the unborn, their partner and other children and their moral 
satisfaction. Additionally, research should analyse the relationship between the 
control (and selection) of the offspring characteristics and the women's moral 
beliefs about the aim of procreation, good motherhood, good life and 
happiness. Results of this research might contribute to deeply understand the 
ethical aspects of decisions not only about prenatal screening and testing but 
also in the framework of the embryo selection through prenatal genetic 
diagnostic and (newborn) genetic testing of children. 
The view of the partner regarding testing was assessed on basis of the 
narratives of participants. As the partners were not directly approached the 
concrete impact of their views in decision making could not be deduced. 
Furthermore, the view of the women regarding the opinion of their partner 
might reflect their own impression without being objective. Future research 
should incorporate the view, beliefs, values and attitudes of partners in order 
to determine their role in decision making and their impact on the autonomy of 
the women. 
In contradiction to other studies we found that social views and expectations 
do not impede women to decide according to their values and beliefs. This 
might be due to the fact that prenatal screening was not part of normal 
prenatal care in the Netherlands at the time of our study. Therefore, women in 
our study might consider testing as not necessary for health pregnancy 
outcomes. Furthermore, since prenatal screening was not standardly 
performed, society might be seen as more tolerant towards women who did not 
want prenatal testing. Studies is other countries show that the way in which 
parental duties are conceived might then change over time when prenatal 
testing has become a routine practice. Additional research is needed to 
determine the concrete impact of social norm in the actual Dutch situation in 
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which all pregnant women receive information about the possibility of 
performing a prenatal test. Research should explore the real impact of the 
social values, ideals, welfare standards and views on disability on the women's 
view about the meaning of prenatal testing within their parental duties to their 
prospective child and family. 
The possibility of the application of reliable non-invasive prenatal diagnosis 
without prejudicing the safety of the mother or her unborn is an important and 
exciting development that will introduce new ethical, social and economic 
issues. The fact that screening only gives a chance approximation about the 
presence of disability makes it difficult to make well considered decisions in the 
interest of the child. Further invasive testing is necessary to confirm the 
presence of a disability. For many women the risk of pregnancy loss of invasive 
diagnostic outweighs the possible (ethical) benefits of testing. If a barrier to 
testing is removed, will women feel less justified in declining or be more open 
to persuasion? Research should also contemplate the concrete impact of the 
parental duties to the unborn and other family members as well as the impact 
of the interest of women and family on the application of the ethical principles 
on decision making. Managing the introduction of this new technology will 
require attention to the understanding and views of women and couples 
regarding the avoidance of diagnostic disabilities. Non invasive prenatal 
diagnostic also forces us to revisit existing debate and dilemmas in prenatal 
diagnosis in order to determine how they might change and what safeguards 
might be required. 
An additional focus of future research should be on determining the ethical 
aspects of unexpected findings i.e. whether and how unexpected findings 
should be passed on to women; Whether women should be beforehand informed 
about all the conditions that can be seen or only about the conditions that are 
standard tested before testing takes place; Whether a difference should be 
made between treatable and not treatable and between genetic and not 
genetic conditions. 
146 Discussion 
References 
1. Gregg R. Pregnancy in a High Tech Age: Paradoxes of Choice. New York: 
New York University Press, 1995. 
2. Mulvey S, Wallace EM. Women's knowledge of and attitudes to first and 
second trimester screening for Down's syndrome. BJOG 2000;107: 1302-5. 
3. Alkuraya FS, Kilani RA. Attitude of Saudi families affected with 
haemoglobinopathys towards prenatal screening and abortion and the 
influence of religious ruling (Fatwa). Prenat Diagn 2001 ;21 (6) :448-51. 
4. Carroll JC, Brown JB, Reid AJ, Pugh P. Women's experience of maternal 
serum screening. Can Fam Physician 2000;46: 614-20. 
5. Sher C, Romano-Zelekha 0, Green MS, Shohat T. Factors affecting 
performance of prenatal genetic testing by Israeli Jewish women. Am J 
Med Genetics 2003; 120(3): 418-22. 
6. Ahmed S, Atkin K, Hewison J, Green J. The influence of faith and religion 
and the role of religious and community leaders in prenatal decisions for 
sickle cell disorders and thalassaemia major. Prenat Diag 2006;26(9): 801-
9. 
7. Rapp R. Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of Bioscience in a 
Multicultural World. Sci Technol Human Values 1998;23(1): 45-70. 
8. - Rapp R. Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: the Social Impact of 
amniocentesis in America. London: Routledge, 1999. 
9. - Liamputtong P, Halliday JL, Warren R, Watson F, Bell RJ. Why do women 
decline prenatal screening and diagnosis? Australian women's 
perspective. Women Health 2003;37(2): 89-108. 
10. Williams C, Alderson P, Farsides B. Is nondirectiveness possible within the 
context of antenatal screening and testing? Soc Sei Med 2002;54: 339-47. 
11. Rendtorff DJ, Kemp P. Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and 
Biolaw Vol I: Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability. Copenhagen 
and Barcelona: Centre for ethics and law and Institute Borja de Bioètica, 
2000. 
12. Oshana MAL. The autonomy Bogeyman. J Value Inquiry 2001 ;35: 209-26. 
13. Lawson K. Perceptions of deservedness of social aid as a function of 
prenatal diagnostic testing. J Appi Soc Psychol 2003;33: 6-90. 
14. Ten Have HAMJ. Living with the Future: Genetic Information and Human 
Existence. In: Chadwick R, Levitt M, Shickle D (eds). The Right to Know 
and the Right Not to Know. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997: 87-95. 
15. Parker M, Fortnum HM, Young ID, Davis AC. Genetics and deafness: what 
do families want? J Med Genet 2000;37(10): E26. 
16. Savulescu J. Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best 
children. Bioethics 2001 ;15(5): 413-26. 
17. Takala M, Häyry M. Genetic ignorance, moral obligations and social 
duties. J Med Phil 2000;25: 107-13. 
Discussion 147 
18. Buchanan A, Brock D, Daniels N, Wikler D. From chance to choice: 
Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
19. Green JM, Hewison J, Bekker HL, Bryant LD, Cuckle HS. Psychosocial 
aspects of genetic screening of pregnant women and newborns: a 
systematic review. Health Technol Assess 2004;8: 1-124. 
20. Rothschild J. The dream of the perfect child. Bloomington, USA: Indiana 
University Press, 2005. 
21. Hwa HL, Huang LH, Hsieh FJ, Chow SN. Informed consent for antenatal 
serum screening for Down syndrome. Taiwan J Obstet Gynecol 
2010;49(1): 50-6. 
22. Ubel P, Loewenstein G. The role of decision analysis in informed consent: 
choosing between intuition and automaticity. Soc Sei Med 1997;44(5): 
647-56. 
23. Sjögren Β, Uddenberg Ν. Decision making during the prenatal diagnostic 
procedure. A questionnaire and interview study of 211 women 
participating in prenatal diagnosis. Pren Diagn 1988;8(4): 263-73. 
24. Evers-Kiebooms G, Nys N, Decruyenaere M, Witters I, Fryns JP. Triple test 
screening for down syndrome: looking back on a false-positive result and 
having or not having a triple test in subsequent pregnancies. Community 
Genet 2001 ;4: 43-9. 
25. Remennick L. The quest for the perfect baby: why do Israeli women seek 
prenatal genetic testing? Soc Health Illness 2006;28:21-53. 
26. van den Berg M, Timmermans DR, Kleinveld JH, van Eijk JTM, Knol DL, 
van der Wal G, van Vugt JMG. Are counsellors' attitudes influencing 
pregnant women's attitudes and decisions on prenatal screening? Prenat 
Diagn 2007;27(6): 518-24. 
27. - Redelmeier DA, Rozin P, Kahneman D. Understanding patients' decisions. 
Cognitive and emotional perspectives. JAMA 1993;270: 72-96. 
28. Mackenzie C, Stoljar N. Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on 
Autonomy. Agency and the Social Self. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. 
29. Christman J. Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social 
constitution of selves. Phil Studies J 2004;117: 143-64. 
30. Dworking G. Is More Choice Better than Less? Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy. In: Shoemaker S, ed. Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press, 1988: 62-81. 
31. Taylor C. Sources of the self. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
32. Friedman M. Autonomy and social relationships: Rethinking the feminist 
critique. In: Meyers D (ed). Feminists Rethink the Self. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1997: 55-56. 
33. Sherwin S. A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care. In: Sherwin 
S (ed.). The Politics of Women's Health: Exploring Agency and Autonomy. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1998: 19-47. 
148 Discussion 
34. Dodds 5. Choice and Control in Feminist Bioethics'. In: Mackenzie C, 
Stoljar Ν (eds). Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000: 
213-35. 
35. Donchin A. Understanding autonomy relationally: Toward a 
reconfiguration of bioethical principles. J Med Phil 2001;26(4): 365-86. 
36. Ryan RM, Deci EL. Self determination theory, and the facilitation of 
intrinsic motivation, social development and well being. Am Psychol 
2000;55: 68-78. 
37. Ryan RM, Deci EL. Self-regulation and the problem of human autonomy: 
Does psychology need choice, self-determination, and will? J Pers 
2006;74(6): 1557-86. 
38. Seavilleklein V. Challenging the Rhetoric of Choice in Prenatal Screening. 
Bioethics 2009;23(1): 68-77. 
39. Soini S, Ibarreta D, Anastasiadou V, Aymé S, Braga S, Cornel M, et al. The 
interface between medically assisted reproduction and genetics: 
technical, social, ethical and legal issues. ESHRE Monogr 2006;1: 2-51. 
40. Dan-Cohen M. Conceptions of choice and conceptions of autonomy. Ethics 
1992;102: 221-43. 
41. Bridle L. Prenatal Diagnosis, Choice and the Moral Character of 
Parenthood, What Does it Mean to be Human in the 21st Century? 
Brisbane, QLD: Wesley Hospital, 2002. 
42. Watt H. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Choosing the "Good Enough" 
Child. Health Care Analyses 2004; 12: 51-60. 
43. van den Berg M, Timmermans DR, Kleinveld JH, Garcia E, van Vugt JM, 
van der Wal G. Accepting or declining the offer of prenatal screening for 
congenital defects: test uptake and women's reasons. Prenat Diagn 
2005;25(1): 84-90. 
44. Dworkin G. Taking risks, assessing responsibility. Hastings Cent Rep 
1981 ;11: 26-31. 
45. Lauritzen P. What Price parenthood? Hastings center report 1990;20: 38-
46. 
46. Lauritzen P. Pursuing parenthood: Ethical issues in assisted reproduction. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
47. Michie S, Marteau TM. The choice to have a disabled child. Am J Hum 
Genet 1999;65(4): 1204-8. 
48. Kass LR. Beyond therapy: Biotechnology and the pursuit of happiness. A 
report of the president's council on bioethics. New York Regan Books, 
2003. 
49. Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC. The Virtues in medical practice. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
50. Shelp EE. Virtue & Medicine. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1985. 
Discussion 149 
51. Brink D. Moral Motivation. Ethics 1997;108: 4-32. 
52. Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994: 468. 
53. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. London: Penguin Books, 1953. 
54. Carr D. Educating the virtues: an essay of the philosophical psychology of 
moral development and education. London: Routledge, 1991. 
55. Hursthouse R. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
56. McDougall R. Parental Virtue: A New Way of Thinking about the Morality 
of Reproductive Actions. Bioethics 2007;21(4): 181-90. 
57. Ryan RM, Huta V, Deci EL. Living well: a self-determination theory 
perspective on eudemonia. J Happiness Stud 2008;9: 139-70 . 
58. Fan HC, Blumenfeld YJ, Chitkara U, Hudgins L, Quake SR. Noninvasive 
diagnosis of fetal aneuploidy by shotgun sequencing DNA from maternal 
blood. PNAS2008;105: 16266-71. 
59. Lo YMD, Chiù RWK. Prenatal diagnosis: progress through plasma nucleic 
acids. Nat Rev Genet 2007; 8:71-7. 
60. Wright CF, Burton H. The use of cell-free fetal nucleic acids in maternal 
blood for non-invasive prenatal diagnosis. Hum Reprod Update 2009; 15: 
139-51. 
61. Geifman-Holtzman O, Berman JO: Prenatal diagnosis: update on invasive 
versus noninvasive fetal diagnostic testing from maternal blood. Expert 
Rev Mol Diagn 2008; 8: 727-51. 
62. Maron JL, Bianchi DW. Prenatal diagnosis using cell-free nucleic acids in 
maternal body fluids: a decade of progress. Am J Med Genet 2007; 145C: 
5-17. 

su ARY 
152 Summary 
The impetus for this study came from the ethical debate associated with the 
expanding of the offer of prenatal screening for Down syndrome (DS) and Neural 
Tube Defects (NTD) to pregnant women in low risk groups. Contrary to other 
Western countries, health policy in the Netherlands has been reluctant to 
making screening available to all pregnant women. Till 2007 prenatal screening 
was not offered as part of antenatal care. Only women with an increased risk of 
giving birth to a disabled child due to advanced maternal age (from 36 years 
old), or to a medical indication were routinely offered a diagnostic test 
(chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis). It was forbidden by law to offer 
tests or to give general information on these tests to women outside these high 
risk groups. From January 2007 onward, however, the policy has changed. 
Nowadays Dutch caregivers are requested to ask all pregnant women whether 
they want to receive information about prenatal screening as part of prenatal 
care. When women want caregivers have to provide both verbal and written 
information about methods for foetal screening and diagnostic with the 
emphasis on voluntary participation. Cost of these test are reimbursed only for 
women in the risks groups. 
One of the main arguments of the Dutch parliament against the introduction 
of nationwide prenatal screening program was the negative impact that an 
unsolicited test offer could have on women's reproductive autonomy and 
ethical decision making. Central in the Dutch debate was whether an 
unsolicited offer of prenatal testing allows women to make autonomous choices 
based upon their personal values and beliefs or on the contrary pressures them 
to make decisions that meet society's norms bringing them into complex ethical 
dilemmas. At issue was whether women to whom a test is offered can 
successfully determine the significance of prenatal screening within their moral 
duties toward their offspring. An additional question was the impact of the 
availability of testing on the women's views about the conditions needed for a 
good life. The main objective of this thesis was to answer and discuss these 
questions. Most of the studies on women's motives for accepting or declining 
prenatal screening tests mainly focus on the impact of psychological, social and 
emotional factors of decision-making. Consequently, little is known about the 
concrete role of women's ethical values and beliefs on decision making 
regarding prenatal screening. 
Which moral norms do women take into consideration when deciding on the 
use of prenatal screening? which -if any- is the concrete role of the women's 
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ethical values and beliefs in decision making? And what is the effect of an 
unsolicited test offer on the women's views on their moral duties toward their 
offspring. These factors need to be analysed before the impact of an unsolicited 
prenatal screening offer on women's reproductive autonomy can be assessed. 
In order to gain more insight in the impact of the women's ethical principles 
and beliefs on decision making we developed a qualitative study within a 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) that aimed to assess the decision making 
process of women when confronted with a prenatal screening test offer. The 
RCT was carried out at the VU Medical Centre between May 2001 and April 
2004. It consisted in two research groups, being offered a Nuchal Translucency 
Measurement (NTM) for DS or a Maternal Serum Screening Test (MST) for DS and 
NTD and one control group that received normal care at that moment in the 
Netherlands (no offer). 
Data collection took place at five different times: before a screening test 
was offered (T1); during decision making (T2); after the screening result was 
known or at a comparable point in time when screening was denied (T3); in the 
last trimester of pregnancy (T4) and within two months after delivery (T5). A 
subgroup of participants of the RCT randomly was selected for participating in 
the qualitative study. These participants received an extra open-ended 
questionnaire at T1, T4 en T5. Some participants were approached for 
participating in a face to face semi-structured interview during the process of 
decision making (T2). 
All questionnaires included questions about the women's ethical view on the 
control of the offspring's characteristics and abortion. In questionnaire T4 we 
included additional questions about their feelings regarding the test offer and 
the decision they made. In questionnaire T5 we asked which decision they 
would make in a next pregnancy and the reasons for their decision. In this 
questionnaire some items on the meaning of prenatal screening within the 
parental reproductive duties and rights were included. 
As this thesis was aimed at exploring the ethical aspects of decision making 
of women to whom a prenatal screening test was offered, only data from 
women in the intervention group were used. 
Chapter 1 (introduction) provides an overview of the factors that come to 
the fore in debates about the desirability of expanding the offer of prenatal 
screening to all pregnant women independent of their age and their family and 
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personal medical history. The methodology and outline of the thesis are 
described. 
Chapter 2 explores the impact of the women's ethical views and beliefs on 
decision making. Contrary to the most accepted view, we found that choices 
about prenatal screening were not primarily driven by the women's ethical 
views. Participants' choices where mainly related to: the reassurance provided 
by the screening; the emotional consequences of further decisions regarding 
invasive diagnostic and abortion; and their view of a life with DS together with 
personal considerations about the acceptability of abortion in case of DS 
together with the expected burdens of a disabled child on their family and their 
own life perspective. All these considerations shape together the final decision. 
Participants mentioned ethical principles as support for their decision. 
Remarkably acceptors and decliners reported the same moral principles. These 
findings suggest that ethical beliefs might perform an instrumental role as 
normative reasons, being brought into play in order to give a moral justification 
to the women's reproductive preferences regarding the place of a disabled child 
in their lives. 
One of the ethical considerations that were mentioned both by acceptors 
and decliners was the moral duty to respect nature without controlling the 
outcomes of pregnancy. In chapter 3 we explored what women exactly mean 
when they appeal to nature and the impact of those considerations on decision 
making. Contrary to theoretical debates we found that appeals to the moral 
authority of nature do not provide pn'mo facie justification for (not) controlling 
or intervening in the outcomes of pregnancy. Both acceptors and decliners 
believed in an inherent morality in nature that must be respected. They 
welcome the possibility of knowing more about the health of the foetus and to 
make their own reproductive decisions. They also believed that parents ought 
to take an active part in the course of pregnancy by employing all the available 
means that can assure a healthy foetus. Concerns for the quality of their child's 
life and for their capacity to assure a good life for their family and disabled 
child appear to play a central role in the decision regarding the use of 
screening. 
Participants' appeals to nature might be interpreted as an expression of the 
difficulties women face when deciding about the acceptability and necessity of 
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testing. According to this interpretation "nature" refers to the women's views 
about the disabilities that ought to be accepted". Appeals to nature might also 
be associated with the women's assessment of the utility of prenatal screening 
for holding some control over the health of the foetus. In this sense "nature" 
refers to "that what is beyond our choice and control". 
The impact that an active and unsolicited offer of prenatal screening may 
have for women's autonomy is explored in chapter 4. The central question that 
is assessed in this chapter is: does an unsolicited prenatal screening offer 
impede women to make an autonomous decision in line with their ethical values 
and beliefs? In order to analyse this question we searched for the existence of 
both external pressures coming from family and social context and internal 
constrains such as feelings and expectations caused by the test offer, that may 
hinder rational decision making. From our results it became clear that support 
and approbation of close related persons might be seen as an important factor 
that help women to make well considered choices. Participants did not want to 
bear the responsibility of the consequences of their choice on their own. 
Therefore, they freely chose to involve their partner, family and friends in 
decision making. They also searched for the advice of their midwifery of 
gynaecologist. All participants reported that they freely made their own 
decision. These results indicate that the influence of other persons cannot be 
seen as an impediment for making an autonomous choice. On the contrary 
sharing their decision with other persons might enhance women's autonomy by 
helping them to assess the different options and to shape their ethical views 
regarding prenatal testing. Sharing the decision with important ones might also 
help participants to assess the conflicting feelings that they experienced during 
decision making. At one side they wanted to obtain assurance about the health 
of the foetus. At the other side they were unwilling to decide about its life. 
These conflicting feelings could be interpreted as a normal process in forming 
the women's personal view about the place of testing within their parental 
responsibilities. They may have an important role as tie-breakers helping to 
choose between options which rationally are considered to be equivalent. From 
the autonomy perspective, there is no reason to reduce the offer of prenatal 
screening. 
Based on the above results we propound a concept of autonomy that takes 
into consideration the relational aspects of the human existence and the impact 
of the social framework in which decisions take place. As our results show, the 
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involvement and consultation with relatives are important conditions for 
autonomous choices. 
Chapter 5 explores the conflicting feelings that participants experienced 
could be considered as the manifestation of a moral dilemma. The main 
question in this chapter is whether the offer of a prenatal screening test brings 
women in the difficult position to choose between two exclusive actions that 
they are morally required to do. Although, both acceptors and decliners 
described the choice as hard to make they were satisfied with their final choice 
and believed that their choice was the right one in their concrete 
circumstances. They did not report feelings of guilt and uncertainty that are 
characteristic of moral dilemmas. The conflict that participants experienced 
could be interpreted as the difficulty of assessing the significance of the testing 
within their personal and family circumstances. They found it hard to find the 
option that met either their moral views and the family and individual interests. 
Therefore, we conclude that women are not so much faced with an ethical 
dilemma as a conflict of interest. 
The above results indicate that the availability of prenatal screening 
compels women to review their moral beliefs about their responsibilities toward 
their offspring and to adapt them to the new technical possibilities. The 
concrete impact of the availability of testing on the women's views about their 
moral duties to the unborn and their family is explored in chapter 6. At issue is 
whether the availability of prenatal screening leads women to believe that they 
have a moral duty to accept testing. Results show that although participants 
felt responsible for the health of their child, they did not believe in an absolute 
moral duty to guarantee health, neither to avoid disability. A duty to test was 
formulated only when women had a high risk to get a disabled child. In this 
case, testing was described as a prudential measure to assure the health of the 
foetus. Still, participants claimed that further decisions always belong to the 
competency of the parents. The capacity for guaranteeing a good life both for 
their future child and their family appears to be a crucial factor in determining 
whether testing becomes morally obligatory. Participants who accepted 
screening and those who opposed to it agreed in the view that testing becomes 
necessary when the birth of a disabled child would stand in the way of the well 
being of their family. Participants' accounts suggest that the women's wish of 
providing the best possible life for their family might morally compel women to 
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make use of screening. When they expect that they will not be able to give a 
disabled child and their family the care and attention they need, then alone 
screening becomes imperative. 
Our finding that participants did not judge screening as moral obligatory 
might be related to the fact that prenatal screening was not part of normal 
prenatal care in the Netherlands during our study. The way in which parental 
duties are conceived might change over time if prenatal screening becomes a 
routine practice. In countries where prenatal screening is standard part of 
prenatal care, women's participation in testing is not always preceded by a 
conscious well considered decision. The impact of the medical and social 
framework on the ethical deliberation of pregnant women on accepting or 
declining a test offer is subject of further research. 
Chapter 7 illustrates at the hand of a case study the impact of the 
availability of prenatal screening on the way women shape their ethical views. 
This case illustrates the different considerations that shape women's choices 
regarding the acceptance of prenatal screening. It also reveals the importance 
of the interplay between the decisions regarding prenatal testing and the 
context in which choices are made. This interplay confirms the adequateness of 
a relational concept of autonomy for ethical deliberation regarding prenatal 
testing. 
Findings of this thesis suggest a clear need for a new ethical framework of 
thinking in reproductive decisions. Our results demonstrate that a context-
bounded ethics in which the moral responsibilities and duties that spring from 
the women's views about what constitutes a good life, would be more adequate 
to understand the decisions that women make in the practice. We propose a 
virtue centred model of ethical thinking for the decisions regarding prenatal 
testing. This model does not only include the women's moral views and values 
about the acceptability of quality control of the foetus. It also allows room for 
the attitudes and emotions of the women triggered by a test offer as well as for 
contextual influences from the medical practice and closed persons. The 
central question when deciding about testing is not "is testing against any 
ethical principle?" or "does testing harm anyone?" but "which decision would a 
good mother make in these circumstances?" 
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Translated to clinical practice, findings of this thesis suggest that every offer 
of prenatal screening testing should be timely done in order to give women the 
opportunity to discuss the offer with significant others (i.e. partner, friends and 
relatives). Caregivers should also care for the women's emotions when 
confronted with a test offer. Women should also be informed beforehand about 
the difficult decisions that a high screening result can lead to, as well about the 
different options to follow. For helping women to assess the meaning of testing 
within their parental duties, a test offer should not be limited to the 
communication of the technical characteristics of the screening and of the test 
results. Counselling should include discussion about the women's wishes, 
preferences and expectations regarding testing, their family situation, the 
women's thoughts about the life with a child with DS and their view on their 
commitments to their family. 
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De drijfveer achter deze studie is het ethische debat rond de uitbreiding van 
het aanbod van prenatale screening op het syndroom van Down (DS) en het 
neurale buisdefect (NBD) aan zwangere vrouwen die niet tot de risicogroepen 
behoren. 
In tegenstelling tot andere westerse landen was Nederland terughoudend ten 
aanzien van het beschikbaar stellen van de prenatale screening aan alle 
zwangere vrouwen. Screening maakte tot 2007 geen onderdeel uit van de 
prenatale zorg. Diagnostische tests, zoals de vlokkentest of de 
vruchtwaterpunctie, werden slechts aangeboden aan vrouwen met een 
verhoogde kans op de geboorte van een gehandicapt kind, door hogere leeftijd 
(36 jaar of ouder) of op basis van erfelijke belasting. Het was wettelijk niet 
toegestaan om risico schattingstests of algemene informatie over deze tests te 
verstrekken aan vrouwen buiten deze risicogroepen. Sinds januari 2007 is dit 
beleid veranderd. 
Als onderdeel van de zwangerschapszorg worden thans zorgverleners geacht alle 
zwangere vrouwen te vragen of zij informatie wensen over de prenatale 
screening. Vrouwen die dit wensen krijgen zowel schriftelijke als mondelinge 
informatie over de beschikbare screening en diagnostische tests, waarbij de 
vrijwillige deelname aan deze tests wordt benadrukt. De kosten van deze tests 
worden echter alleen vergoed voor vrouwen die tot een risicogroep behoren. 
Eén van de voornaamste bezwaren van de Nederlandse overheid tegen het 
invoeren van een landelijk programma voor prenatale screening op aangeboren 
afwijkingen was de negatieve impact die het testaanbod zou hebben op 
enerzijds de reproductieve autonomie van zwangeren en anderzijds op hun 
ethische besluitvorming. 
Centraal in het Nederlandse debat stond de vraag of vrouwen die 
geconfronteerd worden met een ongevraagd testaanbod in staat zouden zijn 
een vrije keuze te maken in overeenstemming met hun persoonlijke morele 
waarden en opvattingen, of dat zij daarentegen onder druk worden gezet om 
een bepaalde keuze te maken, waardoor zij in een ethisch dilemma terecht 
komen. Het debat draait dus om de vraag of vrouwen aan wie de test wordt 
aangeboden erin slagen de betekenis van prenatale testen binnen hun morele 
opvattingen over hun plichten ten opzichte van hun kinderen te plaatsen. 
Tevens is het van belang te bezien of zij de testen binnen hun concept van wat 
goed leven is weten te interpreteren. 
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In dit proefschrift wordt een antwoord gezocht op bovenstaande vragen en deze 
worden nader besproken. De meerderheid van de studies naar de redenen van 
vrouwen voor het wel of niet laten verrichten van een prenatale test richt zich 
op de invloed die psychische, sociale en emotionele factoren op de 
besluitvorming hebben. Over de rol die morele opvattingen spelen in het 
beslissingsproces van vrouwen is weinig bekend. 
Welke morele normen worden in beschouwing genomen bij de besluitvorming 
over de prenatale screening? Wat is de concrete rol van de ethische waarden en 
opvattingen die de vrouw heeft, gesteld dat deze een rol spelen? Wat is de 
impact van een ongevraagd testaanbod op de visie van vrouwen op hun morele 
plichten ten opzichte van hun kinderen? Deze vragen moeten worden 
beantwoord alvorens het concrete effect van de prenatale screening op de 
autonomie van de vrouwen kan worden bepaald. 
Teneinde meer inzicht te krijgen in de rol van de morele waarden en 
opvattingen van vrouwen in de besluitvorming omtrent het gebruik van 
prenatale screening, ontwikkelden wij een kwalitatieve studie binnen een 
groter onderzoeksproject. In het grote project werd gewerkt met een 
gerandomiseerde gecontroleerde trial (RCT). De RCT richtte zich op 
onderzoeksvragen betreffende de risicoperceptie, de besluitvorming, en het 
psychische welbevinden van zwangere vrouwen die wel of geen prenatale 
screening kregen aangeboden. De RCT werd uitgevoerd bij het VU Medisch 
Centrum in de periode van mei 2001 tot april 2004. Hij bestond uit twee 
interventiegroepen die een vorm van prenatale screening kregen aangeboden: 
een Nekplooimeting (NTD) of een Maternale serumtest (MST). Daarnaast was er 
nog een derde groep die bij wijze van controle de gebruikelijke zorg op dat 
moment in Nederland kreeg (dus geen testaanbod). Dataverzameling vond 
plaats middels vragenlijsten die de deelnemers op vijf tijdstippen tijdens de 
zwangerschap ontvingen: voordat prenatale screening werd aangeboden (T1); 
gedurende de besluitvorming (T2); nadat de uitslag van de test bekend was of 
op een vergelijkbaar tijdstipt voor vrouwen die niet op aanbod ingingen (T3); 
tijdens het laatste trimester van de zwangerschap (T4); en twee maanden na de 
bevalling (T5). Voor de kwalitatieve studie selecteerden wij via randomisatie 
een subgroep van de deelnemers van de RCT. Deelnemers aan deze studie 
ontvingen een extra vragenlijst op T1, T4 en T5. Sommige deelnemers werden 
willekeurig benaderd voor een semi-gestructureerd interview gedurende de 
besluitvorming (T2). 
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Alle vragenlijsten bestonden uit open vragen over de morele opvattingen van de 
vrouwen over de controle van de eigenschappen van hun nageslacht en over 
abortus. Vragenlijst T4 bevatte extra vragen over de visie en gevoelens van de 
vrouwen naar aanleiding van het testaanbod en hun eigen beslissing. 
In vragenlijst T5 vroegen wij naar de beslissing die deelnemers zouden maken in 
een eventuele volgende zwangerschap en naar de redenen voor hun beslissing. 
In deze vragenlijst werden ook stellingen over de betekenis van prenatale 
screening voor de reproductieve plichten en rechten toegevoegd. 
Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel het onderzoeken van de ethische aspecten van 
besluitvorming over prenatale screening. Daarom werden alleen data van 
vrouwen uit de interventiegroepen gebruikt. 
Hoofdstuk 1 (Inleiding) geeft een overzicht van de factoren die op de voorgrond 
treden in de debatten over de wenselijkheid van de uitbreiding van het aanbod 
van prenatale screening aan alle zwangere vrouwen, ongeacht hun leeftijd en 
hun familiare, persoonlijke en medische geschiedenis. De methodologie en de 
hoofdlijnen van het proefschrift worden beschreven. 
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de invloed van de morele opvattingen van de vrouwen 
op de besluitvorming. In tegenstelling tot de meest gebruikelijke zienswijze 
wijzen de resultaten van ons onderzoek erop dat vrouwen niet met ethische 
overwegingen worstelen bij de besluitvorming over prenatale screening. De 
keuze van deelnemers was gerelateerd aan de volgende factoren: het 
verschaffen van geruststelling door prenatale screening; de emotionele last die 
gepaard gaat met verdere beslissingen over invasieve tests of abortus; de 
persoonlijke visie op wat het leven met een kind met DS inhoudt; de 
persoonlijke overwegingen over de aanvaardbaarheid van abortus in geval van 
DS; en de verwachte (over)belasting die een gehandicapt kind het gezin en hun 
eigen levensperspectieven zou geven. Deze genoemde factoren geven vorm aan 
de definitieve beslissing. Zowel de vrouwen die ingingen op het 
screeningsaanbod als degenen die het afwezen, rechtvaardigden hun keuze met 
dezelfde morele principes. Op basis van deze bevindingen concluderen wij dat 
morele principes een instrumentele rol spelen door als normatieve redenen op 
te treden. Deze redenen worden namelijk ingezet als een morele 
rechtvaardiging achteraf van de reproductieve voorkeuren van de ouders met 
betrekking tot de plaats van een gehandicapt kind in hun leven. 
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Een van de overwegingen die werd genoemd door zowel vrouwen die op het 
screeningsaanbod ingingen als door vrouwen die het screeningsaanbod afwezen, 
was de morele plicht om de natuur te volgen zonder de uitkomsten van de 
zwangerschap te controleren. In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken wij nader wat 
vrouwen precies bedoelen als ze zich beroepen op de natuur en welke invloed 
deze overweging heeft op de besluitvorming. Wij vonden, In tegenstelling tot de 
visie die naar voren komt in ethische debatten, dat de erkenning van een 
moreel gezag in de natuur geen prima facie argument is om het natuurlijk 
beloop van de zwangerschap te controleren en/of hier in te grijpen. Zowel 
vrouwen die ingingen op het screeningsaanbod en vrouwen die dit afwezen 
geloofden in een normatief karakter dat in de natuur besloten ligt en dus 
gerespecteerd dient te worden. Anderzijds waren ze van mening dat ouders een 
actieve rol kunnen en dienen te spelen in het beloop van de zwangerschap 
teneinde een gezonde foetus te waarborgen. De verwijzing van deelnemers naar 
het morele en normatieve gezag van de natuur kan worden gezien als een uiting 
van de moeilijkheden die vrouwen ervaren bij de beslissing over leed dat moet 
worden voorkomen. Volgens deze uitleg kan "natuur" geïnterpreteerd worden 
als de handicaps die volgens de opvatting van de vrouwen moeten worden 
geaccepteerd. Het doen van een beroep op het morele gezag van de natuur kan 
echter ook worden gekoppeld aan de waarde die de vrouw gaf aan het nut van 
prenatale screening om enige controle te kunnen uitoefenen over de natuurlijke 
uitkomsten van de zwangerschap. In deze context is 'natuur' dat wat buiten 
onze controle en keuze ligt. 
In hoofdstuk 4 behandelen wij de impact van een ongevraagd aanbod van 
prenatale screening op de autonomie van de vrouwen. De centrale vraag die in 
dit hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht is of een screeningsaanbod zwangeren 
belemmert een autonome beslissing te nemen die in overeenstemming is met 
hun eigen morele waarden en opvattingen. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden 
keken wij naar de aanwezigheid van druk vanuit de omgeving en de gevoelens 
of twijfels die door het screeningsaanbod worden veroorzaakt en die de 
mogelijkheid van een autonome besluitvorming in de weg staan of kunnen 
beperken. Uit de resultaten werd duidelijk dat naasten een ondersteunende rol 
spelen in de besluitvorming over het verrichten van een prenatale screening. 
Deelnemers wilden de verantwoordelijkheid van de gevolgen van hun beslissing 
niet alleen dragen. Daarom kozen ze ervoor om samen met hun partner te 
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beslissen en hun keuze te delen met hun geliefden, ook als die niet rechtstreeks 
betrokken waren bij het besluitvormingsproces. Ze zochten ook de steun van 
familie en vrienden en het advies van hun verloskundige of gynaecoloog. 
Deelnemers rapporteerden dat zij vrij hadden besloten. Op basis hiervan kan de 
invloed van derden niet worden gezien als een belemmering voor het maken van 
een autonome keuze. Integendeel, het delen van de beslissing met anderen kan 
de autonomie van de vrouwen vergroten door hen te helpen de verschillende 
opties te beoordelen en vorm te geven aan hun visie over prenatale tests. De 
steun en advies van derden kan helpen vrouwen om een plek te geven aan de 
tegenstrijdige gevoelens die zij ervoeren tijdens het besluitproces. Aan de ene 
kant verlangden zij meer te weten over de gezondheid van de foetus. Aan de 
andere kant wilden zij liever geen beslissing nemen over het leven van hun 
foetus. Deze tegenstrijdige gevoelens kunnen worden gezien als een normaal 
proces in de vorming van hun persoonlijk standpunt over de plaats van 
prenatale tests binnen hun ouderlijke verantwoordelijkheden. In het geval van 
onzekerheid en twijfel kunnen deze gevoelens beslissend zijn bij de keuze 
tussen opties die rationeel als gelijkwaardig worden beschouwd. Vanuit het 
perspectief van de autonomie is er dus geen reden, om het aanbod van 
prenatale screening te beperken. 
Op basis van de bovenstaande resultaten stellen wij een concept van autonomie 
voor dat meer recht doet aan de interdependentie en de relationele aspecten 
van het menselijke bestaan, waarmee wordt erkend, zoals onze resultaten 
aanduiden, dat betrokkenheid en overleg met naasten belangrijke voorwaarden 
zijn voor autonome beslissingen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de mogelijke tegenstrijdige aspecten bij de 
besluitvorming met het doel te analyseren of vrouwen aan wie een test wordt 
aangeboden in een ethisch dilemma terechtkomen. Hoewel beide groepen 
(degenen die wel en degenen die geen test kiezen) de keuze als moeilijk 
beschreven, waren beiden positief over hun beslissing. Zij waren ook van 
mening dat zij de juiste beslissing hadden genomen binnen hun concrete 
omstandigheden. Zij vermeldden geen schuldgevoelens of onzekerheid; 
kenmerkende gevoelens voor ethische dilemma's. Het conflict dat deelnemers 
ondervonden kan worden geïnterpreteerd als de moeilijkheid om de betekenis 
van testen binnen hun persoonlijke en gezinsomstandigheden te bepalen. Het is 
namelijk moeilijk te bepalen wat het meest in overeenstemming is met zowel 
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de eigen morele waarden en opvattingen als met het eigenbelang en het belang 
van hun gezin. Daarom concluderen wij dat de vrouwen niet zozeer terecht 
komen in een ethisch dilemma maar in een belangenconflict. 
De bovenstaande resultaten suggereren dat de mogelijkheid om een prenatale 
screening te doen, vrouwen ertoe aanzet hun morele opvattingen over hun 
verantwoordelijkheden ten opzichte van hun nageslacht te herzien en deze aan 
te passen aan de nieuwe technische mogelijkheden. 
De concrete invloed van prenatale screening op de manier hoe vrouwen hun 
morele verantwoordelijkheden ten opzichte van hun kinderen invullen, wordt 
onderzocht in hoofdstuk 6. De centrale vraag is of de beschikbaarheid van 
prenataal onderzoek vrouwen doet geloven dat ze een morele plicht hebben om 
op het testaanbod in te gaan. Vrouwen voelen zich verantwoordelijk voor de 
gezondheid van hun kind. Zij geloven echter niet dat zij een absolute morele 
plicht hebben om de gezondheid van hun kind te verzekeren, noch om 
beperkingen te voorkomen. Het testen werd alleen als een plicht ervaren in 
geval van een verhoogd risico op de geboorte van een gehandicapt kind. In dat 
geval werd het testen beschreven als een zorgvuldigheidsmaatregel om de 
gezondheid van de foetus te bevestigen. Toch stelden de deelnemers dat 
verdere beslissingen in deze altijd tot de bevoegdheid van de ouders behoort. 
Het vermogen van vrouwen om een goed leven te garanderen, zowel aan hun 
gezin als aan hun toekomstige kind, lijkt een beslissende factor te zijn bij de 
bepaling of vrouwen zich moreel verplicht voelen zich te laten testen. Zowel 
deelnemers die een screeningstest hadden gedaan als degenen die het 
screeningsaanbod hadden afgewezen, waren het met elkaar eens dat testen 
noodzakelijk wordt zodra de geboorte van een gehandicapt kind een 
belemmering zou betekenen voor het welzijn van hun gezin. De wens om het 
best mogelijke leven aan hun gezin te geven kan wel een morele druk op 
vrouwen uitoefenen om toch de screening te gebruiken. Wanneer zij denken dat 
ze hun gezin geen goed leven kunnen waarborgen vanwege de extra zorg en 
aandacht die een gehandicapt kind vereist, dan en alleen dan, wordt het 
gebruik van een prenatale test als een morele plicht gezien. 
Onze bevinding dat vrouwen zich niet moreel verplicht voelden op het test 
aanbod in te gaan kan samenhangen met het feit dat prenatale screening geen 
normale procedure was in de prenatale zorg in Nederland tijdens onze studie. 
De wijze waarop ouderlijke plichten worden gezien kan veranderen zodra 
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prenatale tests een routine praktijk worden. In landen waar prenatale screening 
al lang onderdeel is van de standaard prenatale zorg wordt het laten doen van 
een prenatale test niet meer voorafgegaan door een bewuste weloverwogen 
keuze. Het testen is meer iets dat erbij hoort. 
De concrete impact van de medische en sociale context op de ethische 
besluitvorming van zwangeren bij het accepteren of weigeren van een 
testaanbod is onderwerp van nader onderzoek. 
Aan de hand van een cose study illustreert hoofdstuk 7 het effect van het 
beschikbaar stellen van prenatale screening op de morele opvattingen van 
vrouwen. Deze case study laat de overwegingen die vorm geven aan de 
beslissing over het gebruik van prenatale screening duidelijk zien. Dit hoofdstuk 
laat de samenhang zien die er bestaat tussen de beslissingen over prenatale 
tests en de context waarin deze beslissingen worden genomen. 
Bevindingen uit dit proefschrift suggereren een duidelijke noodzaak van een 
hernieuwde ethische benadering voor beslissingen binnen de voortplanting. 
Onze resultaten tonen aan dat een contextgebonden ethiek waarbinnen de 
morele plichten en verantwoordelijkheden die voortvloeien uit de visie van 
vrouwen over wat het goede leven inhoudt geschikter zou zijn om de 
besluitvorming over prenatale screening beter te begrijpen. Wij pleiten voor 
een deugd gecentreerd model voor de ethische analyse van de besluitvorming 
omtrent prenatale tests.Dit model omvat namelijk niet alleen de morele 
opvattingen en waarden van de vrouwen over de aanvaardbaarheid van de 
controle van de kwaliteit van de foetus. Het deugd gecentreerde model biedt 
bovendien ruimte aan zowel de emoties die door een testaanbod worden 
veroorzaakt als de invloed vanuit de medische praktijk en de dichtstbijzijnde 
personen. De centrale vraag bij een afweging over de verschillende 
alternatieven bij prenatale screening is dan niet "gaat het gebruik van een test 
in tegen een ethische norm of principe?" of "schaadt de test iemand? maar 
"welke beslissing zou een goede moeder nemen in deze concrete 
omstandigheden?" 
Uit de bevindingen van dit proefschrift volgt dat ieder aanbod van prenatale 
screening voortijdig moet worden gedaan om vrouwen de gelegenheid te geven 
met belangrijke personen in hun sociale context te kunnen overleggen (partner, 
vriend(inn)en en familiekring). Zorgverleners zouden aandacht moeten geven 
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aan de emoties van de vrouwen wanneer zij met een testaanbod worden 
geconfronteerd. Het is ook van belang vrouwen vooraf te informeren over de 
moeilijke beslissingen die een verhoogd risico met zich meebrengt, evenals over 
de verschillende opties waartussen zij kunnen kiezen. Indien vrouwen geholpen 
moeten worden om de betekenis van prenatale tests voor hun ouderlijke 
verantwoordelijkheden te bepalen, dient een testaanbod meer gericht te zijn 
op de morele afweging van de vrouwen en niet slechts op de technische en 
medische details van de test en de testuitslagen. Counseling dient gericht te 
zijn op de volgende aspecten: de wensen, voorkeuren en verwachtingen van 
vrouwen met betrekking tot het testen; hun gezinssituatie; hun gedachten over 
het leven met een kind met DS; hun visie op hun verplichtingen ten aanzien van 
het ongeboren kind en haar bestaande kinderen; en hun visie over hun 
verantwoordelijkheden ten opzichte van het voorkomen van handicaps. 
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